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The Process of Making Market-Enhancing Laws in Morocco

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INTRODUCTION

The objective of transiting from a "non-market economy" towards an "open and liberalized economy" has required over the last two last decades¹ drafting, debating, approving and enacting a substantial number of laws and regulations. Several factors influence the quality of these drafting, debating, approving and enacting processes. These factors range from the depth and inclusiveness of consultation campaigns at the very early stages of the law's inception, clarity and consistency of the drafting, quality of the knowledge basis upon which provisions were designed, transparency of voting and adoption mechanisms, to the degree of commitment to its implementation.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the law making process in Morocco and assess the strengths and weaknesses of the actors participating in the market-enhancing reforms. One explanation could be the inconsistency or the gap between the official legal framework on one hand, and market signals as perceived by potential actors on the other hand. There is a relatively large consensus that the weakness of institutions in charge of implementing and enforcing laws and regulations undermines seriously their credibility and effectiveness. Several examples may be provided in areas such as fiscal policy, labor regulations, and competition policy. In all these three cases, the legal and regulatory frameworks exist, but they are only weakly enforced. There is however less consensus on why these institutions are so weak. Is it just a matter of capacity and financial means that can be resolved by technical and financial assistance? Or Is it deeper than that revealing the existence of actors that participate in weakening the enforcement process, and that might use it as a rewarding or a disciplining device?

The purpose of the paper is to contribute to the debate on these issues by focusing on the law-making process. It starts by presenting and assessing the process through which laws are initiated, drafted, amended, adopted, and enforced in Morocco. A particular attention is devoted to the role played by various actors, especially the Executive and the Legislature, in shaping this process.

¹ The structural adjustment program that can be taken as a starting date to this process was adopted in Morocco in 1983.

1. THE LAW MAKING PROCESS IN MOROCCO

The process of making laws entails a series of steps through which any draft of law proceeds. This process is highly codified either by constitution or by other legal means. The process of elaborating legal documents in Morocco is to a large extent inspired from the French model.

Technically, law-making or legislation encompasses the legally binding rules used to make requirements on private and public firms, citizens, as well as on various branches of the government. Legislation covers both laws passed by Parliament and regulations made by the government on the basis of the authority delegated to it in order to complement and provide detail to laws under the form of implementation decrees.

Figure 1 below is an attempt to represent the *typical itinerary* followed by any "law project"² from its inception to its final adoption and promulgation. The figure is kept as simple as possible although the itinerary is not as linear as might be understood.

1.1. Legislative Initiative

The need to legislate for the first time or to amend an existing legislation is generally initiated by the King³ through his speeches at the opening of the first session of each legislative year⁴. The King may also give direction of where he wants to set priorities of reform in his speeches to the nation, his letters to the Prime Minister, or letters sent to national meetings, and conferences. The King provides both the government and

² Any project initiated by the executive branch is called "law project", and any project initiated by members of parliament is called "law proposal". Law proposals in Morocco represent less than 10 percent of laws adopted by the parliament, that's why our focus is exclusively on "law projects".

³ The king is constitutionally granted large legislative prerogatives. The king legislate directly under the state of exception, in the case of the parliament dissolution, during transition periods (passage from one constitution to another).


⁴ Each legislative year is made of two session. The first session scheduled for the second Friday of October is officially opened by the King.

parliament with general orientations, but also with directives and instructions on law projects that he wants to be drafted⁵.

Besides law proposals originating inside Parliament, which is rare, the initiative to legislate can also emerge from "government declarations," from ministerial or sectoral strategies, or from international commitments (bilateral, regional or multilateral).

⁵ A. Fountir (2002).

Figure 1 : The law Making Process



1.2. Drafting Stage

The law project is brought forward by a specific ministry or several ministries depending on its aim and scope⁶. The staff in charge of *legal affairs*⁷ prepares and updates early versions of the project. The drafting stage may also involve some support from the "*General Secretariat of the Government*" (SGG⁸).

Any legal text that has direct or potential financial implications is sent to the Ministry of Finance for approval⁹. On the other hand, any text that deals with cross-cutting issues, is sent to concerned ministries and departments for their appreciation and comments. Interest groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and experts may also be consulted during the drafting stage.

Once comments are collected and incorporated by the initiating ministry, the draft is sent to the General Secretariat of the Government. This department examines the conformity of the draft with the constitution (constitutionality requirement) and with the overall existing laws and regulations (consistency requirement). The text is then sent to all line ministries for their opinion.

