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Understanding Local Violence
*Security Arrangements in Kandahar,
Kunduz and Paktia (Afghanistan)*

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Introduction

Triggered by the terror attacks of 9/11, the subsequent international intervention in Afghanistan has catapulted the country to the centre of international political attention. The military intervention by the US forces and its allies, which started in October 2001 and led to the consecutive collapse of the Taliban regime in November/December 2001, resulted in a power vacuum which was immediately filled by hundreds of commanders as well as tribal and religious leaders. These 'big men' either possess certain legitimacy or control the means of violence to a sufficient degree. This development was further strengthened by the US-strategy to use Afghan militias to back up their fight against the remnants of al-Qaida and the Taliban.ⁱ Thus the world suddenly became aware of structures of power which developed during 22 years of continuous war in the absence of a functioning state which could hardly be changed by a military intervention from one day to another. Consequently, the internationally stimulated peace process in Afghanistan was repeatedly shaken by recurring acts of violence and a lacking designation of clear responsibilities for security tasks. This volatile situation was grasped by international observers as a complete lack of security and regarded as the core obstacle for all political steps of the peace process – the *Emergency Loya Jirga* in June 2002, the *Constitutional Loya Jirga* in December 2003, the presidential elections in September 2004 and the parliamentary elections in September 2005. No one less than Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nations special envoy to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2003, coined the saying that Afghanistan is in need of three things: 'Security, security and security'.ⁱⁱ

While the notions of 'security' can be very different and at times even contrary (see for example the contribution of Donini), the international community – policy-makers, as well as journalists and researchersⁱⁱⁱ – tends to circumscribe the lack of physical security in Afghanistan with the term 'warlordism'. This labelling was the expression of a modern, state-centric understanding of physical security which generally assumes that the state institutions hold the monopoly of power and violence. Contrary to this ideal situation, individual actors – so called warlords – were identified as the ones who *de facto* control the means of violence. Since 2002, virtually no influential political figure in Afghanistan could elude this label which subsequently became the category for all actors spoiling or even casting doubts on the international agenda of the Afghan peace process. Hereby the term *Jang Salar* (Persian term of 'warlord'), which had never been used in the Afghan parlance in the past, found its way into the Afghan rhetoric and is used – in contrary to the mainly used term 'commander' – in a very biased and negative sense.

The aim of this paper is to show that the term 'warlordism' and its connoted perceptions are not sufficient enough to characterize the structures of violence in Afghanistan. While we do not deny the existence of warlords in Afghanistan, the manifold forms of individual leadership as well as the local differences regarding security arrangements are too significant as that they could be positioned on a linear axis between warlords on the one side and the modern state on the other. To support our argument, we will firstly discuss the term 'warlord' itself to reach a concise and practicable definition of this term. Secondly, we will present and discuss the security situation on the provincial level in three case studies (Kunduz, Kandahar and Paktia). Hereby we intend to demonstrate that the variations of security arrangements on the local level are enormous. Drawing from these examples, we will elaborate various patterns which are of primary importance for defining the local security architecture.

1. Warlordism in Afghanistan

Besides the war against remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaida, which is still very active in the South and Southeast of Afghanistan and has destabilized large parts of that region, the dominance of so-called warlords has been stressed during the last years as the major security threat.^{iv} The most prominent individual examples of these so-called warlords were Rashid Dostum, Mohammad Fahim and Ismail Khan, who became the archetypes or icons of today's warlordism. The persistently advanced argument is that their arbitrary habits and their control of the means of violence are the main impediments to establishing a countrywide peace and security..

In view of the omnipresence of the term 'warlord' in the recent literature^v on Afghanistan to describe the lack of security, it makes sense to shed light on the etymology of this term.^{vi} Within the general debate on state collapse in recent years, the term 'warlord' was attributed to competing elites which gained control of the security sector^{vii} and looted the country for their own profit.^{viii} However, the etymological notion of the term 'warlord' has been criticised from various points of view. First, the term bears a negative connotation and suggests a one-sided tie of the actors to warfare. Second, the positive suffix '-lord' was criticised for elevating the respective actors to the status of noblemen. However, when looking closely at a whole series of different Afghan actors which are commonly labelled as warlords, it is striking that they neither draw their income from warfare per se nor show an honourable or baronial behaviour. Accordingly, it can be argued that the term 'warlord' is misleading because it is used for a high variety of actors who seldom have much in common.^{ix} In light of this fact it has to be questioned generally whether the use of this term makes sense or not. However, since this expression was picked up very quickly by the media and policy-makers and is well established in the public awareness, it is unlikely that this term will be dropped.^x Hence, it has to be stressed that this term, even though it lacks the necessary differentiation and sharpness, tackles the problem in a catchy way.^{xi} Moreover the discussion on the term 'warlord' has also spread among Afghan intellectuals.^{xii}

While the term 'warlord' experiences criticism as well as public reception and popularity, the deeper problem lies within the perceptions which usually go along with the use of this term. Two main perceptions can be identified which often turn out to be chimaeras in reality: Firstly, that warlords allegedly are the counterweight to the state;^{xiii} secondly, that the sole motivation of warlords lies in their personal economic profit and enrichment. Concerning the aforementioned, the term 'warlord' is commonly linked to actors who are diametrically opposed or hostile towards the state. They are identified as the 'bad guys' boycotting or spoiling the peace process and jeopardizing the establishment of a well organized and regulated state power. Thus this term carries the risk of believing in a bipolar semantic order which rarely exists in reality because most of the so-called warlords operate in a limbo of power: On the one hand they take over state functions and posts as governors, ministers, police chiefs or military officers, on the other hand they pursue their own interests and are not hesitant to deploy state resources to accomplish their personal goals.^{xiv} Although the emergence of so-called warlords is tied to the weakness or fragility of the state,^{xv} warlordism should not be understood as an antipode to the state. In contrast, the relationship between warlords and the state can be described as a situation or process in which the former reduce state order and power due to the take-over of state positions while simultaneously ignoring the fulfilling of state functions and the obeying of state rules.

