


AGGN YEARBOOK 2014-2015



*A man who uses force is
afraid of reasoning*



2014-2015



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PREFACE

Gilbert Ndi Shang (PhD) & Serawit Bekele Debele (MA)

The African Good Governance Network (AGGN) is an international network coordinated by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and sponsored by the Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ). It is constituted of German trained intellectuals and practitioners from various African countries on the platform of promoting good governance on the continent. Created in 2007 under the impulsion of former president of the Federal Republic of Germany, Prof. Dr Horst Köhler, this body brings together young, talented and dynamic specialists from a variety of fields across human, social, natural sciences to exchange views and create constructive projects aimed at influencing good governance in Africa.

This Yearbook is the brainchild of the Research and Publications Committee of AGGN in harness with its members. The main objective of the Yearbook is to inform the public and AGGN partners about the activities of the network and to share members' views on some of the current issues that affect good governance on the African continent.

The first part of the Yearbook dubbed "Internal Issues" grants an overview of AGGN activities for the years 2014-2015. As such, it includes an interview with the current chair of the network and a report on the activities of the Executive Committee. This is followed by reports on series of highly enriching workshops and seminars on a variety of themes like media, regime types, population management and their interconnection with aspects of good governance.

The second part is based on insightful contributions from both members and non-members of the network on current issues in Africa and their bearings on the concept and practices of governance both from national and trans-national perspectives. The first section "Good governance and Security" constitutes reflections on the question of governance and security, the latter term understood in its multifarious connotations. A fundamental component of good governance is to cultivate a measure of certainty and belief in the future amongst citizens. This has to do with the preservation of citizens' individual and collective lives against somatic violence, aliments and environmental hazards. These are the most fundamental pre-conditions for self-actualization and collective realization in any polity. Thus, the articles in this section deal with health security, environmental security and security against sectarian violence respectively. In the African continent, the major challenges to citizens' security have been posed by the spread of Ebola in West Africa, the violence occasioned by the terrorist groups like Boko-Haram and al Shabab and the long-term pernicious effects of unrestrained and non-transparent management of natural resources like forests. These issues are not limited only within the ambit of one nation but rather require inter-regional efforts and supranational legislation. The three articles analyze the indispensability of security in fostering good governance.

The second section deals with questions of good governance and media. The power of the media in Africa has blossomed in the past decades with the multiplicity of radio and TV stations that have penetrated hitherto remote and inaccessible localities. However, the media sector constitutes a very ambiguous aspect of socio-political life and its influence has had chequered track record in several societies. In dire cases, media-waves have been vectors of xenophobic hatred, inter-ethnic animosities and become uncritical mouthpiece of unpopular regimes. In others, media houses have constituted decentralized platforms for popular participation at local, national and international affairs contributing to the formation of a democratic consciousness. Another dimension of media handled in this Yearbook is related to the exogenously produced images and discourses on Africa informed by a long history of orientalist “othering”. This has served the purpose of inscribing Africa into a global world order whose aim is to represent the continent as an exotic space lagging behind in various domains of modern life. Intellectual critics have therefore been concerned with interrogating the images of Africa(ns) in multinational media, underlining the dangers of a single story and showing the other side of life on the continent. Generally, each paper in this section addresses an aspect of the broad thematic of representation.

The third section “Continent on the Move” examines the question of Africa as a rapidly changing continent, one prompted towards the future even as it wrestles with challenges posed by a difficult past. While recognizing the fact that fundamental reforms are needed in many sectors, contributions in this section acknowledge the determination of certain parts of the continent to shed dark histories and move on as a nation. Articles in this section discuss progress made in the domains of national reconstruction and nation building. As such, emphasis is placed on the proactive role being played by civil society and the young generation to halt undemocratic seizure/maintenance of power. The national healing process is usually long-drawn and open-ended. It also necessitates a continuous dialogue and vigilance from the civil society with the active involvement of citizens at grassroots level. While these aspects are captured by the first two articles, the third paper in this section deals with the African Diaspora in its contribution to the economic life of the continent. In many contexts, the Diaspora has remained connected, socially, culturally, economically and even politically with the continent. The contribution highlights the role of remittances members of the Diaspora send home and the importance of governing the remittances in order to convert the income into a veritable tool for development. The last piece in this section deals with the topic of migration. It mainly focuses on African migrants in Germany and their challenges and prospects. This last article is a guest contribution by Dr. Karamba Diaby, the first Afro-German citizen in the German Parliament. Since Dr. Diaby's election at the Bundestag, much attention (nationally and internationally) has been drawn to his person and to his commitment for a just Migration, Human Rights and Education Policies in Germany. His contribution is a reflection of his commitment to the cause and many years of experience in the field.