The drafting stage may also involve various formal and informal consultations. Some of them are legally required such as consulting the "High Council of Civil Service¹⁰" for any text related to civil servants status. Others are not required legally but they are very crucial for the adoption and implementation stages. These are consultations with social partners (labor unions, business association). Evidence shows that whenever the government circumvents these preliminary consultations, it faces strong opposition from stakeholders later in law-making process.

⁶ There are cases in which different ministries work separately on the same legal text. Each ministry considers it is its own prerogative to do so. As a result, heterogeneous and inconsistent drafts are circulated. These disputes may delay the process.

⁷ Depending on the ministry "Legal affairs" (called sometimes "*general affairs*" or "*administrative affairs*") may be in a directorate, a division or simply in a service.

⁸ SGG: Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement.

⁹ Because any text is likely to have either direct or potential implications, all texts tend to be sent to the Ministry of finance to avoid any delay later in the process.

¹⁰ Le Conseil Supérieur de la Fonction Publique

1.3. Adoption Stage

The draft is submitted by the General Secretariat of the Government (GSG), after endorsement by the Prime Minister, for discussion within the "*Government Council*¹¹". Then, the draft is presented and examined in the "*Council of Ministers*¹²" chaired by His Majesty the King. The adoption of the law project by the Council of Ministers is a very critical stage. The agenda of this Council is set by the GSG in coordination with the *Royal Cabinet*. Some law projects may be accepted by the Government Council but not scheduled for the Council of Ministers. Once the law project is adopted, it is sent by the Prime Minister to *Parliament*.

Within Parliament, the legal procedure is both conflictive and repetitive. It is conflictive because it involves a large debate among various components of the parliament; and it is repetitive because it goes through both chambers separately.

The draft is sent to one of the two chambers of parliament but both have to vote on the law, the Chamber of Representatives and the Chamber of Counselors (see box 1 for Morocco's bi-cameral model). In either chamber the draft is first scheduled for discussion in a specific "*permanent parliamentary commission*" depending on its object (see Box 2 for the various commissions). Within the commission, the text is examined article by article and amendments are submitted. The minister in charge of the law project, or his delegates, participate in the commission, explaining the law project's provisions and answering MPs questions. It is also at this stage that interest groups seek to exert their influence. If the text is very controversial, it may be blocked at this level¹³. Once the "*permanent commission*" adopts the project it is then debated in a "*Plenary Session*" and then voted.

The same process is replicated in both chambers. Even if a text is adopted by one chamber, it will not go further unless it is voted by the other chamber.

¹¹ The government Council (Le Conseil du Gouvernement) chaired by the Prime Minister has only a preparation role.

¹² Le Conseil des Ministres

¹³ This was for example the case of the labor code that lasted three years in the competent commission in the chamber of advisors.

Box 1: Morocco's Bi-cameral Model

The Kingdom of Morocco is a constitutional monarchy. The last constitutional revisions took place respectively in 1992 and 1996. The Head of State is the King (Mohamed VI since 23 July 1999) who is also by constitution the "*Defender of the Faith*". The Constitution guarantees a multi-party system. Some thirty political parties are represented in the Chamber of Representatives. Morocco is at its seventh parliamentary experience: 1. from 1963 to 1965; 2. from 1970 to 1971; 3. from 1977 to 1984; 4. from 1984 to 1992; 5. from 1993 to 1997; 6. from 1997 to 2002; and 7. is the current session which started in 2002 after national parliamentary elections.

In September 1996, a constitutional referendum divided the Parliament into two chambers (*bicameral legislature*). The "lower chamber" (Chamber of Representatives¹⁴) is directly elected, and the "upper chamber" (Chamber of Counselors¹⁵) is made up of representatives elected by professional and business organizations, labor unions, communal councils, and chambers of commerce.

The Chamber of Counselors ensures that the parliament will represent local and elite interests. Three-fifth (3/5) of its members are elected by regional electorate colleges consisting of local bodies (communal councils, prefectural assemblies, and regional councils), and two-fifth (2/5) are selected by electoral colleges of representatives of professional associations. The Chamber of Representatives is composed of 325 members and elected for five years. The Chamber of Counselors is composed of 270 members and elected for nine years, with one third of the Chamber up for re-election every third year.

¹⁴ House of representatives is *Majliss Annouwab* in Arabic.