The other perception prevailing within the arena of academics as well as the media and policy-makers is that warlords are modern robber barons: They are viewed as relentlessly exploiting the ordinary population mainly motivated by greed for individual, material profit.^{xvi} According to this narrative, wars are fragmented along profit interests of single actors and are perceived as economic contentions on lootable resources.^{xvii} However, this line of argument lacks the socioeconomic contextualisation of the single actors. Most of these warlords are embedded in certain social-economic structures and are part of reciprocal interpersonal networks. The loyalty of their militiamen depends not only on economic benefits, but is often tied by family, clan, tribal, ethnic or religious relationships. Many of the Afghan warlords spend their revenues to reinforce their networks or exchange women to maintain the relationships with strategically important allies.^{xviii} Furthermore, it is misleading to confine a warlord to the military sphere. Functional differentiations between politics, economics and the military are virtually non-existent in non-modern societies as we can find them in Afghanistan. Moreover, the social status is not necessarily defined by wealth. In most cases, it is rather achieved by conforming to a certain positively connoted archetype of Afghan societies such as the 'brave warrior' (Rashid Dostum) or the 'wise emir' (Ismail Khan). Thus individual behaviour is tied with ideal figures of the Afghan society in a positive way.

Based on the closer examination of the academic discussion on warlordism we decided not to reject the term 'warlord' completely but to define it narrower and more precisely. Hereby we attempt to elude both a judgmental or even negative connotation as well as a blurred or even exchangeable definition.^{xix} Our aim is to operationalise a definition which aims to elude the pejorative notion of the term warlord, but focuses on the functional characteristics of these actors. That way we firstly underpin the connotation of the actors with the control of the means of physical violence. Secondly, we focus on the relationship between actors and structures. Hereby we understand warlords as actors which are able to make decisions without necessarily being controlled by institutional bodies of the state or society. Thus warlords control the means of physical violence – private as well as state owned – and have the potential and capacity to decide themselves about its use.

2. The Localisation of Security

As demonstrated above, the term 'warlord' is not sufficient enough to describe the current (in)security situation in Afghanistan. Neither is there a uniform type of actors nor can these actors be accurately described with a single term. However, alongside the variety of actors, the regional differences also play a crucial role. We intend to show that on the local level different social, economic and political factors result in different security architectures. Moreover, it would be a shortcoming to position these security architectures on a linear spectrum between the poles of the state on the one side and the warlords on the other. The main reason is that there are many more variables which define the security situation. In all case studies – Kandahar, Kunduz and Paktia – we chose the provincial level as the level of research.

Kandahar – the feudal warlordism

The city of Kandahar is not only the capital of the homonymous province, but also the main centre of Southern Afghanistan. Moreover, Kandahar played an important role in Afghan history: Afghans perceive Kandahar as the birthplace of modern Afghanistan and Kandahar served as the stronghold and secret capital for the Taliban. Since the movement was ousted from Kandahar in December 2001, the province has been dominated by a handful of strong warlords collaborating with the government as well as by the Taliban^{xx} and international anti-terror forces.^{xxi}

To understand the emergence of warlordism in Kandahar, it is important to take the socioeconomic structures of the province into consideration. The Pashtun confederations of the Durrani and Ghilzai, which comprise several tribes, have been competing for the control of Kandahar city since the 18th century.^{xxii} In contrast to the Pashtuns of Eastern Afghanistan, the tribes of Kandahar are structured in a hierarchical manner. Already during the 18th century a small landowning aristocracy emerged within each tribe which managed to seize the economic resources and had a say in local decision-making processes, while ordinary tribesmen often ended up as their clients (*Hamsayagan*).^{xxiii} Thus the tribal coherence has not only been built on common tribal identities and values, but also on the access to economic resources, patronage and protection.^{xxiv}

These socioeconomic structures are reflected in the security architecture of today's Kandahar province. Within each large tribe we find a single or very few powerful warlords stemming from landlord or business families and maintaining their own private militias.^{xxv} The power elite of Kandahar province encompasses no more than half a dozen of men.^{xxvi} Furthermore, these warlords compete for the control of core government positions to exceed their regional influence.^{xxvii} They already succeeded in taking over core positions within the Kandahar provincial administration^{xxviii} and successfully placed their clients within the civil administration as well as the key local security posts.^{xxix} Especially within the security sector the warlords managed to transform their militias into regular army units during the DDR process.^{xxx} To illustrate these structures of violence, it is insightful to portray two prominent warlords: Ahmad Wali Karzai and Gul Agha Shirzai.

Ahmad Wali Karzai is the younger brother of President Hamid Karzai and currently the head of the provincial council of Kandahar province.^{xxxi} The Karzai family has been influential in the Kandahar region for decades and belongs to the leading families of the Popalzai tribe, of which the king's family is also part of.^{xxxii} Ahmad Wali Karzai makes use of his closeness to Hamid Karzai while at the same time being the main representative of the Popalzai tribe in Southern Afghanistan.^{xxxiii} Furthermore, he is said to control a big share of the drug trade in the region.^{xxxiv}

Besides the Popalzai, the Barakzai are the second biggest tribe in Kandahar province.^{xxxv} The most prominent member of the Barakzai is Gul Agha Shirzai. However, in contrast to Ahmad Wali Karzai, Gul Agha Shirzai does not descend from the tribal aristocracy. Yet his father, Haji Latif, was an important *Mujahidin* commander in the 1980s and his family gained influence due to large property holdings. Gul Agha Shirzai served twice as provincial governor and for a short period as minister in Hamid Karzai's cabinet. He has to be considered as one of the most powerful men in Kandahar, not least since he integrated his 2nd Corps (*Nazmi Khas*, 'Special order') into the Afghan National Police during the

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration process.^{xxxvi} His militias also have assisted the Coalition Forces in fighting various insurgency groups.