The Yearbook culminates with an introduction of fellows who joined the network in 2014 and the expression of their expectations as members of the network.

INTERNAL ISSUES

INTERVIEW WITH REBECCA GACHAGO, CHAIRPERSON OF AGGN*Chisha Chakanga (interviewer), Rebecca Gachago***When did you join AGGN?**

After an interesting interview in December 2010, I became a member of the network in 2011. On the day of my interview, I had a course paper submission deadline for my Development Economics Class and spent the train ride to and from the DAAD offices in Bonn, writing my paper. I was summarising the Kenyan 2009 Poverty Assessment Paper from the World Bank. Despite the tight timelines, I felt that this was one interview that I was not going to miss. And I have to say that the material in that paper came in handy during the interview. Since joining the network, we have discussed poverty and I now critically question the data and ideas related to poverty.

What motivated you to join the network?

My key motivation was the possibility to meet like minded people who are not only concerned about what is going on in their countries but are willing to critically evaluate these situations and employ their time to working on solutions through academic study. I find that the network does what great minds do, i.e. discuss ideas. Having a sound board and so many potential partners to execute ideas is one big step towards making change a reality. To be honest, being a member of this network has exceeded my expectation. After discussions with fellows in the network, I have closed every single AGGN conference feeling energised, challenged and sure that I have learned something new.

How long have you been serving as a chairperson?

Fifteen very challenging, nail biting months, where sometimes things do not go exactly as planned, but have also been a period of pleasant surprises. I marvel at how interesting it is to work with a dynamic team composed of fellows from diverse disciplines.

What motivated you to take on the role of Chair, despite being elected?

To be elected for the position of chair at the 2013 Abuja summit was an honour that demonstrated an incredible amount of confidence from the fellows. I am a bit of a strategist and I enjoy championing forward-looking ideas. Therefore, my main interest is to have the opportunity to gather ideas, help them grow and connect like-minded people towards building solutions. I have previously served in the Exco, as secretary and treasurer, and was interested in taking up the position of chair to challenge myself to be held accountable for change. This was stepping out of a comfort zone and into the frontline.

What major achievements have been registered so far?

More and more institutions are asking for representatives from the network to take part in conferences, deliver papers and also join in decision-making round tables. Through participating in events, we have been able to make more connections and widen interest in the network. We are also able to reach out to key decision makers and share our unique ideas for change. However not only do we contribute unique ideas, we also take active part in translating those ideas into action.

What are some of the biggest challenges in your role as a chair?

The biggest challenge in our network is also one of our biggest strengths. We have fellows in various locations in Germany and on the African continent, in addition to a couple who are in other continents. Creating a feeling of connectedness while spreading out in this manner can sometimes be difficult. However, I do not see this as an obstacle. I rather take this as a way to have different perspectives depending on the situations that affect us at any one time. Despite the distances, whenever we meet, it's always an invigorating experience to hear what the other fellows have been up to, both in their professional and academic lives.

Where do you see AGGN in, for instance, five years time?

I would like to position AGGN as a professional network of excellence where, due to our unique characteristic of being highly educated people from various African countries, we can take part in making key decisions and point policy makers in the right direction. It is my key objective to demonstrate how each one of us in our different disciplines can contribute towards making a difference. This is how I define 'good governance' – using resources at my disposal to achieve positive outcomes in society.

In your view, what are the strengths of the AGGN?

In contrast to other organisations, AGGN always stands out as a multi-disciplinary professional network. We come from different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and diverse academic disciplines. The key selection criterion for a fellow joining the network is that he or she must have studied in Germany. This means the average fellow is either a masters or PhD holder and, of course, we already have fellows working for various institutions in the private and public sector, in different African countries, Germany as well as other parts of the world. To enrich the group we also have fellows who founded their own research institutions and not-for-profit organisations.

