



Beyond the State – Local Politics in Afghanistan

Symposium

Bonn, Center for
Development Research (ZEF)

26–28 February 2009

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University of Bonn



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Symposium

“Beyond the State – Local Politics in Afghanistan”

Final Report

Hafiz Boboyorov, Henrik Poos, Conrad Schetter

The academic symposium *Beyond the State – Local Politics in Afghanistan* was a unique attempt to bring researchers together who are experts on various facets of local politics in Afghanistan. In total about 50 academics and practitioners discussed 22 papers in three days. The participants stemmed from different academic backgrounds such as anthropology, history, sociology, geography, political sciences, linguistics as well as regional studies. Due to the submission of the papers beforehand, most of the time during the symposium was spent with discussions, which revealed certain controversies as well as new paths of academic thinking on local politics in Afghanistan.

The core idea of this symposium was to generate an overview of the state of the art of local politics in Afghanistan and, hereby, to identify common ground as well as diverging standpoints among the academic community. During the symposium aspects of local politics on the theoretical level (e.g. labelling, categorization) as well as particular case studies were intensively discussed. Due to the highly volatile security situation in the South and the Southeast of the country, most of the presented case studies on local politics originated from the north-east Afghanistan. While this limits the realm of generalized statements about local politics in Afghanistan, the presented case studies unclothe a huge variety of themes – ranging from studies on particular individuals to the macro-level (village, ethnic group etc.). Especially the balance of power between the local arena and the state was time and again discussed. While the symposium was structured in five panels a) *Local Politics in Afghan History*, b) *Resources of Livelihoods*, c) *Worldview and Identities*, d) *Physical Violence* and e) *Reconstruction and Local Politics*, this report does not intend to discuss the contents panel-wise, as all papers of the panels are available. Much more this report intends to reveal the main strands of discussions which often enough cross-cut the five panels of the symposium.

1) Categorization

One main strand of the discussion circulated around the question of how local dynamics can be understood, defined as well as categorized from an academic point of view. Here the discussion revolved around the concern that any categorization does not only imply a simplification and generalization, but inherently includes the peril of a biased view.

a) Labelling

The continuous discussion arose about the advantages and disadvantages of using terms such as ‘warlord’ and ‘Taliban’ to define certain groups of actors. Many participants highlighted that these terms encompass actors who inherit very subjective and individual characteristics which they express in different contexts and, thus, cannot be covered by overarching categories. Moreover, some participants underlined that especially current politics are using these both terms to deem individuals illegitimate or hostile towards the rebuilding process. Another label which was strongly discussed due to its biased notion was

'corruption'. Here the discussion revealed that the references of this term in international circles are diverging from the Afghan ones. It was pointed out that many Afghans differentiate between graft and corruption. Hereby they understand the latter as 'the stealing of money', while the first is seen as common procedure. While this discussion on labelling underlines how significant it is to reflect the discursive constructions of social categories, some participants argued that there is the ultimate need of such categories to describe and to compare social realities. So the category of 'warlord or the related concept of *qumondon* – even if they are diffuse and biased – are crucial to describe the omnipresence of physical, non-state organized violence as a source of political legitimacy.

b) 'Culture of Violence'

Referring to the labels of 'warlord' and 'Taliban' clarified that the complexity of actors controlling means of physical violence is much larger. Hereby the question arose to what extent a 'culture of violence' can be assumed for Afghanistan. Especially, the rare existence of peaceful role-models in the Afghan society was pointed out by some participants. However, it was argued against the term 'culture of violence' that this label is too broad and goes into the wrong direction. Thus one always has to ask which form of violence is used for which purpose. Moreover, violence has to be distinguished from the exertion of control. Also a difference has to be made between violence which is perceived by the people as legitimate and the abuse of violence.

Some attendees mentioned that also the medial perception of violence has to be borne in mind. While the media are covering the ongoing contestation between ISAF and Taliban, communal and localized violence (about land or other resources, family conflicts, revenge killings and kidnappings) which is causing by far more casualties than the aforementioned war is often not taken into consideration at all.

c) Ethnicity

Also the fuzziness of ethnic categories which are politically of high relevance was disputed during the symposium. So it was confirmed once more that the term *qawm* which is used as an overall category for self-referential group remains blurred due to it refers to any kind of social belonging.