¹⁵ House of advisers is *Majliss Al Moustacharine* in Arabic

Box 2: Parliamentary commissions or Permanent commissions

There are six parliamentary commissions in each chamber. Those of the Chamber of Representatives are:

- Foreign Affairs, National Defense and Islamic Affairs
- Justice, Legislation and Human Rights
- Interior, Decentralization and Infrastructure
- Finance and Economic Development
- Productive Sectors
- Social Sectors

The six commissions of the Chamber of Counselors are:

- Education, Cultural and Social Affairs
- Foreign Affairs, Borders, Occupied Zones, and National Defense
- Interior, Regions and local territories
- Finance, Infrastructure, and Regional Development Planning
- Justice, legislation and Human Rights
- Agriculture and Economic Affairs

The Bureau of Parliament allocates law projects among commissions depending on their content. For example, the law project on privatization was debated in the commission of "Finance and Economic Development", and the Association Agreement with the European Union was debated in the "Foreign Affairs Commission".

In principle, 54 members are affiliated to each commission in the Chamber of Representatives, and 45 in each commission in the Chamber of Counselors. No MP can be a member of more than one commission. However any MP can participate in any other commission without voting right. Each commission selects its bureau and elects its president and a vice-president.

For each law project received, the commission nominates one of its members to report to the plenary session. The commission is briefed on the content and motives of any law project by the Minister in charge; it may be supported by other experts or specialists as required. Amendments are submitted formally by different parliamentarian groups and then debated within the commission. The final stage is the vote on the law project article by article and then in its entirety.

Low attendance characterizes parliamentary commissions even when debating very important law projects. Attendance is compulsory although internal rules don't require any quorum for *regular meetings* to be held. Any absence must be justified otherwise absence without justification in three consecutive meetings means loss of membership in the commission. Moreover, the name of "undisciplined" member is announced in a plenary session and published in the official bulletin. However, these provisions have never been enforced. Regarding *meetings for vote*, internal rules require an absolute majority of commission members. In case this condition is not fulfilled, the meeting *can be postponed* upon request of the commission's president or one third of its members. In any case, the meeting cannot be postponed beyond the same day or the following day. In case of postponement, no quorum is required.

In the plenary session the debate, although not effective in terms of amending the project, is crucial for political parties. Their objective is to express their positions publicly, so that the public opinion can hear them.

In the plenary session, the government is endowed with a number of prerogatives. First, it can reject any amendment that has not been previously submitted in the commission. Second, the government can ask the Chamber to conduct one vote keeping only amendments proposed or accepted by the government.

If a law project is not adopted after two readings by both Chambers, or if the government declares emergency after one reading, it can call for a meeting of a "*mixed bipartite committee*"¹⁶ representing both Chambers. Its task is to propose a text approved by both. This text is then submitted to both Chambers for adoption. At this stage, no amendment can be accepted unless the government agrees. If the mixed committee has not succeeded in adopting a common text, or if the common text has not been adopted by both Chambers, the government can submit the text, amended if necessary, to the Chamber of Representatives. The Chamber of Representatives can only adopt the submitted text with an absolute majority of its members¹⁷.

Once both chambers have adopted the text, it goes back to the Prime Minister's cabinet who submits it to the Royal Cabinet for the stamp of the King (promulgation). The King promulgates texts passed by Parliament within 30 days after they have been forwarded to him¹⁸. The text becomes law and goes the General Secretariat of the Government GSG that publishes it in the Official Bulletin¹⁹.

¹⁶ Commission mixte paritaire.

¹⁷ The constitution does not deal with the case where the text would be adopted by the "house of advisers" and rejected by the "house of representatives". It is understood that the "absolute majority" is not required. A "simple majority" is sufficient to reject the text. Such a situation has never occurred, but should it happen it would highlight the superiority of the house of representatives over the house of advisers.

¹⁸ This provision (30 days) has been introduced in the 1996's constitution. There was no time constraint in previous constitutions.

¹⁹ Organic laws (laws that deals with State's organization, constitution or international treaties) are voted and modified under the same conditions but two exceptions. First, they are voted ten days only following their submission to one of the chambers. Second, they can be promulgated only once constitutional council has asserted their conformity with the constitution.

1.4. Implementation Stage

Once the text is adopted by the parliament and promulgated by the King, it is published in the "*official bulletin*" and enters into force, unless there is a transition period explicitly indicated in the law.