What advice do you have for new AGGN members?

I would borrow an old adage to capture my message for new fellows. They say, "if you want to go quickly, go alone. If you want to go far, go together." There is great power where like-minded people join hands, and no contribution is ever too small. Everything we do counts when it is done in the right spirit

FROM THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES' DESK

Sylvia Amiani



Since its existence as a group in 2007, the African Good Governance Network's executive committee, comprising of the board of governors and the various committees as stipulated in the constitution, is determined to keep the networks' objectives clearly in view. Aiming at creating a better network and making a distinctive impact in the society, the executive committee systematically follows a path that intends to permanently help improve its effectiveness.

The year 2014 was a demanding year for the committee, with teleconferences being conducted once every month, despite all members of the committee being on full-time jobs or studies as well as some of them keeping families. Nevertheless, the committee carried out eight teleconferences, a physical meeting with DAAD and an additional one with Arnold Bergstraesser Institute (ABI). During these meetings, the past, present and future of AGGN were discussed. The Committees' deliberations tackled the following topics:

Strategic steering of the network

2016 is the tenth year of the network's existence and will be celebrated as its 10th anniversary. With this quite impressive benchmark in mind, the executive committee held strategic discussions on both the short-term and long-term goals and achievements of the network. They deliberated that it would be especially meaningful to take a longer-term perspective on the impact which AGGN can create, rather than looking at the year-to-year change. Members agreed to take up two to three key activities that can be easily accomplished and can leave a significant impact in 2015 in addition to the activities AGGN has so far successfully carried out.

Personnel and responsibility changes at the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)

During one of the physical meetings, it was brought to the committees' attention that structural changes were going to take place within DAAD and this leads to the coming of a new contact Person for AGGN. By the end of the year 2014, it was still unclear who the new contact person was going to be. Eventually, in the first quarter of the year 2015 along with the intake of 20 new members, Dr. Martin Adelmann of ABI informed the ExCo of the new contact persons at DAAD. These are Ms. Sylvia Vogt, Ms. Dorothee Weyler and Mr. Lars Gerold.

AGGN profile book

For nearly five years, the network has followed the project of compiling information on the educational and social background of fellows in a “profile book”. A first version had been published and printed in 2012. With the yearly increase in memberships as well as professional progress of many of the fellows, the book shall regularly be updated. An updated second version has been published in 2014 as a digital version. The ExCo regards a printed version of the profile book as important. Yet, the process of editing it and getting it revised from the network partners (ABI, DAAD) takes up quite some time, and it is a challenge to finalize it to a printing stage before it gets outdated again. This has led to questions how this very effective PR instrument can be kept up in a way that satisfies all involved parties.

AGGN Website

The AGGN Website has been under major construction in 2014, with a launch of a new Site in the beginning of 2015. Throughout the year, there had been discussions on what a reasonable web presence would look like and how this could be achieved. The committee agreed on the importance of having a website that is dynamic and not static, an activity that needs someone to always keep an eye on and invest some time. The exceptionally work-intensive step of setting up a new Site was outsourced to a professional web designer. Now, the Site is running under the maintenance of ABI, with inputs being delivered by AGGN fellows.

VAD panel at University of Bayreuth

Based on the preparations by the previous research and publication committee, a panel was proposed by fellows for an international conference. It was accepted by the organisers of the VAD (Vereinigung für Afrikawissenschaften in Deutschland) held at the University of Bayreuth in June 2014. Dr. Jude Kagoro and Dr. Charity Musamba spearheaded the initiative to organize the panel and they chaired the discussions. Executive committee members who actively participated at the event confirmed that the panel was well attended and therefore the network should be keen on such events.

Newsletter and annual report

The research and publication committee finally prepared and released the first AGGN newsletter after a longer planning period in June 2014. The second and third issue were published in October 2014 and June 2015 respectively. Soft copies are being circulated to the members and the first issue was also disseminated at the VAD conference at the University of Bayreuth. In addition to the newsletter, the publication committee led a discussion and provided a template of the intended annual report that is to be released at the end of each year. The intentions are to capture major AGGN activities and fellows' academic contributions, which do not make it to the newsletter.