The situation in Kandahar is strongly influenced by the US-driven 'War against terrorism' and the counter-operations of anti-government resistance. While information about the latter is rare, it is interestingly enough that the opponents of the Coalition Forces are highly embedded in the local communities. Thus rural districts such as Naish, Arghistan, Khakrez and Ghorak are under the control of the Taliban and became backbones of the anti-government resistance.^{xxxvii} From these districts the movement of the Taliban started its rapid military expansion once in the mid-1990s and here the population is sharing the norms and values with the former Taliban regime. Moreover the local population still perceives the physical security provided by the Taliban as more sufficient and applicable than the one established by the government or the Coalition Forces. A common statement is that the harsh and uncompromised exertion of power by the Taliban abandoned banditry and created certain countability for the everyday life.^{xxxviii} In addition the military operations of the Coalition Forces tightened the relationship between the Taliban and the local population. Especially military actions such as routine house searching are violating local customs such as the hiding of the womenfolk against men's eyes. Due to the high intensity of violent actions between the Taliban and the Coalition Forces the local elites are furthermore forced to position themselves either with the Coalition Forces or with a 'total spoiler' position. The dramatically increase of violence and instability^{xxxix} along with increasing anti-governmental sentiments in the population^{xl} has made *Shuras* on the district level rather ineffective to bridge the gap between the government and the communities. So nowadays anyone who is suspected to support the government became a potential target.^{xli} Facing this strong anchorage of the Taliban in the local societies the Afghan government recently changed its policy: While seeking to install their own state actors directly after the collapse of the Taliban, the Afghan government nowadays follows a co-opting strategy. In this vein, several representatives of the Taliban exercising the de facto control over a district were officially approved by the Afghan government.^{xlii}

The opium cultivation also has a strong impact on the security situation. Even though dating back to the pre-war times in Kandahar province, this economy has only started booming since the late 1980s when the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan. In 2005, nearly 13 percent of the Afghan area under poppy cultivation was situated in Kandahar province.^{xliii} The dominance of the opium economy has been so strong that hardly any elite family could maintain its leading position within its tribe without an involvement in the drug economy in one or the other way. The counter narcotic strategy of the international community, which was initiated in 2004, however, pressures those elites loyal to the government to curb their poppy cultivation.^{xliv} This has led to a situation in which patronage networks are facing a tremendous change: More and more farmers and traders, for whom the drug economy constitutes the basis of their daily livelihood strategy, shift their loyalty to the Taliban.^{xlv} Today the drug trafficking networks make use of both the government as well as the Taliban, depending on which group controls the respective area.

Summing up, during the last years, the combination of insurgency, well-financed drug networks and hierarchical tribal structures restricted the influence of the Afghan government in Kandahar province and instead favored the emergence of strong warlords and the Taliban. The only difference between the former and the latter is that the Taliban still maintain a

corporate identity and act in a collective way. However this does not exclude that single leaders of the Taliban can be categorized as warlords.

Kunduz – the fragmented warlordism

Despite the long distance between the capital Kabul and Kunduz as well as the geographical barrier of the Hindukush mountain range, the Afghan state was quite influential in the northeastern province of Kunduz^{xlvi} since the emergence of the Afghan state at the end of the 19th century.^{xlvii} This was a prerequisite for the Pashtun colonisation which took place in several waves since the early 1920s, encompassing stockbreeders, farmers and the Pashtun aristocracy. While the latter received large landholdings from the central government, especially the migration of stockbreeders created tensions with the autochthonous population.^{xlviii} This colonisation policy required a strong state to effectively control the distribution of land. Consequently all influential officials were Pashtuns, mostly related to the king's family. Accordingly, the language spoken in the provincial government was Pashtu, what excluded the bulk of the population from direct access to the state.^{xlix} The result of this colonisation was a totally shift of the power structure due to the confiscation of large, mainly Uzbek, landholdings^l. Moreover the ethnic diversity of Kunduz is enormous and often enough changing from village to village. Besides Pashtuns, also Tajiks, Uzbeks, Arabs, Baluchs and Turkmen are located in Kunduz province.

This historical anchorage of the Afghan state in Kunduz has significant influence on the constellation of today's power structures. Holding an official position in Kunduz province is regarded by the elites as a guarantor for power and as an important material as well as symbolic resource. The intermingling of pursuing personal interests and holding a state position directly affects the security situation: For example, high ranking officials within the highway-, border- and provincial police, are accused of deploying policemen for their own interest.^{li} In fact, the local population describes the police as their private militias in uniform.^{lii}

Due to the migration and pashtunisation as well as the ethnic diversity within the province and due to the frequently changing frontlines during the war, there are no universally accepted communal forms of organisation and institutions which are capable of checking and balancing the power of individuals. This resulted in myriads of mini-fiefdoms as well as localised 'rules of law' or 'rules of the gun'. Thus each village is headed by a 'big man' who often held the position of a commander during the war.^{liii} In the past, the territory under control of the respective commanders was sharply demarcated due to the levying of taxes (*Ushr, Zakat*).^{liv} But with the collapse of the Taliban and the presence of the civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz, the commander system also experienced its demise: the levying of taxes was disrupted and consequently the borders of the warlords' territories vanished gradually.^{lv} Nowadays, armed militias are not often to be seen; nonetheless the mutual relationship between commanders and militiamen remains significant. Due to the hierarchical structure of the militias in Kunduz, the loyalty of a militiaman is primarily and foremost directed to his immediate commander. Alliances among militias tend to be brokered on a broader scale and seldom rely exclusively on tribal, ethnic or regional similarities.^{lvi} As outlined above, there are no communal or religious bodies which are influential enough to control the militias.

While the cities (Kunduz, Khanabad, Imam Sahib) are controlled by the police (former militias), the rural areas are marked by individual security arrangements between local

warlords, which differ from district to district. This can be illustrated by the example of the two districts of Imam Sahib and Khanabad. Imam Sahib borders to Tajikistan and is a key hub for the drug-trade. Accordingly, both the district itself and the post of the chief of the border police are strategically very important. Imam Sahib is dominated by the Ibrahimis, an Uzbek clan, that rose from nothing to become the predominant family of that district and beyond in the course of war. Ibrahim Abdul Latif became the governor of Kunduz province before he was appointed governor of Faryab.^{lvii} His brother Haji Raooof earned a reputation as a commander, headed the border police in Imam Sahib and won a seat in the parliamentary elections.^{lviii} Finally, the influential position of the *Mirab Bashi*^{lix} is monopolized in the hands of Afiz, the brother in law of Haji Raooof, whereas in other districts this position is commonly exercised by members of different clans and usually varies from village to village (from irrigation canal to irrigation canal). Thus the Ibrahimis rule the district in a quasi-feudalistic way and control the access to economic resources. Hence, most small warlords in Imam Sahib are directly related to this family.

