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**MULTI-AGENT SIMULATION FOR THE TARGETING OF DEVELOPMENT
POLICIES IN LESS-FAVORED AREAS**

Thomas Berger^a, Pepijn Schreinemachers^b, and Johannes Woelcke^c

^a University of Hohenheim, Stuttgart

^b Center for Development Research (ZEF), Bonn

^c The World Bank, Washington, D.C.

Contact:

Thomas Berger

University of Hohenheim (490e), D-70593 Stuttgart, Germany

Phone: (+49) 711-459 4117

Fax: (+49) 711-459 4248

EMail: 490e@uni-hohenheim.de

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1 **Multi-Agent Simulation for the Targeting of Development Policies in Less-Favored**

2 **Areas**

3

4 **Abstract**

5 Complex combinations of biophysical and socioeconomic constraints characterize the less-
6 favored rural areas in developing countries. More so, these constraints are diverse as they vary
7 considerably between households even in the same community. We propose Multi-Agent
8 Systems as a modeling approach well suited for capturing the complexity of constraints as
9 well as the diversity in which they appear at the farm household level. Given that empirical
10 multi-agent models based on mathematical programming share the characteristics of bio-
11 economic farm models plus some additional features, one may interpret bio-economic farm
12 models as a special case of multi-agent models without spatial dimension and direct
13 interaction. Evidently, spatially-explicit, connected multi-agent models have higher
14 requirements in terms of development costs, empirical data and validation. Therefore, we see
15 them as a complement, and not a substitute, to existing bio-economic modeling approaches.
16 They might be the preferred model choice when heterogeneity and interactions of agents and
17 environments are significant and, therefore, policy responses cannot be aggregated linearly.
18 We illustrate the strength of empirical multi-agent models with simulation results from
19 Uganda and Chile and indicate how they may assist policymakers in prioritizing and targeting
20 alternative policy interventions especially in less-favored areas.

21

22 **Keywords**

23 Diversity of constraints to agricultural development, empirical multi-agent systems, bio-
24 economic modeling, ex ante assessment of policy options

25

1 **1. Introduction**

2 A wide diversity in terms of biophysical conditions, farm resource endowments, and social
3 structures characterize the less-favored rural areas of developing countries (Ruben and
4 Pender, 2004; Kuyvenhoven, 2004). This diversity translates into a long list of factors
5 constraining agricultural development: uncertain rainfall, poor soil fertility, steep slopes, lack
6 of irrigation, poor physical infrastructure, high transaction costs, imperfect and missing
7 capital, land and product markets, etc. (idem.). The abundance of these constraints as well as
8 their interaction creates an overwhelming level of complexity. All constraints can be, or have
9 been, shown as important. Yet policy intervention is costly and resources are limited. Ranking
10 of constraints and prioritizing policy interventions is thus important to ensure that the limited
11 funds are spent efficiently.

12

13 Bio-economic simulation models are suitable tools for disentangling complex relationships
14 and have been widely applied for this purpose (Barbier, 1998; Holden and Shiferaw, 2004;
15 Holden et al., 2004; Deybe and Barbier, 2005). These models are, however, not fully capable
16 of capturing the heterogeneity in biophysical and socioeconomic constraints and the
17 interaction between these. We argue that Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) is a modeling approach
18 well suited to complement these bio-economic models when heterogeneity and interaction are
19 important. MAS are therefore of particular relevance for developing tools to support policy
20 targeting in the less-favored areas (LFAs).

21

22 The paper is organized as follows. We first shortly elaborate on the specific policy challenges
23 posed by LFAs. We then describe multi-agent simulation as a well-suited approach for
24 integrating the many constraints characteristic of LFAs into a single modeling framework. We
25 illustrate the applicability of MAS models with empirical research from Uganda and Chile.

1 The last section of the paper summarizes the foregoing in terms of relevance for research and
2 policymaking and draws conclusions.

3

4 **2. Diversity and interaction of constraints**

5 A defining feature of LFAs is that biophysical and socioeconomic constraints are more
6 binding than in the favored areas. This creates particular challenges for farm households,
7 researchers and policymakers alike.