Eastern and Southern Africa joint regional project in Nairobi, Kenya

Following the discussions at the summit in Abuja, Nigeria in 2013, a regional project for the eastern and southern African fellows was a discussion item during the executive committees' meetings. With Justus Masa from the career and project committee in the lead, an event on the theme 'Governance in Post 2015 Africa' was planned and organized in 2014. The event took place in Nairobi, Kenya from 12 to 15 January 2015. The response was termed as a success. Lively and thought provoking talks followed by heated debates on the future of good governance characterised the event. A significant number of AGGN fellows as well as DAAD-Kenya-Alumni attended the event. A great work of promoting the network to other guests has also been done.

Discussion of project and networking ideas

In some cases, the executive committee gets involved in the planning of activities that are being initiated by individual fellows. For example, Erick Gankam Tambo brought to discussion his intentions of initiating a regional project in cooperation with Cameroonian engineers in Germany on knowledge transfer for and with AGGN fellows from western and central Africa. Also, Erick in his role as network committee member suggested an AGGN partnership with the Horn Institute of Governance and Development in Ethiopia, for which the networking committee will take the lead.

Transition of AGGN into an independent association

In order to grasp the full potential of AGGN as a network and bind older fellows to the network, the executive committee is making an utmost effort to find sustainable mechanisms to reach out to a larger audience. To achieve this, committee members agreed that AGGN needs a balanced, cooperative, comprehensive and integrated approach. In this regard, the committee conferred and agreed to focus on the transformation of the network into an independent association in the year 2015. With this in place, the network would be able to mobilise resources and carry out its' own projects. To reach the transformation, a few legal issues concerning the creation of an association in Germany need to be dealt with before the network can take off on business. As a result, an extra date, on which the committee would only deal with this issue, was proposed.

The teleconferences in 2014 were concluded with an action plan encompassing more engagement of the network in 2015 and finalising the installment of the association and ensuring broader participation of fellows, hence anticipate an even larger impact.

AGGN WORKSHOPS IN 2014

Judith Altrogge

The ABI organized three junior fellow workshops in 2014. They covered the topics “Governance & Media”, “Authoritarian Rule” and “Population Growth”. By this range of subjects, the program offered insights into various societal aspects related to governance as well as it enhanced an analytical view on states and systems of power.

“Governance & Media”, 30 March to 5 April 2014

Overview and Theme

The weeklong workshop on “Governance & Media” was AGGN’s first in 2014. Following an AGGN tradition, it took place in Bonn and especially welcomed those fellows that had just been included into the network at the beginning of the year and brought them into contact with other junior fellows for the first time. All in all, 23 fellows participated in the workshop.

Considered the “fourth power” alongside legislature, the executive and the judiciary, the media play a vital role in democratic leadership. The workshop dealt with the topic both in a theoretical-analytical and a practical way. It focused on media in Africa as well as on the bridging function of media between Germany and Africa.

The Workshop Program

The first two days introduced the new fellows to the ideas behind the network as well as to the concept of good governance. In a meeting at the DAAD headquarters, DAAD representative Heike Martin gave an overview of the development of AGGN from 2006 until the present and explained the role of DAAD in the network. Dr. Martin Adelmann, network coordinator from the ABI, further explained structures and proceedings; later in the week, AGGN chairperson



AGGN FELLOWS AT WORK

Rebecca Gachago presented the perspective of the executive committee on the network. In a first thematic session, central aspects of the concept of good governance were discussed. An excursion to the building of the former German Bundestag (1949-1989) and the “Haus der Geschichte” introduced important stations of

the history of democracy in Germany to the participants.

The program on the topic of governance and media included lectures as well as interactive sessions. After an introductory “World Café”, Prof. Stefan Kaußen gave an overview of the role of the media in the political system in his keynote presentation. Being a political

scientist with both a scholarly career and experience in practical work as a journalist, Prof. Kaußen's first-hand experience complemented the theoretic depictions.

Two practical examples of the interaction of media and politics in Africa were presented by AGGN fellow Jane Ayeko-Kümmeth (Uganda) and Eric Topona, a leading journalist from Chad who reported critically on press freedom both in his home country and in Africa in general.

Adding another dimension to the topic, Kenneth Gbandi discussed the image of Africa in German media. As editor of the African Heritage Magazine, he pointed out that the African continent is depicted negatively in Western reporting most of the time. He then presented examples of African Diaspora-Magazines that try to disseminate a positive image of the continent.