While the means of violence in Imam Sahib are monopolized by one family, Khanabad provides a different picture. During the war the district was under control of Commander Amir, the most influential commander of the Islamist Abdulrab Sayyaf in north-eastern Afghanistan. After Amir's death, he was followed by his brother Ghulam, who lost several of his sub-commanders due to the upsurge of ethnic and political polarisation since the collapse of the Taliban.^{lx} Taken together with the lack of commonly shared institutions, this led to a fragmentation of power and the emergence of a myriad of loosely connected small 'big men', rarely controlling more than one village. Their actions are solely restricted by the competition with other 'big men', but not controlled or regulated by the local population or the government.

Summing up, a high variety of warlords and 'big men', who differ widely in the scope of influence and power, are controlling the means of physical violence in Kunduz province. Moreover a complete lack of religious, ethnic-tribal or even modern institutions can be observed which are capable to constrain the arbitrary of the rulers. This results in a strong localisation of the 'rules of the game' and varying architectures of the power structure from district to district, and as in Khanabad district from village to village. Additionally, the rentier economy of large landlords strengthens the position of the warlords, makes them independent from the population and further weakens the existing collective institutions.

Paktia – the rule of the tribes

Paktia province^{lxi} is located in the eastern part of the so-called Pashtun belt and is more or less ethnically homogenous. Despite the geographical proximity to the capital Kabul, the state presence in Paktia always remained weak, which largely is the result of the strength of the tribal system.^{lxii} By the end of the 1970s, the state influence did not exceed beyond the provincial capital of Gardez. During the civil war, the state presence in Paktia even decreased. Similarly, the Taliban were only present in the provincial capital and had no control whatsoever of the countryside. Even today the power of the government is very limited: The Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police are concentrated in Gardez and along the main roads.

The Pashtuns of Paktia are divided along tribal lines. Tribal identities are still perceived as the most important points of reference, incorporating ideas of honour and justice as well as

daily behaviour.^{lxiii} The *Pashtunwali* is the commonly accepted ‘rule of the game’, which is binding for everybody and provides strict guidelines of how to deal with a specific situation. Although the community values of the *Pashtunwali* differ slightly from place to place, the main underlying notion influencing all interpretations of the *Pashtunwali* in the east is that all Pashtuns have an equal status and no one should possess more rights and power than the others.^{lxiv} According to this notion, all Pashtuns descend from the same ancestor and possess the equal social and political status. Furthermore, the Paktia tribes settle their problems by consensus building, meaning that tribal gatherings (*Jirga*) are the place to mediate conflicts until a solution is found. In contrast to many other regions, this tribal system is still intact in Paktia.^{lxv}

Due to this tribal structure and the underlying egalitarian understanding of society, political leadership is always hard-fought.^{lxvi} This is why the last two decades were characterized by a continuous struggle between the tribes on the one hand and single warlords, who challenged the tribal system, on the other hand. Very often, strong men – first *Mujahidin*, then warlords – endeavoured to gain a powerful status within their tribes. But as soon as they behaved contrary to the codes of the *Pashtunwali* conflicts arose between them and the tribes. This was especially the case after the collapse of the Taliban in Winter 2001/2, when Bacha Khan of the Zadran tribe seized power in Paktia even without the legitimacy of his own tribe. Bacha Khan was initially backed by the Northern Alliance and the Coalition Forces for his operations against the Taliban. He was able to mobilize warriors from his Zadran tribe as well as small warlords such as Raz Mohammad and Wazir Khan. As a result of his arbitrary way to gain power over the province, most of the tribes regarded him as a ‘bandit’ or *Jang Salar*.^{lxvii} Within a few days, the tribes reacted to Bacha Khan’s seizure of power and managed to build up a counter force across tribal boundaries. After several days of heavy clashes in Gardez, which left about 100 people dead, the tribes were able to oust Bacha Khan from town.^{lxviii} Following this event, the tribes established their power across the entire province.^{lxix} The Coalition Forces took sides with the newly appointed governor of Paktia against Bacha Khan. This development was further supported by the US strategy to arrest spoilers – Taliban or not – and deport them to Guantanamo or Bagram.^{lxx}

Since that incident, the policing in the tribal areas of Paktia is carried out by the *Arbakee*, a sort of traditional tribal police.^{lxxi} According to the tribal system, the establishment of an *Arbakee* becomes necessary if the decision of a *Jirga* is not accepted by one of the persons affected by a dispute and if a ruling has already been passed. Hence, the *Arbakee* implement the decisions of a *Jirga* and are legitimized and controlled by tribal elders. However, the *Arbakee* remain a spontaneous force which is only in power as long as the tribal *Jirga* is in need of it. Since first being established in 2001, *Arbakee* have been installed in all districts of Paktia and outnumber today the regular police by far. The *Arbakee* take over classical police tasks as well as the protection of tribal resources such as forests and pastures. That scope of operations, as defined by the government, rests very comfortably with the notion of community policing. This is due to the fact that the primary goal of the *Arbakee* concept is to protect the tribal community interests. As a corollary, the providing of physical security of key assets remains the top priority.^{lxxii} The *Arbakee* are controlled by a *Wazir* (commander) who takes part in the tribal gatherings and receives his orders from the tribal elders. Interestingly enough, since 2002 the *Arbakee* have increasingly become an interface between the state and the tribes. Several security tasks such as the protection of forests and road security were officially handed over from the provincial government to the