8

9 **2.1. The challenge of agricultural growth in the LFAs**

10 At the farm household level, we can broadly divide these constraints into biophysical and
11 socioeconomic ones plus an interaction between these two. At the aggregate level, the
12 diversity between farm households creates an additional constraint to development. We
13 shortly detail on these in the following.

14 1. The biophysical constraints faced by farm households in the LFAs are not unique to
15 the LFAs but their intensity is more severe than in the favored areas. Crop growth is
16 limited by short growing periods due to seasonal drought, flood, or stresses posed by
17 unfavorable soil physical properties such as low soil depth, salinity, poor drainage or
18 water holding capacity, or susceptibility to erosion—to name a few. Because of these
19 constraints, the yield premium from farm technology adoption is usually lower in
20 LFAs than in favored areas while the seasonal yield variability is usually higher (e.g.
21 de Rouw 2004).

22 2. In addition to the biophysical constraints, farm households in the LFAs face also more
23 socioeconomic constraints (Ruben and Pender, 2004). These constraints include high
24 transaction costs, for instance, resulting from geographic insulation, imperfect and
25 missing input and output markets, as well as from poor infrastructure and public

1 services, which can be a consequence of past neglect in development policies
2 (Kuyvenhoven, 2004).

3 3. The interaction between biophysical and socioeconomic constraints creates additional
4 binding constraints for agricultural growth in LFAs. For example, fertilizer is used at
5 sub-optimal levels when farm households are uncertain about the returns to fertilizer
6 use, which results from a large variability in both rainfall and output prices (Vlek,
7 1990).

8 4. A characteristic of farm households in LFAs is their large heterogeneity in terms of
9 biophysical and socioeconomic constraints. Often, the farm households have different
10 land qualities and differential access to markets. The opportunities to adopt improved
11 technologies or to seek off-farm employment can also not be assumed equal for all
12 farm households. The potential for rapid technology diffusion tends to be lower in
13 environments with a high degree of network diversity (Rogers 1995).

14

15 **2.2. The challenge of targeting policy interventions**

16 The heterogeneity of biophysical and socioeconomic constraints in LFAs and the multitude of
17 their interactions pose great difficulties to the design of development policies. In order to be
18 effective, the most binding constraints at the farm household level should be the target of
19 policy interventions and guide public investments in agricultural R&D. From the complexity
20 of the planning problem in LFAs derives a challenge for researchers to provide scientific
21 information for policy targeting and *ex ante* technology evaluation.

22

23 In a previous special issue of this journal, several bio-economic modeling approaches were
24 presented that might support the development and formulation of policy interventions
25 (Kuyvenhoven et al., 1998). These bio-economic approaches quantify the biophysical and

1 socioeconomic constraints and model them within a single framework to analyze the human-
2 environment interactions and the likely effects when particular—biophysical or
3 socioeconomic—constraints are relieved (see also the more recent work of Holden et al.,
4 2004; Deybe and Barbier, 2005).

5
6 The scientific challenge, however, is to apply bio-economic models when policy interventions
7 and/or environmental changes are likely to cause large differences in individual policy
8 responses. In general, this is the case when farm households differ considerably in terms of
9 factor endowments and decision-making processes and when resources are exchanged locally
10 or in networks. Another challenge for bio-economic modeling is to allow for a sufficient
11 degree of spatial and temporal complexity, since changes in the natural environment, the
12 market environment, and the introduction of improved technologies typically involve long-
13 term interacting processes. This is especially important for the *ex ante* evaluation of plant
14 breeding programs which will usually take about ten years to release newly adapted varieties
15 for LFAs. In the remainder of this paper, we present multi-agent simulation as a promising
16 tool for capturing more fully the heterogeneity over space and time and for providing
17 information for policy targeting by means of computational experiments.

18

19 **3. Agent-based bio-economic models**

20 Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) is a quite recent concept, originating in the computer sciences; it
21 has rapidly diffused to other disciplines and is now broadly applied to the analysis of complex
22 systems (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999; Janssen, 2002; Parker et al. 2003). MAS is also of great
23 interest to scenario analyses of agricultural development opportunities in LFAs, because it is
24 highly suitable for representing interlinked socioeconomic and biophysical systems.