Some laws can only be effective if they are followed by "*implementation decrees*". In some cases, the implementation decrees are prepared simultaneously with the law project and require only their approval by the Council of Ministers after their review by the Government Council. In other cases, the preparation of implementation decrees starts only months, or even years, after the publication of the law in the "*official bulletin*". Finally, some laws have never been effectively applied because their implementation decrees have never been issued²⁰.

The stage of drafting the implementation decrees involves social partners and stakeholders. They seek actively to introduce in the decrees what they failed to include in the law. The implementation decrees are very often very crucial and might significantly affect the content of provisions stipulated in the law.

2. CAPACITY-BUILDING COMPONENT IS LACKING WITHIN MINISTRIES

The ministerial departments in charge of drafting laws are not sufficiently staffed with legal experts except in some large ministries such as "Finance", "Interior" and "Public Works". According to A. Rabiaa, the General Secretary of the government²¹: "*Legal experts, capable of analyzing legal documents, identifying their weaknesses, comparing legal provisions and writing a new law project, consistent with the existing legal structure are very scarce in our ministries, not mentioning their ability at the end of the drafting process to defend the legal foundations of the project*".

One major problem is the education system which is producing a large number of graduates in law who need substantial training and experience before they can write law projects. Although there are new and very complex areas that need to be

²⁰ It would be interesting to assess the extent of this phenomenon and understand the reasons that lie behind it. But this issue goes beyond the purpose of this paper.

²¹ La Vie Economique January 2004.

regulated, the capacity building component of the "legal staff" within ministries has not yet been seriously taken into account.

The General Secretariat of the Government

The General Secretariat of the Government GSG reviews and finalizes every draft of law before it is presented to the "Government Council". The GSG was reorganized by a decree of January 1985. It includes 6 departments (directorates) and one division. The "*legislative studies directorate*" is the key component of the GSG. Its staff counts 12 jurists and 10 legal advisors to the administration. These 22 are in charge of drafting all legislative texts and regulations submitted to the GSG. Since 1999, an average of 50 draft laws has been adopted by the Government Council annually. The number of laws finalized has increased from 40 in 1999 to 68 in 2003 (see table 1).

Table 1: Laws and Decree finalized by the GSG between 1999 and 2003

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Laws	40	53	41	60	68
Decree	118	107	84	91	77

Source: La Vie Economique January 16 2004

3. THE MOROCCAN PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE POWER

The legal architecture of the law making process presented earlier can be assessed from two complementary angles. First, how much legislative power is granted to the parliament by the Moroccan constitution? Second, to what extent members of parliament use the margins granted by constitution to initiate and affect the legislative production?

3.1. Members of Parliaments tend to be Law-Voters Not Law-Makers

Under the current constitutional framework, the "*legislative power*" of the Parliament tends to be constrained. First, the "domain of law" is explicitly limited by constitution. The parliament is therefore a "legislative power" but with fixed attributions, or an "exceptional legislator". Any jurisdiction not explicitly mentioned in the constitution as being part of the domain of law belongs to the regulatory field, and therefore can be handled by governmental decrees.

Second, legislative process grants dominance to the executive branch over parliament. Members of parliament are endowed with limited resources as to propose or actively debate laws drafted by the government. In addition, any amendment that might have financial implication is automatically rejected.

Article 51 of the constitution stipulates that any proposal or amendment of the budget-law submitted by members of parliament is rejected if its approval leads either to reduce government resources or increase the budget deficit. This article restricts MPs legislative initiative regarding the fiscal law. All they can suggest is transferring credits from one item to another, approving the fiscal plan entirely or rejecting it. Usually, the difference between the budget submitted and the budget adopted is insignificant. As a consequence, budget-law debate has been characterized over the years by its ineffectiveness, and the level of attendance does not improve during this special event.

The government can legislate between regular parliamentary sessions (*intercession period*). As such, the constitution has allowed the parliament to delegate its legislative power to the government. Finally, the government controls the agenda of parliament and gives priority to draft laws it submits over law proposals.

However, the issue is not only about how much power is granted by constitution to parliament; it is also about how much room is being effectively used by members of parliament? Parliamentary practice in Morocco reveals that MPs fail to fully and effectively use their constitutional and legal prerogatives in proposing and contributing to the legislative process. The ineffectiveness of previous parliamentary experiences has negatively affected the image of the parliament and the perception of members of parliament among the public.