Arbakee.^{lxxiii} Moreover, the state has been permanently financing 40 to 60 members of an *Arbakee* in each district since 2002 and even increased this number drastically during the elections. While being paid by the state, the *Arbakee* remain loyal with the tribes and are still controlled by the tribal *Jirga*. Consequently, the *Arbakee* experience a much broader acceptance by the local population than the regular police, which is often regarded as corrupt and ineffective.^{lxxiv}

However, the behaviour of the *Arbakee* is highly dependent on the tribal norms and values, which in many cases are diametrically opposed to Western norms and values, but in full accordance with the *Pashtunwali*. For example, the social discrimination of women^{lxxv} contradicts the idea of equal communal participation, and the continuing legitimacy of blood feuds undermines attempts to introduce modern conflict solving mechanisms. Finally, one has to question who monitors the *Arbakee* as they do not constitute a neutral force and are irregularly involved in tribal rivalries. One example is the long lasting tribal feud between the Ahmadzai and the neighbouring Totakhel, which was aggravated by the establishing of the *Arbakee*. Furthermore socioeconomic differences challenge the egalitarian idea within each tribe time and again.^{lxxvi} Especially tribesmen benefiting from remittances of family members working in the Middle East or Pakistan are gaining a certain influence on tribal issues. However, the tribal codes of the *Pashtunwali* have (up to now) remained so strong in Paktia that tribal leaders have to follow the egalitarian ideal in their rhetoric and behaviour. In other words, the tribal system in Paktia obstructs or at least constraints the emergence of warlordism.

3. Security Architecture

On the basis of these examples we illustrated the diversity of security architectures in different Afghan provinces. As the case of Kunduz clarified, one can even find a variety of different security architectures within a province, often diverging from valley to valley and from village to village.

Even though our definition of the term 'warlord' applies to many of the influential actors currently to be found in Afghanistan, the term remains insufficient to characterize the varying forms of the control of the means of violence and to delineate them from state security structures. In fact, the examples of Kandahar und Kunduz reveal that warlordism is very distinct in exactly those regions where the state – at least in the notion of elites – is regarded important. In contrast, the societal structures in Paktia, where the state is hardly recognised as such, prevent the consolidation of strong warlord structures. Thus it seems that Charles Tilly's^{lxxvii} thesis – that warlordism is part of the state building process rather than being diametrically opposed to it – also proves true in the case of Afghanistan.

The fundamental finding of this contribution is that a contextualisation is crucial in order to understand different security structures. On the basis of the aforementioned examples, the basic discernable dimensions affecting the local security structure are the societal structuring, the economic resources as well as the state and international presence.

These societal structures, which have evolved over many years, do not only play an eminently important role, they also cannot be reduced to a common denominator: For example, the different structures in Paktia and Kandahar make clear that a characterization

as 'tribal Pashtuns' is too superficial to say anything about common violence and security structures. The history of each region is equally important: Due to the intensive colonization which took place in Kunduz, these traditional institutions of conflict resolution are not so much rooted in contrast to Kandahar or even more to Paktia.

Similarly, the local economies have a major impact on the security structures. In regions such as Kandahar, which rely heavily on drug cultivation and drug trade, one can witness the establishment of strong warlord structures. Apparently, the financial resources connected with the drug economy seem to contribute to the strengthening of hierarchical structures. This argument is supported by the example of Kunduz, where a strong warlord clan succeeded in establishing itself in the district of Imam Sahib, which is strategically important for the drug trade, while the district of Khanabad faces a fragmentation of the control of power and violence.

The presence of the state has an equally significant impact on the security situation. In general, the endeavour of the state is to control the security sector and to establish a monopoly of violence. Achieving this goal means the leeway for violent private actors will automatically diminish. However, as mentioned above, it would be misleading to perceive the state as counterweight to the warlords. On the contrary, as pointed out in the examples of Kandahar and Kunduz, most warlords regard the state as a desirable resource to control and to have access to. Hence, as long as the state remains the primary means to control the resource flow, the access to land and water rights as well as the means to receive a position with a high social status or to employ the own militiamen, state control will be regarded as desirable by the warlords. However, as the case of the *Arbakee* in Paktia shows, the state is not considered throughout the country as a resource having a direct impact on the security architecture.

The role of the international presence is more difficult to judge. Without doubt the presence of international actors has effected the disappearance of weapons in the public – warlords and militias are forced to display a low profile. This trend is particularly visible in those Afghan provinces which are being heavily funded by the international community for reconstruction measures (e.g. Kabul, Herat). For many 'big men', a share in the international reconstruction resources constitutes a vital economic incentive. Yet the international presence does not always have a taming influence on the violence structures. Ultimately, it was the establishing and equipping of private Afghan militias by the US in the course of its 'War on terrorism' which caused the temporary emergence of warlordism with Bacha Khan in Paktia and continues to determine the security structures in Kandahar to this day..

This article intended to make a contribution to the complex and locally very heterogeneous security structures in Afghanistan. Even though a broad definition of the term 'warlord' can be applied to many actors of physical violence in Afghanistan, it fails to take into account the vast variety of local security architectures. While the presence of the state and of international actors also has a direct influence on the security architecture, it is primarily the local social and economic conditions that shape the mechanisms of producing security. To obtain a better understanding of how these local security structures work, much more research has to be done to investigate the local governance constellations, specifically the economic, political and judicial conditions which influence the local shape of security.

Endnotes:

ⁱ Astri Suhrke, Kristian Berg, Harpviken and Arne Strand, *Conflictual Peacebuilding: Afghanistan Two Years after Bonn*, 2004, accessed at: <http://www.cmi.no/publications/2004/rep/r2004-4.pdf>.

ⁱⁱ Statement of Lakhdar Brahimi on the conference “*Beyond Cold Peace. Strategies for Economic Reconstruction and Post-Conflict Management*”, 27-28 October 2004 organized by the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Federal Foreign Office. Berlin.

ⁱⁱⁱ See Mark Sedra, *Challenging the Warlord Culture - Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*, Bonn: BICC, 2002; and also Michael Ignatieff, *Empire Lite*, London: Vintage, 2003.

^{iv} Sedra (n. 3 above).