25

1 **3.1. Multi-Agent Systems and human-environment interactions**

2 Parker et al. (2003) reviewed applications of MAS to the modeling of land-use decisions and
3 subsequent land-cover changes. They defined multi-agent models of land-cover and land-use
4 change (MAS/LUCC) as consisting of two key components. The first component is a cellular
5 model that represents the landscape under study. This cellular model may draw on a number
6 of specific modeling techniques such as *Cellular Automata*, *Spatial Diffusion Models*, and
7 *Markov Models*. In cellular automata, for example, each cell has discrete states, which can
8 change over time according to pre-defined rules that take into account spatial interactions with
9 neighboring cells (for more details on the cellular model component see Parker et al., 2003).
10 The second component is an agent-based model that represents human decision-making and
11 interactions. It consists of autonomous decision-making units (computational agents), an
12 environment through which agents interact, rules that define the relationship between agents
13 and their environment, and rules that determine the sequencing of actions.

14
15 According to the type of rules, Berger and Parker (2002) classified MAS/LUCC into *abstract*,
16 *experimental*, and *empirical* applications (a fourth class of *historical* applications is not of
17 concern here). In abstract MAS, the rules of agents and environment are hypothetical and
18 simple. The intention is not to represent reality as closely as possible, but to reduce it to its
19 essential features and thereby study the underlying (social) mechanisms of land-use change.
20 In experimental MAS, the computer model serves as a platform for interaction of real human
21 actors. D'Aquino et al. (2003), for example, applied MAS to accompany collective decision-
22 making processes related to the management of natural resources. In role-playing games,
23 participants are first asked to define the decision rules of different resource users.
24 Computational agents are then implemented according to these decision rules and interact
25 within a simplified environment. Participants may observe their computational 'analogs,'

1 change the agents' rules of behavior for the next simulation experiment, and thereby learn
2 how to improve their real-world management rules. In empirical MAS, in contrast, the rules
3 of both the agents and the environment are based on empirical observations or on *ad hoc*
4 parameters that serve as realistic substitutes for lacking empirical data. Simulation
5 experiments are used to frame possible land use dynamics and to explore the policy feasible
6 space.

7

8 In this paper, the focus is only on empirical multi-agent models. In this type of models, a
9 computational agent typically represents a farm household who combines individual
10 knowledge and values, information on soil quality and topography (the biophysical landscape
11 environment), and an assessment of the land management choices of neighbors (the spatial
12 social environment) to make land-use decisions. Figure 1 shows the spatial data representation
13 of an empirical MAS/LUCC.

14

15 << **Insert Figure 1: Spatial data representation of an integrated Multi-Agent System** >>

16

17 The particular strength of empirical MAS is their ability to account for the heterogeneity and
18 interdependencies among agents and their environment. The cellular model component
19 provides a spatial framework to link socio-economic decision models with biophysical
20 simulation models at disaggregated level, for example with models for soil productivity or
21 water run-off (Vlek et al., 2005). MAS models are generally implemented via object-oriented
22 programming languages, which provide an efficient and transparent way of organizing large
23 amounts of data and handling complex model dynamics. Furthermore, their high degree of
24 flexibility makes it possible to incorporate a large variety of agent decision rules such as profit
25 maximization, minimum subsistence levels, or combinations of these rules. For the

1 assessment of binding constraints and the valuation of natural resources (shadow prices), it is
2 convenient to formalize the agent decision problem with the help of mathematical
3 programming, a technique that has proven its suitability to represent the decision rules of land
4 managers and farm households (Hazell and Norton, 1986: 10).

5

6 Balmann (1997) pioneered this combination of agent-based modeling and mathematical
7 programming. He developed a hypothetical farm sector model and showed the theoretical
8 effects of the spatial distribution of farms on both the land rent and the speed of structural
9 change in agriculture. Berger (2001) developed an empirical MAS/LUCC model based on
10 mathematical programming and applied it to the question of technology diffusion in an
11 agricultural region of Chile. In the Chilean model, each farm agent has a separate objective
12 function and individual resource constraints and updates its expectations for prices and water
13 availability. In this respect, Berger's MAS model has the same characteristics as bio-
14 economic modeling approaches based on independent, representative farm models (see for
15 example, Ruben et al., 2000). There are, however, three important additional features that
16 distinguish the MAS from the representative farm modeling approach:

17 1. Number of farm models: Each and all real-world farm households are represented by
18 single model agents, that is, there is a one-to-one correspondence between real-world
19 and modeled agents. Monte Carlo techniques have to be developed to generate model
20 agent populations from sample data and to test the simulation results for robustness
21 (see Berger, 2004).