Further, the blurring of ethnic notions was intensively discussed. So it was stressed that the process of self-identification with a certain ethnic label often enough diverges from the already established characteristics of this particular ethnic group. This was illustrated on the example of the Baluch in Northeastern Afghanistan. They established a self-definition which builds on certain cultural characteristics which diverge from the ones of the Baluchs in Southwestern Afghanistan. The ethnic self-understanding was, moreover, discussed on the notion of *pashtunwali*. Quite contrarily to its idealization and essentialization by earlier ethnographers, the fuzziness of this term was pointed out during the discussion. Depending on the context the term *pashtunwali* invokes different meanings; moreover, it was stressed that the term among many Pashtun communities (esp. in the South) was even unknown. In both cases, the one of the Baluch as well the one of the *pashtunwali*, the politicization of ethnicity was discussed: The current construction of an overall Baluchi identity in order to increase their influence on national politics neglects that various groups which are calling themselves Baluch have only the ethnonym, but not any joint cultural heritage in common. With regard to the *pashtunwali* it was mentioned that this term was first introduced by Pashtun intellectuals in Kabul in the 1930s to inspire the Afghan nation-building process. Other case studies presented during this symposium underlined how even sportive and

aesthetic issues such as *buzkashi* and poetry became time and again politicized and are used as vehicles to express certain power relationships.

2) State and Local Politics

The role of the state in local politics was continuously discussed during the symposium. Much discussion revolved around the question to what extent the rules of the state can be distinguished from the ones of the society. Most of the participants agreed that the Afghan state has to be understood as an integral part of the local social order, and not as a completely separated institutional body following modern rules. Although some participants argued with the fraction and distance between the local and the highly centralized state apparatus, others demonstrated with concrete examples that local and state politics are strongly interwoven. Especially, patron-client networks were identified as dominant mechanisms at least in Northeastern Afghanistan which shape politics from the top to the bottom and vice versa – regardless of a distinction between state and society. This discussion, of course, brought up the core question of to what extent bearing a Weberian understanding of the state in mind when it comes to understanding local politics in Afghanistan makes sense at all. Moreover, the question about the balance of power between the state and local elites was raised. So, it was discussed, to what extent the state is co-opting local elites in the current situation or if it is the other way round, which means that local elites are co-opting the state.

Another controversy arose about the question to what extent ethnicity shapes the interaction between the state and the local level. Some participants argued strongly that ethnicity has always shaped politics on every level in Afghanistan. The integration of local elites who represent non-Pashtuns into the state apparatus was continuously used as a technique to isolate them from their communities for the sake of the central state. While the pro-Pashtun politics of the Afghan state in pre-war times were not denied during the symposium, some participants underlined that the co-optation of local elites was rather guided by the attempt of the state to impose its rule in the countryside than by Pashtun nationalism.

3) Local versus global

During the symposium the impact of trans-national influence on local politics was highlighted. It was agreed that not only the centre-periphery relationship, but also the trans-national level should be included to sketch political processes. Hereby the participants agreed to understand the local as an arena of political action which is interwoven in manifold ways with the national and the global scale and should not be understood as an encapsulated unit. The discussions highlighted that in several regions of Afghanistan transnational drug trafficking as well as labour migration have a strong impact on local politics.

a) Narcotics

The ‘trans-nationality’ of the drug-system or the ‘globalisation of drug-trade’ stimulated a shift in centre-periphery relationships in Afghanistan: Especially in the border areas to neighbouring countries new trans-boundary networks emerged which hamper any efforts of counter-narcotic strategies by the Afghan government as well as the international community. Some discussants brought up the positive impact of the drug economy. So households which are involved in the drug economy show visible signs of an improvement of their livelihoods. Moreover, it was stated that former drug-entrepreneurs are, today, aiming to diversify their economic activities at least into the ‘grey sector’ of the markets.

Moreover, they offer services to their local clients and hereby gain reputation as well as control over local communities. However, some participants pointed out that – despite undeniable ‘pro-poor’-effects – one should not forget that the narcotic industry is a ‘criminal economy’. Especially when talking about social order one should bear in mind that the drug-economy rests on the ‘brutal politics of capital accumulation’.