^v Antonio Giustozzi, *Respectable Warlords? The Transition from War of All against All to Peaceful Competition in Afghanistan*, 2003; Gordon Peake, Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Mari Fitzduff, *From Warlords to Peacelords: Local Leadership Capacity in Peace Processes*, Londonderry: 2004; Sedra (n.3 above) ; Conrad Schetter, 'Gewaltwirtschaft und Warlords', *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, No.10, 2003, pp. 1233-1236.

^{vi} The term 'warlord' was originally used to describe military actors during the Chinese civil war. JAG Roberts, 'Warlordism in China', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 16, No. 45/46, 1989, pp. 26-34. Since the late 1990s the term faced a revival, especially in the field of African studies and research. See *African Political Economy* 1989, 16 (46/47), which dedicated a whole volume to the 'warlord' phenomenon; also [O]William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African Society*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

^{vii} Reno (n. 6 above.; William Reno, 'The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States', *Development and Change*, Vol. 33, No. 5, 2002, pp. 837-858.; John Mackinlay, 'Defining Warlords', in Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, London: 2000, pp. 48 – 61.

^{viii} Paul Collier, 'Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective', in: Mats R. Berdal and David M. Malone, *Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, Boulder, Rienner, 2000, pp. 91-112.

^{ix} With the examples of Ismail Khan, Malik Pahlawan, Rashid Dostum, Ahmad Shah Masood and Burhanuddin Rabbani, Antonio Giustozzi (n.5 above) revealed that many of these so-called warlords have completely divergent backgrounds, social statuses and personal interests.

^x In the same manner, the term 'ethnicity' became the main reference to define violent conflicts after the end of the Cold War at the beginning of the 1990s. See Ulrike Joras and Conrad Schetter, 'Hidden Ties: Similarities between Policy and Research Approaches to Ethnic Conflicts', in Andrea Wimmer, Richard Goldstone, Donald Horowitz, Ulrike Joras and Conrad Schetter, *Facing Ethnic Conflicts. Towards a New Realism*, Lanham: 2004, pp. 315-332. Similarly, 'terrorist' became the predominant term to label international security threats. See Michael V. Bhatia, 'Fighting Words: Naming Terrorists, Bandits, Rebels and Other Violent Actors,' *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2005): pp. 5-22.

^{xi} Finally, there is a lack of other terms: Military terms such as 'commander' or 'general' assume a legality which these actors do not have in most cases, while terms such as 'leader' or 'power-holder' lack the military aspect. Terms such as 'protagonist of violence' or 'violence specialist' again are too abstract for this matter.

^{xii} In spring 2005, Mamoor Hassan, the head of Dostum's *Jumbesh-i Melli*, criticized the deviousness of labelling former resistance fighters as warlords who should be brought to justice and simultaneously offering amnesty arrangements to the Taliban. Former members of the Northern Alliance made accusations that labelling them warlords is a strategy to sideline them while rebuilding a power base for the Pashtuns represented by President Karzai. Rahimullah Yusufzai, *Warlords are going to remain a fact of life in Afghanistan*, 2005, accessed at: <http://jang.com.pk/thenews/mar2005-daily/07-03-2005/oped/05.htm>.

^{xiii} Mats R. Berdal and David M. Malone, *Greed Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, Boulder: Rienner, 2000.

^{xiv} William Reno, 'Welthandel, Warlords und die Wiedererfindung des afrikanischen Staates', *Welttrends*, No. 14, 1997, pp. 8-29; Christian Paes and Björn Aust, 'Bürgerkriegsökonomie, Staatszerfall und Privatisierung von Gewalt', *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, No. 10, 2003, pp. 1229-1232.

^{xv} Jennifer Milliken, *State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction*, Malden: Blackwell, 2003; Robert I. Rotberg, *When States Fail. Causes and Consequences*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

^{xvi} Collier (n.8 above).

^{xvii} François Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin, *Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege*, Hamburg: Hamburger Ed., 1999; Phillipe Le Billon, *The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know*, Humanitarian Practice Network Paper No. 33, London, 2000.