22 2. Spatial dimension: The MAS model is spatially explicit and employs a cell-based data
23 representation where each grid cell corresponds to one farm plot held by a single
24 landowner. Sub-models of water run-off and crop growth are linked to this cell-based
25 spatial framework.

1 3. *Direct interactions*: Several types of interactions among agents and their environment
2 are explicitly implemented in the MAS model such as the communication of
3 information, the exchange of land and water resources on land markets, the return
4 flows of irrigation water, the irrigation of crops and crop growth.

5 This one-to-one MAS representation captures biophysical and socio-economic constraints and
6 interactions at a very fine spatial resolution. Including this heterogeneity of constraints and
7 interactions of farm agents and their biophysical environment broadens the scope of bio-
8 economic modeling significantly. Phenomena that conventional models cannot easily
9 address—such as local resource degradation, technology diffusion, heterogeneous policy
10 responses and changes in farm structure—can now explicitly be modeled.

11
12 Given that MAS models share the characteristics of bio-economic farm models plus some
13 additional features, one may interpret bio-economic farm models as a special case of MAS
14 models without spatial dimension and direct interactions (*aspatial, non-connected* MAS).

15 Evidently, *spatially-explicit, connected* MAS have higher requirements in terms of
16 development costs, empirical data and validation. Therefore, we see MAS/LUCC as a
17 complement, and not a substitute, to existing bio-economic modeling approaches. They might
18 be the preferred model choice when heterogeneity and interactions of agents and
19 environments are significant and, therefore, policy responses cannot be aggregated linearly
20 (this is especially of importance, when farm types change over time). In the following
21 subsection, we outline how a multi-agent modeling framework can be used for policy
22 simulations in LFAs and how it may help in targeting policy interventions.

23 24 **3.2. Policy simulations**

25 There are several policy questions in the context of agricultural development of LFAs, where
26 MAS simulations may generate useful information for decision making on public investments

1 in R&D and targeting of policy interventions. Should funds be spent in crop breeding for
2 stress resistance or in research for improved crop management? Should micro-finance be
3 promoted or should agricultural inputs be subsidized? Which markets are the most distorted
4 and exactly where should market regulations be targeted at? Simulating the likely policy
5 responses of farm households and their impacts on the natural resource base provides
6 information for *ex ante* technology evaluation and for targeting of policy interventions.

7

8 The complexity of the research problem at hand, however, suggests conducting multi-agent
9 policy simulations according to the principle of *ceteris paribus*. Having successfully validated
10 the simulation model, it is convenient to run a sequence of simulation experiments that
11 stepwise isolate the effects of parameter changes. Table 1 outlines a sequence of computer
12 experiments to investigate specifically for LFAs, which constraints farm households face in
13 the adoption of new technologies and which policy instruments may induce them to adopt
14 ecologically sustainable farming practices:

15

16 << **Insert Table 1: Sequence of MAS experiments for policy simulations in LFAs** >>

17

18 Questions 1-5 in Table 1 can be answered with a static, non-connected bio-economic model
19 specification, as location and interaction between farm-households need not be considered.

20 Questions 6-9 require a dynamic, connected bio-economic model specification with spatial
21 and agent interactions. The next section illustrates how these two bio-economic model
22 specifications can be implemented within a multi-agent modeling framework, and what type
23 of information can be generated through computer policy simulations.

24

25 **4. Simulation experiments**

1 Before presenting some simulation experiments from empirical model applications to Uganda
2 and Chile, we have to make two reservations. First, although both study regions have
3 unexploited development opportunities, their agro-ecological conditions are relatively
4 favorable, population density is high, and access to markets is fairly good. In this respect, they
5 rather belong to the group of more favored rural areas than to the group of LFAs, at least if
6 measured by the criteria proposed in Pender et al. (2004). Second, research is still underway;
7 we cannot illustrate the nine questions posed in Table 1 for each study region. Yet, the
8 purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the suitability of MAS rather than to present policy
9 conclusions for a particular LFA. In the first subsection, we show on the basis of farm
10 household data from Uganda, how a static bio-economic model specification without agent
11 interactions can be applied to address questions 1-5. In the second subsection, we then show
12 with Chilean data how a dynamic and connected model specification can be applied to
13 address questions 6-9.