In this line a discussion about the inter-linkage between the drug economy and violence emerged. The argument was made that the drug-economy does not necessarily produce violent conflicts, neither on the local level nor between central and local actors. Narcotic entrepreneurs have a general interest in stability and predictability – as long as the poppy economy is not hampered. This assumption, of course, contradicts the international perception which states that poppy cultivation is necessarily interlinked with bad governance. Despite the high decentralization of the drug economy, it was mentioned that a joint extraction regime has emerged in Afghanistan which includes actors on the local as well as on different state levels. The participants concluded that the Afghan state will hardly be able to fight the drug economy, as long as these actors, especially within the government, benefit from it.

b) Labour Migrants

It was stressed during the symposium that research should give much more attention to the impact of labour migration on local politics. Without any doubts labour migrants and their financial remittances have a huge impact on the social fabric of local communities. In today’s livelihood strategies of Afghan families one or more sons are sent – at least seasonally – abroad to generate the necessary economic resources which are needed to cover the living expenses of the family. Here, the generally assumed high degree of spatial mobility and flexibility of Afghans which stems from cultural as well as historical experiences (e.g. nomadism, refugee movement) are seen as advantages for adapting to labour migration. However, labour migration does not only have an impact on local living standards, but it even changes power relations due to the inflow of external resources. Several case studies show that especially those elites who continuously receive remittances or other external rents (e.g. from NGOs) are the ones who are able to get involved full-time in local politics. However it was also stressed that many countries (Gulf states, Iran etc.) might send Afghan labour migrants back home due to the current global economic crisis. This of course engulfs the risk of the deterioration of living conditions as well as of conflict situations in Afghanistan.

4) The Taliban Movement

Discussing the inter-linkages between ‘the local’ and ‘the global’, of course, light was shed on the characteristics of today’s Taliban movement. Generally, it was discussed during the symposium if the Taliban can be considered a local, s a trans-national or even a global movement or phenomenon. Certain aspects like its funding, arms-supply and external political support can be defined as ‘flows from outside’, which bolsters the argument that the Taliban are a trans-national movement. However, it was argued that their political actions are limited to certain regions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While the Taliban and al-Qaida have a common purpose, it was also stated that the recruitment of Afghans into the networks of global terrorism ‘is still zero’. Despite the trans-national shape of this movement, some participants stressed the heterogeneous character of the Taliban. So the Taliban appear in many places as a localized movement. Afghans often differentiate between local (Afghan) Taliban and ‘the Taliban’ movement. Members of the latter are sometimes considered *kafir*-Muslims.

One topic addressed during the symposium relating to the actual state of the Taliban movement was its ability to gain legitimacy among the population. By resting on coercion and punishment, the Taliban were without any doubt able to establish a certain order within local communities prior to 2001. However, they are also widely perceived as a 'freedom movement' which aims to liberate Afghanistan from foreign occupation. Moreover, as an important factor for gaining legitimacy, the Taliban offer a system of civil administration and services to local communities – even if these services mostly refer to their understanding of justice. Hereby they take over functions usually performed by state institutions which are in many cases not existing at all or perceived as illegitimate. Lastly, the Taliban often enough integrate local leaders into their own political structures and provide the communities with a certain leeway for self-governance. However, the notion of self-governance as provided by the Taliban also stimulated controversies among the participants of the symposium. So it was stated that the Taliban are limiting self-governance only to a degree which is useful for them. Some participants underlined the necessity of awareness to romanticizing portrays of the Taliban movement.

In this context a very lively discussion about the heterogeneity of 'the Taliban' arose. Some participants stated that 'no political movement is homogenous', a characteristic which already featured the 1990s' Taliban. However, the discussions revolved around the ongoing change of the structures and characteristics of the Taliban since 2001. The emphasis on a differentiation between the 'Old Taliban' and the 'New Taliban' highlighted the internal dynamics and the actual changes of the movement. The 'New Taliban' have changed their strategies, were able to tighten their local networks and professionalized their propaganda machine. They, moreover, succeed in providing security to local communities and, in turn, in mobilizing support from them. In this way, they show competence by using various strategies and by integrating different strands of actors, which distinguishes them from the Taliban of the 1990s.

5) Local Communities

Despite the general picture of anarchy and chaos, which is drawn in the media and the policy arena, all participants agreed that an institutional vacuum does not exist in localities in which state structures are weak or absent. Several papers during the symposium highlighted the rich and complex modes of local institutions in place, especially in resource management and conflict resolution. Comparative case studies from Northern Afghanistan, moreover, underlined that local institutional settings did not change dramatically during wartimes.

However, it still remained an open question during the symposium how to define local communities in Afghanistan. All participants agreed that communities can hardly be understood as natural, primordial entities or as territorial units. Much more attention should be paid to the network structures in Afghan society. The mutual relationships between local elites and their constituencies can rarely be territorialized. In this respect research should pronounce whether they are using the term 'community' to describe a certain arena or a process of political mobilization.

a) Role of Middlemen

The role of middlemen for bridging the gap between the local and external actors (e.g. state, NGOs) was intensively discussed during the symposium. Especially, it was pointed out that intermediaries, on the one side, are often enough controlling local communities, but are, on the other side, obliged to provide services to their constituencies to gain legitimacy.