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- ^{xviii} For example the faction of the Panjshiris, which encompasses Mohamad Fahim, Abdullah Abdullah and Yunus Qanuni strengthened their political ties in 2002 by strategic arranged marriages.
- ^{xix} Such as Daniëlle van Grieken, *Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan's Political Reconstruction Process*, Utrecht: 2005, pp. 42-43.
- ^{xx} A similar problem can be observed in regard to the so-called war against terrorism. While the term 'warlord' was catchy enough to label the lack of security in public parlance, a sufficient term for the opponents in the operation *Enduring Freedom* is still not found yet. While terms such as Taliban and Neo-Taliban are too closely linked to the former political movements to embrace the high variation of actors and groups, terms such as 'Anti government elements' or 'Anti Coalition Forces' are too bulky and too long winded to become accepted in public parlance. In the following we will use the term 'Taliban' which is still most common in Kandahar province
- ^{xxi} Jon Lee Anderson, 'After the Revolution', *The New Yorker*, 3 May 2002.
- ^{xxii} Christine Noelle, *State and Tribe in Nineteenth Century Afghanistan*, Richmond, Curzon Press, 1997.
- ^{xxiii} Henry C. Rawlinson, "Report on the Dooranee Tribes, 19th April 1841," in Charles Metcalf MacGregor, ed., *Central Asia II. A Contribution towards the Better Knowledge of the Topography, Ethnology, Resources, and History of Afghanistan*, Calcutta, 1871, p. 835.
- ^{xxiv} Ibid.
- ^{xxv} International Crisis Group, *Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun Alienation*, Kabul/Brussels: 2003.
- ^{xxvi} In summer 2005, the Tribal Liaison Office (TLO) undertook a survey on local leadership in Kandahar province. In contrast to the provinces of Kunduz and Paktia, in which the number of 'big men' mentioned varied between 50 and 70, only the few same names were mentioned across the province in Kandahar time and again.
- ^{xxvii} The Coalition Forces are perceived as supporters of the new Afghan Government. This provides a strong power base for the Afghan government in that region, making it necessary for local warlords to maintain links with an actual weak state.
- ^{xxviii} Andrew Wilder, *A House Divided? Analysing the 2005 Afghan Elections*, Kabul: AREU, 2005.
- ^{xxix} See Conrad Schetter, 'Hamid Karzai. Übergangspräsident für Afghanistan' *Orient* Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 9-19.
- ^{xxx} International Crisis Group, *Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan - ICG Asia Report No 65*, Kabul/Brussels: 2003, p.26; Wilder (n. 28 above).
- ^{xxxi} Human Rights Watch, *The Rule of the Gun - Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression in the Run-up to Afghanistan's Presidential Election, 2004*, accessed at: <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghanistan0904/afghanistan0904.pdf>.
- ^{xxxii} Already in the 1920s the grandfather of Hamid Karzai was not only a leading figure of the Popalzai tribe, but also its main representative in the Senate. Also the father of Hamid Karzai, Abdul Ahad Karzai, took over several influential positions in the state apparatus as well as in the parliament during the 1960s. Ludwig Adamec. *Biographical Dictionary of Contemporary Afghanistan*, ADEVA, Graz, Austria, 1987, pp. 283, here p.82, p.83 and p.85.
- ^{xxxiii} Wilder (n. 28 above).
- ^{xxxiv} A survey undertaken in Kandahar in August 2005 showed that, when questioned on the most powerful figure in the province, his name was mentioned first by almost all interviewees; this connection is also mentioned in a broad variety of reports about Afghanistan: see S. Baldauf, *Warlord Politics Heats Afghan Vote*, 2004, accessed at: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1006/p01s01-wosc.html>; see also Carlotta Gall, 'Afghan Poppy Growing Reaches Record Level, UN Says,' *New York Times*, November 19, 2004.
- ^{xxxv} International Crisis Group (n. 30 above).
- ^{xxxvi} Ibid. p.5.
- ^{xxxvii} The same holds true for neighboring Helmand, where vast regions within the districts of Deh Adam Khan, Hyderabad, Nohzad remain outside state influence[0]. Information based on recent research conducted by TLO.
- ^{xxxviii} This tendency has been observed since 2002. See for example the joint statement '*Afghanistan: A Call for Security*' (first released on June 17, 2003) by over 90 humanitarian, human rights and conflict prevention organizations, that draws on their experiences and contacts with the population. Accessed at : [Hhttp://www.icva.ch/cgi-bin/browse.pl?doc=doc0000995H](http://www.icva.ch/cgi-bin/browse.pl?doc=doc0000995H). Criminality has drastically increased since the ouster of the Taliban. Various security incidents that are attributed in the western press to the Taliban involve bandits instead. Based on a recent comparison between interviews with local security officials and press releases Done by the TLO.
- ^{xxxix} Barnett Rubin, *Afghanistan's uncertain transition from turmoil to normality*, CRS Report for Congress, Washington, 2006.; Rainer Glassner, *FAST Report – Semi-annual risk assessment June to November 2005*,

2005, accessed at: [Hhttp://www.swisspeace.org/uploads/FAST/updates/H_FAST%20Afghanistan%202_2005%20final.pdf](http://www.swisspeace.org/uploads/FAST/updates/H_FAST%20Afghanistan%202_2005%20final.pdf).

^{xl} See Ahmed Rashid, *The Rise of militant Islam*, Interview conducted by David Barsamian, accessed at: [Hhttp://zmagsite.zmag.org/Jun2003/barsamian0603.html](http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Jun2003/barsamian0603.html)H; For Kandahar this was an obvious fact in interviews conducted by TLO in 2005/2006.

^{xli} This can be illustrated with the assassination of the head of the Kandahar Ulema Shura Maulawi Abdullah Fayaz, who was very outspoken against the Taliban and killed on the 29 May 2005 in Kandahar.

^{xlii} Stated by various interviewees during the survey in August 2005 conducted by the Tribal Liaison Office, Kabul.

^{xliii} The area under poppy cultivation increased from 2004 to 2005 by 162%. See: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: *Afghanistan: Opium Rapid Assessment Survey*, 2006, p. 39.

^{xliv} Christopher M. Blanchard, *Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy*, CRS Report for Congress, Washington, 2005. pp. 17/18

^{xlv} *Ibid.* p.15.

^{xlvi} The province of Kunduz emanated 1964 from the larger province of Qathagan, which once embraced roughly the today's provinces of Kunduz, Takhar, and Baghlan.

^{xlvii} Noelle (n.22 above). Rainer, Check mal ob der Verweis noch stimmt

^{xlviii} See Erwin Grötzbach, *Afghanistan: eine geographische Landeskunde*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1990; compare also Audrey C. Shalinsky, 'Islam and Ethnicity: The Northern Afghanistan Perspective', *Central Asian Survey*. 1, 1982, No. 2/3. pp. 71-83.

^{xlix} Mervyn Patterson, *The Shiwa Pastures, 1978-2003: Land Tenure Changes and Conflict in Northeastern Afghanistan*, Kabul: AREU. 2004.

ⁱ Many Uzbek landlords took part in the uprisings against Abdur Rahman and favoured Habibullah II in his rebellion against Amanullah Kahn. As a result, their land was confiscated and most of them were expelled or executed. The land was given to Pashtuns who had proved to be loyal to the Pashtun kings. See Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek, 'Ethnic Identity versus Nationalism: The Uzbeks of Northeastern Afghanistan and the Afghan State', in Touraj Atabaki and John O'Kane, *Post-Soviet Central Asia*, London, New York: 1998, pp. 204-230.

ⁱⁱ Within the context of the 'State failure' project of the Center for Development Research and the Institute for Development and Peace, the authors carried out research in Kunduz province in August and September. In the field interviews persons holding leading positions in the province were often accused of arbitrary behaviour. The range provided in the interviews were from involvement in the drug trade over land-grabbing to forced labour.

ⁱⁱⁱ While the Afghan National Army receives training and works alongside international instructors away from their home provinces, policemen are recruited mainly from the provinces they work in. This is why many former militiamen took over police positions.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ This is one of the outcomes of field research conducted in August and September 2005 in Kunduz province within the 'State failure' project (n. 51). The [Appraisal](#) of these 'big men' differs from place to place. While some are seen as good and honourable others are described as killers and stealers. Smaller warlords can act with impunity since they are backed by other.