14

15 **4.1 Assessing the feasibility and constraints to increasing agricultural productivity**

16 The first group of research questions to be addressed deals with the feasibility of increasing
17 agricultural productivity in a sustainable manner. We first give an overview of the model
18 implementation and then show some simulation results. The study region comprises two
19 communities in the Iganga district in Southeastern Uganda. The prospects of agricultural
20 development are high, but current land productivity is very low and farmers extract large
21 amounts of nutrients from their soils through unsustainable land management practices. This
22 process of low productivity and high nutrient depletion could potentially be halted and
23 reversed through the application of new fertilizer technologies (e.g., green manures and
24 improved fallow). Such technologies were recently tested in field trials in the region; at
25 present, however, their adoption is limited (Woelcke, 2003; Kayuki et al., 2004).

1

2 The bio-economic modeling system, developed for testing the feasibility and constraints to
3 technology adoption, consists of three major components:

- 4 1. mathematical programming models at the farm household level to reflect agent
5 decision-making under different scenarios;
- 6 2. artificial neural networks as yield estimators; and
- 7 3. nutrient balances for N, P, and K as indicators for ecological sustainability.

8 The modeling system is implemented as an aspatial, non-connected MAS; it consists of
9 independent farm programming models without inter-agent linkages and is used for
10 comparative-static analyses. The objective function of each agent maximizes the household
11 income subject to consumption requirements and a number of financial and technical
12 constraints. Additional nutritional constraints represent the food requirements and
13 consumption preferences that the households articulated during in-depth interviews. Statistical
14 tests with data from fertilizer experiments revealed that artificial neural networks could better
15 capture the observed nonlinearities in fertilizer response than general linear models and
16 multiple regressions. The yield estimations and nutrient balances are incorporated into the
17 mathematical programming problem as coefficients and sustainability constraints. Model
18 validation is conducted by measuring the “goodness of fit” between modeled and observed
19 values in the baseline scenario; for details, the reader is referred to Woelcke (2003).

20

21 << **Insert Table 2: Simulation experiments for the average commercial farm household**
22 **in Iganga district, Uganda** >>

23

24 From a large sample of farm households, four household types are identified through cluster
25 analysis taking into account the level of education, resource endowments, innovativeness, and

1 market orientation. Here, we summarize the simulation experiments only for a single
2 household type, namely the average commercial farm household. Results for this household
3 type have high policy priority in Uganda because the commercialization of farm production is
4 promoted by the government. The simulation results for questions 1-5 are depicted in Table 2.
5 Negative nutrient balances in the current situation reveal a relatively high rate of nutrient
6 depletion in the study region (S1a in Table 2). Imposing an additional sustainability constraint
7 (non-negative nutrient balances) does not yield a feasible solution—meaning that, under
8 current conditions, ecological sustainability is out of reach for the average commercial farm
9 household (S1b). Even if new technologies (fertilizers), which could potentially increase
10 agricultural productivity and preserve soil fertility, are made available, the negative nutrient
11 balances still persist, and nutrient mining does not halt (S2). Making available new
12 technologies and imposing the sustainability constraint simultaneously is still infeasible (S3).
13 Only if cash constraints are relaxed, the commercial farm household may increase
14 productivity and produce with non-negative nutrient balances (S4a). Without the
15 sustainability constraint though (S4b), the profitable solution leads to higher nutrient losses
16 for nitrogen and potassium, as compared to the baseline scenario. This implies a tradeoff
17 between the private goal of increasing the farm household income in the short run and the
18 social goal of ecological sustainability in the long run. These results are similar to those
19 reported by Ruben et al. (2000).

20

21 Having identified the binding factors for the adoption of profitable and sustainable farming
22 practices, the model can then be used to identify policy incentives that could induce the farm
23 households to increase productivity while maintaining soil fertility. Through sensitivity
24 analyses it is first estimated by how much the fertilizer price must be reduced to give an
25 incentive for setting off the nutrient losses. Reduction in fertilizer price alone, however, is

1 found to be insufficient. Only combinations of higher output prices, lower input prices, and
2 provision of credit may induce the adoption of profitable and less depleting farming practices
3 (S5).