Interestingly enough, the presented case studies during the symposium underline that the scope of action of middlemen is not guided by the difference between state and non-state actors, but much more by the gravity of power. Thus, they do not necessarily approach the local administration, but activate their relationships to strong commanders or central state authorities when it is needed. Hereby they often bypass the pyramidal structure of the government administration. These practices of political networking explain, why local elites from remote regions (such as Wakhan) are – despite the geographical distance – well connected to the central government. These interactions between peripheries and the political center become especially strong when the option of resource extraction is high. Hereb, the opium economy and drug trafficking transformed remote border areas (e.g. in Badakhshan) into pivotal regions of economic interest.

b) Legitimacy of Local Structures

During the symposium a controversy arose around the question to what extent these local institutional settings can be regarded as legitimate. Some participants argued that all institutions which can be found on the local level have to be understood as legitimate in the eyes of the local population. Hereby the political recommendation was made that the state's presence on the local level should be reduced as much as possible to overcome its 'legitimacy crisis' which derives from endemic corruption, nepotism and the dis-functionality of the state. In this line of argument it was, furthermore, mentioned that the 'legitimacy crisis' of the post-Taliban government is deeply rooted in the historical evolution of the Afghan state itself. The institutionalisation of kinship and ethnic hierarchy as the principals of state formation in pre-war times was adopted for the post-Taliban state-building process supported by the international community. Therefore, some participants favoured a systemic change of the political architecture in Afghanistan by empowering local communities and their informal self-governance institutions. The *shura-ye qaawmi* [local gatherings] were highlighted as a traditional mechanism which is able to solve local conflicts not only effectively but also in a participatory manner.

In contrast to this perspective, other participants emphasised the complex realities which shape politics on the central as well as on the local level. Various case studies presented during the colloquium highlighted that personal relationships between local strongmen and state authorities foreclosed the access of ordinary people to the state administration (e.g. for dispute resolution). These personified relations of elites survived on all political levels throughout the protracted wartimes. Moreover, it was stated that the inter-linkage between local communities and the state apparatus includes a non-defined room for manoeuvres. So often enough contingent parties follow a very pragmatic approach by addressing their problem to local elders, religious dignitaries as well as state representatives to see who can provide the most satisfying solution to a certain problem.

c) Outside Interventions

Several case studies underlined the role of middlemen in shaping the institutions of development programs as well as state politics in Afghanistan. Case studies about micro-credit programs, the National Solidarity Program (NSP) and the Kunduz River Basin Program (KRBP) showed that the relationships between local elites and external organizations are shaping the outcome of reconstruction projects. As a result, development projects often strengthen the position of local leadership in a non-intended way and so weaken the participation of local communities. Hereby local elites always have to redress the balance between the assertions of their own interests on the one hand and the interests of their constituencies and external actors on the other hand. In order to implement their

projects and to distribute their resources, external actors need to rely on intermediaries as the ones who are able 'to bridge something' – be they the 'few good men' with an un-corrupted reputation, local strongmen or Western educated elites. These middlemen emerge as the 'new elders' in local arenas. They are the ones who gain control over the channelling of the resource flow.

Taking these dynamics into consideration, some participants of the symposium critically reflected that the reconstruction approach contributed to a political fragmentation and to the emergence of new inequities and failed to strengthen participation and an equal improvement of conditions of livelihood. Hereby they drew on historical examples which underline that stability in Afghanistan has ever been gained by the creation of inequities.

Outlook

As this report shows, the symposium discussed different strands of local politics which reached from questions of academic conceptualization up to policy recommendations. Moreover, it became clear during the symposium that different political standpoints as well as different methodological approaches – field research, participatory observations, key informant interviews etc. – resulted in a diverging perception of local politics. Nevertheless all participants agreed on the rich variety of facets of local politics in Afghanistan which are too often neglected in the current phase of reconstruction and academic discourse about the latter and Afghanistan in general. Also the central argument of this symposium that social order on the local level always exists was bolstered by the papers as well as by the discussion. All participants agreed that a large deal of the current conflicts and problems which can be observed in Afghanistan derive from this ignorance of the qualitative dimension of the interplay of the Afghan state and the international community with local political structures.