The average rate of presence in committee meetings is around 20 percent, and between 17 and 24 percent in plenary sessions. The low level of attendance of members of parliament is a general phenomenon regardless of the nature of laws debated. A prominent example is the labor code for which the number of voters (by yes, no or abstention) did not exceed 8 percent of total members. This is very worrying since the labor code, debated in the parliament, for more than six years, is one crucial piece of economic and social legislation.

The budget law debate has also been characterized over the years by its ineffectiveness. Attendance of members of parliament, which is usually low, does not improve during this special event. The difference between the budget submitted and the budget adopted is generally insignificant. To a large extent, this is due to *article 51* of the Moroccan constitution which postulates that any amendment of the budget that increases expenditure or budget deficit is automatically rejected.

The curious matter is that MPs tend to well educated. Still they do not attend regularly, not even in the specialized committees. Even when parliament is discussing important law projects, MPs have a very low attendance rate (see box 3).

Box 3: Who are Members of Parliament in Morocco?

The age structure of members of parliament in Morocco indicates that 13,5 percent are 60 years old and above; 32 percent are between 50 and 60 years old, 41,2 percent are between 40 and 50 and 12,9 percent are between 30 and 40. Only one parliamentarian is less than 30 years old (see table 2).

Educational attainment of members of parliament has significantly improved in recent legislatures. In the current legislature, 64 percent of members in the Chamber of Representatives have a higher education level, 25 percent a secondary education degree and 11 percent completed primary education.

Table 2. Education attainment of the house of representatives' members

Education level (%)	1963	1970	1977	1984	1997	2002
Higher Education	24	25	48	51	54	64
Secondary Education	13	28	24	23	27	25
Primary Education	14	21	16	9	13	11
Can read & write	49	27	12	18	6	-
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

In terms of their socio-professional background, the largest professional group is teachers and professors with 25,5 percent of the seats. They are followed by the liberal professions with 15,3 percent of the seats and business entrepreneurs with 14,7 percent. Commercial professionals represent 10,8 percent, top managers 7,6 percent, and civil servants 6,7 percent.

Nevertheless, members of parliament are generally not active and their participation in the parliamentary commission tends to be limited. Members do not devote much time to their representative duties²². The "privatization law" and the "customs code" for example were voted with less than 20 parliamentarians.

²² L. ACHY (2004).

Data on educational attainment of members of the Moroccan parliament show that over the period (1997-2002): 54 percent of them have a higher education, 27 percent have a secondary education, 13 percent primary education and 6 percent are illiterate. However, if educational attainment may be seen as a necessary condition to understand issues dealt with the legislative arena, and compile data available; it is not sufficient. The skills needed to carry out properly parliamentary responsibilities suppose extra efforts, and investigations to grasp new and evolving issues. Looking at the data on the presence rate in the parliament indicate that members are not devoting much of their time to their representative duties.

3.2. Weak Financial and Human Resources Allocated to the Parliament

More than 80 percent of the budget allocated to the parliament is devoted to cover overheads and salaries of parliamentarians and civil servants employed in parliament's administration (see table 3). The rest is allocated to other operational expenses. Parliament's administration does not have services able to provide members of parliament with information, studies and documentation. Parliament's financial and human resources are extremely modest regarding its constitutional mission and in comparison with governmental departments.

Table 3: Provisional expenditures of the House of representatives in millions of DH

Years	Salaries	Total	Salaries as a % of Total
1990	133,6	152,3	87,7
1995	178,5	223,3	79,9
2001	178,2	219,7	81,1
2002	178,2	235,1	75,8
2003	178,2	211,4	84,3
2004	178,2	216,8	82,2

The parliament has also serious weaknesses in its managerial staff. According to Achy (2004) the number of civil servant in the Chamber of Representatives does not exceed 261. The personnel in charge of the legislative services, the commissions and the sessions are insufficient. The parliamentary groups do not have specialized assistants which significantly affects their work. The parliamentarian themselves do not have any support staff or individual offices within the parliament.