4

5 **4.2 Assessing the impacts of technology adoption and policy intervention**

6 Until now, we have used the bio-economic modeling system for analyzing the constraints and
7 policy incentives from a comparative-static point of view. The next group of questions put to
8 a dynamic, connected model version focuses on the likely adjustment process and policy
9 responses of farm households. Even if profitable and sustainable combinations of new
10 technologies, credit and relative prices can be identified as incentives as in the Ugandan study
11 region, there is still no guarantee that farm households eventually adopt these innovations and
12 increase agricultural productivity. Often, farm households can select between multiple
13 innovations and then—depending on their individual factor endowments, resource constraints
14 and subjective risk behavior—adopt only the most suitable ones. The interaction of farm
15 households in communication networks is, especially in developing countries, an integral part
16 of the adoption decision process since interpersonal communication lowers the uncertainty of
17 innovation (Rogers, 1995: 304). Other types of interactions that may be decisive for
18 technology adoption are land markets and population migrations (Berger, 2005). Furthermore,
19 the goals of farm households are not necessarily compatible with the goals of policymakers. A
20 model of policy response must therefore include the farm households' objective functions
21 (Hazell and Norton, 1986: 135). Both, interactions and heterogeneity of policy responses, can
22 be captured by adding three more components to the static, non-connected specification of
23 MAS:

- 24 1. rules of interactions between agents as, for example, the exchange of information in
25 communication networks and the exchange of land parcels on land markets;

- 1 2. specification of the agent decision-making, especially for inter-temporal decision
- 2 problems such as consumption versus investment;
- 3 3. sequencing of the agents' actions, for example, when agents make investment
- 4 decisions, when they engage in land markets, and when they harvest their crops.

5 We will here discuss results of a model application to Chile. The Chilean model employs
6 standard crop water production functions instead of artificial neural networks, and water
7 balances instead of nutrient balances. But the basic model component, the mathematical
8 programming models at farm household level, has the same structure as the model for Uganda
9 in the previous section. For implementation, validation and more empirical results of the
10 Chilean model, the reader is referred to Berger (2001).

11

12 In the Chilean study region—the Melado River catchment, 300 km south of the country's
13 capital Santiago—ten farm household types were identified according to farm size,
14 communication networks and innovativeness. Again, we summarize scenario results for the
15 household type that receives most attention of policymakers and change agencies, which in
16 this case are the clients of the Chilean extension service. The extension clients belong to the
17 group of small-scale holdings, the network of *campesino* farms, and to the late majority in
18 terms of innovativeness.

19

20 << **Insert Table 3: Simulation experiments for farm households in the Melado River**
21 **catchment, Chile** >>

22

23 Table 3 depicts the simulation results related to the second group of research questions in
24 Table 1. The columns 'EXT' provide indicators for the group of extension clients only; the
25 columns 'ALL' provide additional information for all households at catchment level. The first

1 three scenarios (S6a/b and S7 in Table 3) show that the extension clients will likely adopt
2 much less innovations than were made available through change agencies (column 1).
3 Fourteen basic innovations with high yield potentials for different technology levels and soil
4 types were tested both at the experimental station and in farm trials. According to the gross
5 margin analyses, all innovations are profitable. But even under ideal technical conditions with
6 *a priori* complete information sets —i.e., technology adoption occurs independent of the
7 communication process in farm agent networks (Berger, 2001)—, only 27% of the
8 opportunities for innovation are taken advantage of. Under market conditions (S7), if we
9 consider the communication process in farm agent networks, this indicator even goes down to
10 4%.