Finally we like to emphasise that this symposium should not remain a unique event. The following steps are foreseen for future work on this topic:

- The papers which were contributed to this symposium will be published in an edited volume on "Local Politics in Afghanistan" due in late 2009. Hereby we hope to attract more attention in the public, in the policy-arena as well as in academia in order to deepen the understanding of local politics.
- The goal of this symposium was to get an overview of the academic state of the art. Against the background of the knowledge which was gained during the symposium, we envisage a policy oriented symposium on "Local Politics in Afghanistan", which should take place in 2010, as one of the next steps.
- On the conceptual level this symposium tested the significance of local politics in the very situation of a non-existent state. The idea is to widen the scope by comparing the structures of local politics in Afghanistan with the situation in other Central Asian countries. Therefore another conference is planned which is scheduled for 2010.

Lastly, we like to thank the *Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung*, the *Auswärtiges Amt* as well as the *Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* for their generous contributions to realize this symposium.

Program of the Symposium

“Beyond the State – Local Politics in Afghanistan”

Conference Venue
Center for Development Research (ZEF)
Ground floor, Walter-Flex Str. 3, 53313 Bonn

Thursday, 26 February 2009

	Welcome Lunch	12h00
Introduction		13h00
Opening Ceremony		
<i>Solvay Gerke</i> (ZEF, University of Bonn) Welcome		
<i>Conrad Schetter</i> (ZEF, University of Bonn) Local Politics – From a State-Oriented Approach to Social Order		
<i>Nazif Shahrani</i> (University of Indiana) Local Politics in Afghanistan		
	Coffee Break	14h30
Panel I		15h00
Local Politics in Afghan History		
<i>Thomas Barfield</i> (Boston University) Legal Pluralism and Legitimacy		
<i>Andreas Wilde</i> (ZEF, University of Bonn) The Role of Patronage in Local Politics in Early Twentieth Century Afghanistan – The case of Kunduz		
<i>Pierre Centlivres / Micheline Centlivres-Demont</i> (Université of Neufchatel) Local Policy Making in Northern Afghanistan in the Sixties and the Seventies		
<i>Whitney Azoy</i> (American Institute of Afghanistan Research) Politics, Social Order and Buzkashi		
<i>Katja Mielke</i> (ZEF, University of Bonn) Discussant		
<i>Conrad Schetter</i> (University of Bonn) Chair		
	Reception at the old city hall	19h00
	Dinner at “Em Höttche”	20h00

Friday, 27 February 2009

Panel II 10h00
Resources of Livelihood

Hermann Kreutzmann (Free University of Berlin)
Livelihood and Poverty Alleviation in the Afghan Wakhan

Usman Shah (Monash University, Melbourne/Victoria)
Bringing Order to the *Jangal*:
State Building and Social Water Management in the Kunduz River Basin

Erna Anderson (Winnipeg)
Informal and Formal Credit System as a Means to Understand Local Politics in Rural
Afghanistan

Jonathan Goodhand (School of Oriental and African Studies, London)
A Case Study of the Drug Economy on Shegnan, North East Afghanistan.
The Emergence of Social Order from the Margins?

In between Coffee Break

Iskandar Abdullaev (ZEF, University of Bonn)
Discussant

Tobias Debiel (INEF, University of Duisburg-Essen)
Chair

Lunch 13h00

Panel III 14h30
Worldviews and Identities

Bernt Glatzer (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Afghanistan, Schriesheim)
Pashtunwali – A Shared Mental Model for Local Decision Making?

Ingeborg Baldauf (Humboldt University, Berlin)
Identities and Local Politics – A Case Study from North Afghanistan

Lutz Rzehak (Humboldt University, Berlin)
Language and Local Identities in Nimruz

Omar Sharifi (American Institute of Afghanistan Research, Kabul)
Poetry and Identity in Afghanistan [paper only]

In between Coffee Break

Bernd Kuzmits (Foundation for Peace and Development, Bonn)
Discussant

Michael Daxner (University of Oldenburg and Free University Berlin)
Chair

Visit of the exhibition “Gandhara, the Buddhist Heritage of Pakistan”
in the Bundeskunsthalle 18h00

Dinner 19h30

Saturday, 28 February 2009

**Panel IV
Physical Violence**

9h00

Arne Strand (Christian-Michelsen Institute, Bergen, and
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo)
Local Conflicts and Locally Based Solutions [paper only]

Antonio Giustozzi (London School of Economics, London)
Local Politics of the Taliban

Kristian Berg-Harpviken (International Peace Research Institute, Oslo)
The Transnationalization of the Taliban