^{liv} Jonathan Goodhand, 'From Holy War to Opium War? A Case Study of the Opium Economy in North-Eastern Afghanistan', in Christine Noelle-Karimi, Conrad Schetter and Reinhard Schlagintweit, *Afghanistan - A Country without a State*, Linz: 2002, pp.139-160.; G. Dorronsoro, 'Afghanistan: von Solidaritätsnetzwerken zu regionalen Räumen', in François Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin, *Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege*, Hamburg: Hamburger Ed., 1999, 121-154.

^{lv} Information based on interviews conducted in August and September 2005 (see n. 53 above).

^{lvi} Information based on interviews conducted in August and September 2005 (see n. 53 above).

^{lvii} In this position he ruled in favour of the Uzbeks in regard to the prevailing land conflict. See International Crisis Group, *Peacebuilding in Afghanistan*, Kabul/Brussels: 2003.

^{lviii} This border police formed a quasi-independent army nominally under the control of commander Daud, chief of the 6th corps, but in reality linked to Raof's brother Abdul Latif, which further strengthened their influence. International Crisis Group (n. 30 above).

^{lix} Literally the 'master of water'. His duty is the equitable distribution of water to all farmers. Normally, a *Mirab* is responsible for only one irrigation canal.

^{lx} A new confrontation arose 2001/2 between the *Jamiat-i Islami* and the *Jumbesh-i Melli*, the strongest war parties in the north, which still play a considerable role in national and local politics. See also: International Crisis Group (n. 30 above); and Sedra (n. 3 above).

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- ^{lxi} Paktia faced several phases of redefining the territorial shape. The original Loya Paktia ('Greater Paktia') roughly encompassed the today's provinces of Pakta, Paktika and Khost. However in 1964 Loya Paktia was split into Paktia and Paktika. 1995 the province of Khost was created out of parts Paktia and Paktika, allegedly to break up local Pashtun tribal alliances in Khost/Paktia.
- ^{lxii} One reason is that the tribes were granted certain privileges. By 1929, the tribes of Loya Paktia became the king maker of Nadir Shah when they brought back the monarchy to Kabul. Nadir Shah as well as his son and successor Zahir Shah endowed the tribes of Loya Paktia with a privileged status by giving them honorary military titles, property, monetary gifts and political advisory. In addition, the tribes of Paktia were freed from army service and allowed to practice their customary laws. International Crisis Group (n. 30 above).
- ^{lxiii} See Willi Steul, *Paschtunwali - Ein Ehrenkodex und seine rechtliche Relevanz*, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1981. Also Bernd Glatzer, *Sword and Reasons among Pashtuns: Notions of Individual Honour and social Responsibility in Afghanistan*, paper presented at the 14th European conference on modern South Asia Studies, Copenhagen, revised 1997; Bernd Glatzer, 'The Pashtun Tribal System', in Georg Pfeffer and Deepak Kumar Behera, *Concept of Tribal Society*, New Delhi: 2002, pp.265-282.
- ^{lxiv} Alfred Janata and Reihanodin Hassas, 'Ghairatman - Der gute Paschtune - Exkurs über die Grundlagen des Paschtunwali', *Afghanistan Journal* Vo. 2, No. 3, 1975, pp. 83-97.
- ^{lxv} A recent study argues that in Nangarhar the jirga does not function well as a conflict solving institution Jan Koehler, *Conflict processing and the Opium Poppy Economy in Afghanistan*, Jalalabad: 2005.
- ^{lxvi} Steul (n. 59 above); Jon W. Anderson, 'Khan and Khel: Dialectics of Pakhtun tribalism', in Richard Tapper, *The Conflict of tribe and state in Iran and Afghanistan*, New York: 1983, pp.119-149.
- ^{lxvii} Based on interviews conducted in March/April 2005 by the authors.
- ^{lxviii} Interviews conducted with tribal elders from the Ahmadzai and Totakhel tribes in spring and summer 2005.
- ^{lxix} The *Arbakee* of the Ahmadzai, for example, attacked the check points of commander Raz Mohammad in 2002, defeated his militia and killed him.
- ^{lxx} Interview with head of the Ahmadzai *Arbakee* in summer 2005.
- ^{lxxi} The following description of the *Arbakee* is basically drawn from the TLO study on the *Arbakee* carried out for DFID: *Improving Governance and Security through Local Structures - Feasibility Study on Integrating the Arbakee (Tribal Police) into Central Police Structures*. Kabul, 2005.
- ^{lxxii} This could be observed in the years of war as well. To maintain tribal autonomy the tribes took either side with the government or with resistance groups in order to gain an advantage over competing tribes. The Alikhel of Jaji, for instance, formed the government militias until 1988 to prevent the Mangals from gaining significance and seizing valuable forest resources in that area. See Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002.
- ^{lxxiii} While the *Arbakee* are the major interface between the state and the *Shuras*, the state also works on other policy field via these structures on district level. It is quite common in Paktia that *Shuras* supported by the state are used to settle disputes in the context of state-community as well as within inter-tribal issues. A conflict between Mangal and Tutakhel for example was solved by a government backed *Shura* in 2004 (Information based on research conducted by the Tribal Liaison Office in 2005). This ability of the *Shuras* to interact with the government also underlines the contrast to Kandahar, where the elders rely on those who control the means of violence.
- ^{lxxiv} Interviews conducted in spring and summer 2005 came to the result that more than 90% of the interviewees preferred the *Arbakee* compared to the state police.
- ^{lxxv} Nancy Tapper, *Bartered Brides: Politics, Gender and Marriages in an Afghan Tribal Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- ^{lxxvi} In Khost, for example, the socio-economic inequality is the main cause for the *Arbakee* system being dysfunctional in that region.
- ^{lxxvii} Charles Tilly, 'War-Making and State-Making as Organized Crime', in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer and Skopcol Theda, *Bringing the State Back in*, Cambridge: 1985, pp. 169-191.