11
12 The environmental impacts at the catchment level are measured by the frequency of water-
13 saving irrigation methods adopted by all households in twenty years, at the end of the last
14 simulation period (column 2). Under ideal technical conditions, almost half of the irrigated
15 area is irrigated with modern, water-saving methods; under market conditions only 12%. The
16 socioeconomic impacts of technology diffusion at the catchment and extension group level
17 are here measured by indicators for migration and household incomes. Without innovation,
18 slightly more than 1% of the farm household agents *per annum* decide to abandon their plots
19 (column 4). Under ideal technical conditions, in contrast, the farm household incomes can
20 almost be doubled (column 6) and by this means provide a strong incentive to stay; out-
21 migration slows down to 0.1% per year. But technical change, and thus higher income, does
22 not reach all households under market conditions because the communication of information
23 slows down ideal adoption rates (for more details on the underlying network threshold model
24 see Berger, 2001). As scenario S7 reveals, the extension client incomes fall by 14% and
25 migration rises to nearly 2% *per annum*. Other interactions between agents, in the Chilean

1 context the exchange of land parcels and water rights, do not play a major role. Empirically,
2 land and water sales hardly occur and rental contracts are only informal and short-term in the
3 study region. Accordingly, there should be little incentives for additional investments in new
4 technologies in order to expand farm sizes. The simulation experiment without rental markets
5 and ‘pull’ factors for migration confirms this hypothesis as it does not lead to significant
6 changes in income under ideal technical conditions (S8 compared with S6b).

7

8 Finally, the model simulations shed light on the response to policy programs that aim at
9 promoting the diffusion of innovations. The first program as proposed by the Chilean farmers
10 association is comprehensive and non-targeted; it is intended for all farm holdings and
11 includes credit schemes for all available technologies, public investments in irrigation
12 facilities as well as fertilizer subsidies (S9a). In contrast, the second program of the Chilean
13 extension service is much smaller in scope and therefore less costly. It targets exclusively at
14 extension clients and mainly involves micro-finance and intensified extension (S9b). The
15 simulation experiments suggest that both policy programs may give incentives to take more
16 advantage of agricultural development opportunities than under market conditions (see
17 indicators for all farm households in columns 2, 4, and 6). They also show that well targeted
18 extension programs are cost-effective because both the non-targeted and the targeted policy
19 programs have similar environmental and socioeconomic impacts. The key success factor of
20 the targeted program, however, is a smoothly functioning extension service that enables
21 extension clients to innovate and actually links them to high-value markets.

22

23 **5. Discussion**

24 The simulation experiments demonstrate the suitability of multi-agent simulations in
25 disentangling the complexity of human-environment interactions and policy responses. The

1 MAS implementation captures more fully than conventional modeling approaches the social
2 and spatial heterogeneity of farm households and their biophysical environment. This is
3 especially important for policy modeling in LFAs, which, by definition, face a multitude of
4 biophysical and socioeconomic constraints and interactions. The MAS experiments allow for
5 a stepwise isolation of partial and combined effects to parameter changes and can thus
6 identify the binding factors at farm household level. Through sensitivity analyses it is possible
7 to identify ideal policy incentives leading to the internalization of environmental externalities.
8 The model structure is also flexible and rich enough to test actual policy interventions over
9 time at disaggregated and aggregated level. By exploring the socio-economic and
10 environmental impacts of different policy options, MAS may therefore provide useful
11 information for the targeting of policy interventions in LFAs.

12

13 The model case studies represent the situation typical of LFAs where farm technologies with
14 high yield potentials do not automatically translate into high adoption rates. Although
15 improved and sustainable technologies are potentially available, low land productivities and
16 relatively high rates of resource depletion can be observed. The first group of MAS
17 simulations shows that a number of technical and financial constraints might compel the farm
18 households to employ poor farming practices and to deplete their natural resource base. From
19 a normative point of view, policy interventions should be targeted at those factors
20 constraining adoption. The computer experiments may then reveal whether the market
21 environment is too distorted to provide economic incentives for a productive and sustainable
22 land management, even if new technologies were made available through ideal policy
23 interventions. The second group of MAS simulations illustrates that the diffusion of
24 technologies takes considerable time under market conditions. Policy programs can help to
25 speed up the diffusion of innovations by giving incentives to technology adoption. The MAS

1 experiments demonstrate that targeted policy programs have potentially a cost advantage over
2 non-targeted programs but their success relies on the well functioning of hardly manageable
3 factors such as knowledge networks and agricultural extension services.