Rainer Glassner (INEF, University of Duisburg-Essen)
Architecture of Violence and Security in Kunduz

Masood Karokhail (The Liaison Office, Kabul)
Non-state Policing in Afghanistan – an Exploration of the Arbakai

In between Coffee Break

Susanne Schmeidl (Griffith University and Australian National University)
Discussant

Gilles Dorronsoro (Centre d'études et Recherches Internationales, Paris and Carnegie Endowment,
Washington)
Chair

Lunch 12h00

**Panel V
Interventions in Local Politics**

13h00

Anila Daulatzai (Johns Hopkins University)
Flows of Suspicion – Corruption and Kinship in Kabul

Manija Gardizi (University of Erfurt)
Local Politics in Afghanistan. From a State-Oriented Approach to Social Order

Katja Mielke (ZEF, University of Bonn)
State-Making versus State-Building or who is Imposing Order?
Local Realities and International Intervention in North-eastern Afghanistan

Susanne Schmeidl (Griffith University and Australian National University)
Successful Cooperation or Dangerous Liaison? Integrating Traditional and Modern Justice
Mechanisms in South-Eastern Afghanistan

In between Coffee Break

Andreas Wilde (ZEF, University of Bonn)
Discussant

Astri Suhrke (Christian-Michelsen Institute, Bergen)
Chair

Concluding Panel

16h00

Nazif Shahrani, Gilles Dorronsoro, Conrad Schetter, Astri Suhrke, Kristian Berg-Harpviken

List of Participants

	Institution
Abdullaev, Iskandar	University of Bonn
Andersen, Erna	Winnipeg
Azoy, Whitney	American Institute of Afghanistan Research
Baldauf, Ingeborg	Humboldt University of Berlin
Barfield, Thomas	Boston University
Berg-Harpviken, Kristian	The International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo
Boboyorov, Hafiz	University of Bonn
Centlivres, Pierre	Université de Neuchâtel
Centlivres-Demont, Micheline	Université de Neuchâtel
Christians, Timo	German Agro Action, Bonn
Daulatzai, Anila	John Hopkins University, Baltimore
Daxner, Michael	University of Oldenburg
Debiel, Tobias	University of Duisburg-Essen
Dorronsororo, Gilles	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington and Centre d'Études et Recherches Internationales, Paris
Dusend, Sarah	University of Bonn
Entezari, Mehrnoosh	University of Bamberg
Gardiwal, Rohilai	University of Bonn
Gardizi, Manija	University of Erfurt
Gerke, Solvay	University of Bonn
Giustozzi, Antonio	London School of Economics
Glassner, Rainer	University of Duisburg-Essen
Glatzer, Bernt	Afghanistan Research Group (AGA), Schießheim
Goodhand, Jonathan	School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
Hadjer, Tahmina	University of Bonn
Issa, Christine	University of Gießen
Karokhail, Masood	The Liaison Office, Kabul
Kindermann, Ulrich	German Society for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Kunduz
Kipping, Martin	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Bonn
Kohistani, Sardar M.	University of Gießen
Kreutzmann, Hermann	Free University of Berlin
Kuzmits, Bernd	Foundation Development and Peace, Bonn

Lehns, Romy	German Agro Action, Bonn
Maaß, Citha D.	German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin
Manschadi, Ahmad M.	University of Bonn
Mielke, Katja	University of Bonn
Poos, Henrik	University of Bonn
Prinz, Janosch	University of Bonn
Rzehak, Lutz	Humboldt University of Berlin
Sander, Shinta	German Society for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Kabul
Schetter, Conrad	University of Bonn
Schlagintweit, Reinhard	Friends of the Centre for Development Research (ZEF)
Schmeidl, Susanne	Griffith University and Australian National University
Shah, Usman	Monash University, Melbourne/Victoria
Shahrani, Nazif	University of Indiana
Sharifi, Omar (Paper only)	American Institute of Afghanistan Research, Kabul
Strand, Arne (Paper only)	Christian-Michelsen-Institute, Bergen/Cyprus The International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo
Suhrke, Astri	Christian-Michelsen-Institute, Bergen
Tutakhel, Mariam	Federal Foreign Office of Germany (AA), Berlin
Vigier, Corinna	German Development Service (DED), Kunduz
Wenzel, Christoph	Free University, Berlin
Wiegmann, Gunda	Office of the EU Special Representative, Kabul
Wilde, Andreas	University of Bonn
Wyrwich, Roswitha	University of Bonn
Yarash, Nasratullah	University of Bonn