Members of parliament particularly those who are heading committees need support from the administrative staff of the parliament. There are 261 employees in the parliament, among which only two work for “*Studies and Translation service*”, 56 are in charge of “*Parliamentary groups’ support*”, 32 are in charge of helping “*committees*”, 12 work for “*Plenary sessions’ service*”, 7 are allocated to “*Parliamentary questions’ service*” and 6 in “*legislation service*”. The rest (146) is in charge of “*general administrative and logistic services*”. These figures reveal that, on average, each committee has a *support staff* of 5 to 6 employees. Over the parliamentary mandate (1997-2002) this staff (32) had to cover **989 meetings**, which means an amount of **2821 hours of work** inside the committees. This does not account for preparing the meetings and searching for information requested by the members of parliament. The staff in charge of parliamentary questions (7 people) had to deal with 12197 questions over the mandate 1997-2002.

The real issue is not only the size of the parliament staff, it is also its quality and capacity. Looking at the data on the educational level indicates that undergraduates represent 24 percent, master degree holders 3 percent. The rest of the staff has less than higher education. These data show clearly that human resources allocated to the parliament are very low compared to the amount and the quality of support requested by members of parliament.

The Chamber of Counselors employs 281 civil servants. Twenty four among them are advisors, 60 administrators, 42 adjunct administrators, 34 are secretaries and the rest are basic support staff. The provisional budget of the parliament for 2004 amounts to 178 million DH for operational expenditures and less than 40 million DH for investment expenditures.

3.3. Weak Support from Political Parties

After all, members of parliament are representing their parties in parliament. They are elected for their programs and they are supposed to express the view of their parties. In principle, they can rely on the support and technical advice provided by members of their parties. However, to our knowledge, there is generally no institutional framework within political parties which ensures this type of support.

Moreover, the links between members of parliament and their political parties are sometimes weak. The phenomenon of “*nomads*” moving from one party to another is widespread in Morocco. During the current mandate, over 100 members of parliament changed their political parties in less than one year (44 in chamber of representatives and 56 in chamber of councilors). The draft law on political parties has been initiated by the monarchy more than two years ago and is still debated in the parliament. This law is expected to exert a substantial impact on the political landscape in Morocco by preventing fragmentation of parties, and limiting the phenomenon of *nomads*.

4. PROLIFERATION OF PARALLEL STRUCTURES

The process of drafting and designing “new laws” requires building consensus among interest groups and stakeholders. Consensus building relies on different schemes of consultation and participation. In principle, the parliament is the institution in which, by nature, a wide range of interests are represented, consulted and constructively allowed to participate in the law-making process.

However, in most cases, other consultative bodies are created and their composition tailored depending on the specific “law or regulation” to be drafted. “*Consultative bodies*” called also “*council*”, “*commission*” or “*committees*” are *parallel structures*.

Unlike parliament, the composition of consultative bodies are left to political discretion. In principle, their members are expected to be knowledgeable and represent the various stakeholders that may be affected by the legal framework under study. However, a majority of their members is formed from civil servants; other members are more often appointed rather than elected. This composition leaves these consultative bodies with little autonomy.

The conduct and performance of consultative bodies are very heterogeneous. To a large extent, their performance depends on the priority of the issue dealt with and willingness of political power to address it. Consultative bodies can contribute to build consensus more effectively, but they may also delay the decision. They generally report directly to the head of the state or to the prime minister.

One example is the “*Inter-Ministerial Permanent Committee of Public Enterprises*” (IPCPE) created in 1987 by a “*prime minister note*” (CAB n°15 of February 1987). Its objective is to assess the opportunity to privatize some public activities and review

legal or regulatory measures to strengthen this process. The "*Consultative Council for Social Dialogue*", created in 1994, is another example.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this paper was to examine the process of law making and assess to what extent it can help in understanding the gap between expected and recorded performance.

Our findings indicate that legislative initiative is very centralized. The need to legislate for the first time or to amend an existing legislation is generally initiated by the King, who provides both the government and the parliament with general orientations, but also with directives and instructions on the law project to be drafted.

Most legal entities within ministries lack expertise and adequate training to draft acceptable and coherent law projects. This situation puts much of the burden on the SGG, which plays a central role in finalizing all law projects. This administration appears understaffed compared to the growing number of law projects, and regulations that needs to review and finalize.

A substantial effort is required to improve the effectiveness of parliament in the law making process. Internal rules on absence need to be respected, and members have to be accountable to their constituents. It is also equally crucial to increase citizens' awareness regarding the role of parliament in a democratic society. To be effective, parliament needs more human and financial resources. The current staff is quantitatively insufficient, and qualitatively inadequate to meet requirements of a modern and enterprising parliament.

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