4

5 **6. Conclusions**

6 By the very definition of LFAs, their agricultural development is constrained by the
7 abundance of biophysical and socioeconomic factors. If policy interventions are desired, they
8 should be targeted at the most binding constraints at farm household level and provide
9 economic incentives for technology adoption and preservation of natural resources. The
10 policy problem, however, involves a relatively high degree of complexity and cannot be
11 solved straightforwardly without additional scientific information. This again poses
12 difficulties for bio-economic modeling research because computer simulation approaches are
13 needed that capture more fully the spatial and temporal interactions at farm household level.
14 We advocate the use of MAS because this methodology is well-suited to represent the
15 heterogeneity of farm households in an environment characterized by many biophysical and
16 socioeconomic constraints and interactions. By means of computer simulations, the impact of
17 policy options and alternative technologies can be assessed *ex ante* to inform strategic
18 investment decisions in LFAs.

19

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3

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1 **Table 1:** Sequence of MAS experiments for policy simulations in LFAs

2

Scenario	Research question
#1	What are the impacts of current agricultural practices on household incomes, food security, and the conditions of natural resources?
#2	Are innovations available to the farm households that are technically feasible and profitable?
#3	If such innovations are available, does the adoption of these innovations enable farm households to increase land productivity without depleting the natural resource base?
#4	If current adoption levels are sub-optimal, what constrains the adoption at the farm household level?
#5	What policy incentives can induce the change of farming practices? What policy instruments lead to the profitable adoption of innovations?
#6	What will be the speed of technology diffusion and what types of farm households will be reached?
#7	What are the potential economic and environmental impacts of these innovations over time?
#8	Are there future constraints emerging from inter-household linkages? (For example informal land markets, local arrangement for labor exchange, flow of information in communication networks, management of common pool resources.)
#9	How can different policy options best be implemented over time?

1 **Table 2:** Simulation experiments for the average commercial farm household in Iganga
 2 district, Uganda
 3

Scenario (see Table 1)		Profitability	Nutrient balance [kg/ha]		
			Nitrogen	Phosphorus	Potassium
S1a	Baseline	0	-77	-15	-71
S1b	+ Sustainability		#infeasible		
S2	+ Innovation	8	-96	58	-100
S3	+ Innovation + Sustainability		#infeasible		
S4a	+ Innovation + Credit	-30	0	47	53
S4b	+ Innovation + Credit + Sustainability	9	-104	56	-106
S5	+ Innovation + Credit + Price changes	33	-15	72	-14

4 Notes: Simulation experiments for the most frequent soil type; profitability is measured in
 5 terms of percentage change of household income. New fertilizer technologies are only
 6 available for the cultivation of maize. The price changes in S5 include a 50 percent increase in
 7 output price and an 80 percent decrease in input price.


1 **Table 3:** Simulation experiments for farm households in the Melado catchment, Chile (all
 2 values in percent)
 3

Scenario (see Table 1)		Adoption of available innovations	Frequency of water-saving irrigation	Annual change in number of farms		Incremental household income	
		EXT	ALL	EXT	ALL	EXT	ALL
(S6a)	Without technical change	0	0	-0.4	-1.2	0	0
(S6b)	Ideal technical change	27	49	-0.1	-0.1	86	110
(S7)	Market solution	4	12	-1.8	-1.3	-14	8
(S8)	Without rental markets and 'pull' factors	n/a	50	0.0	0.0	84	111
(S9a)	Non-targeted policy intervention	24	27	-0.1	-1.0	93	53
(S9b)	Targeted policy intervention	20	33	-0.2	-1.1	90	52

4 Notes: EXT refers to extension farm households; ALL refers to all farm households.
 5 'Adoption of available innovations' is measured as the ratio of years of actual adoption and
 6 years of availability for adoption, summed over all innovations. 'Frequency of water-saving
 7 innovations' is measured as the proportion of non-traditional irrigation methods in irrigated
 8 agriculture at the end of the twentieth simulation period. 'Incremental household income' is
 9 calculated as the Net Benefit Increase (NBI), i.e. the discounted average income compared to
 10 the baseline income.
 11

1 **Figure 1:** Spatial data representation of empirical Multi-Agent Systems (###please convert to
 2 black and white)

3



4

5 Layout: C. Block, ZEF-Bonn. First published in Berger and Ringler (2000).

6