A visit to the "Deutsche Welle" (DW) was a further highlight of the workshop. After a general introduction to the DW, the fellows were invited to visit the studios. Some were able to discuss with representatives of the Amharic and the Kiswahili news desk and were briefed on DW activities in Africa, for example the DW training and cooperation programs by the "Deutsche Welle Akademie". The topic of foreign media in Africa was approached from another angle by Sergio Grassi from the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES), who focused on China's growing media presence in Africa.



AGGN FELLOWS VISITING DEUTSCHE WELLE HEADQUARTER IN BONN



FELLOWS PRACTICING INTERVIEW SKILLS

A practical part of the workshop was a full-day skills training on public relations and media directed by the journalist Bernd Rössle. The fellows improved their skills in formulating a press release, on giving interviews and in holding press conferences. Thus, the fellows learned to act professionally in their academic and professional lives as well as in civic engagement.

"Authoritarian Rule", 9 to 14 June 2014

Overview and Theme

The program of the meeting consisted of two parts: A network-internal workshop with the theme "Authoritarian Rule" in Nuremberg was combined with a joint visit of the group to the annual conference of the Vereinigung der Afrikawissenschaften in Deutschland (VAD), which took place in Bayreuth, home to the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS). 21 fellows attended the meeting.

Focussing on authoritarian regimes, the thematic part revolved around questions of political regimes in Africa and if/ how they contributed appropriately to the development of their respective countries. The VAD conference had the overall topic of “Future Africa”. AGGN contributed to the conference by organizing a Panel on “Competing Development Paradigms and the Future of Good Governance in Africa”.

The Workshop Program

The first two days of the workshop in Nuremberg, a former centre of the Nazi regime, had a dense schedule during which both the German experience with authoritarian political regimes as well as African case studies of authoritarian rule were dealt with. An introductory lecture was given by Dr. Steffen Kailitz from the Hannah-Arendt-Institute for totalitarianism research. He outlined types of autocratic regimes by citing historical examples. His classifications, which were based on his own research, encouraged lively discussions.

AGGN senior fellow Dr. Jude Kagoro and Dr. Beatrice Schlee from ABI presented country cases from the African continent. Drawing from the experience

of his homeland Uganda, Jude Kagoro argued that a hybrid form of democratic tendencies in a generally autocratic regime should not be rejected out of hand, and that there were many connections between liberal and autocratic systems. Beatrice Schlee demonstrated how authoritarian regimes can sustain themselves, taking Zimbabwe as an example. Her presentation invited at discussion and comparison with other African countries.



AGGN FELLOWS VISITING THE REICHSPARTEITAGSGELÄNDE IN NÜRNBERG

Turning to German history, Dr. Michael Mayer from the Akademie für politische Bildung Tutzing explained the circumstances which brought about the German Nazi Dictatorship before and the foundation of the GDR (German Democratic Republic) after World War II. By visiting the “Reichsparteitag” courtyard and its museum, the physical aspects of the Nazi regime became visible to the fellows.

The workshop program also included a number of interactive sessions such as a poster session and a panel discussion on “Authoritarian rule – a Model for Africa?”. Further discussion was sparked by the evening program, the German movie production “Die Welle”.



DEBATING AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN AFRICA

Following the workshop, the fellows spent two days on the university campus of Bayreuth attending presentations at the VAD conference. They visited the panels according to their interests but also displayed an AGGN stand during lunch and coffee break to advertise the Network. A panel that had been organized by AGGN fellows was considered a great success.

"Population Growth – Chances and Challenges for Africa's Societies", 30 October to 2 November 2014

Overview and Theme

The four-day workshop was organized in collaboration with the "Katholischer Akademische Austauschdienst" (KAAD) and altogether, about 50 participants took part. The topic focused on demographic challenges in African societies. Its aim was to discuss causes and impacts of population growth. The discussions led to a deeper analysis of the role of politics and societal institutions in the steering of these processes. The meeting took place in Helmstedt, which lies in Northern Germany and close to the former inner-German border. This offered the possibility to explore German history by an excursion.

The Workshop Program

The keynote lecture was given by Dr. Tanja Kiziak from the Berlin Institute for Population and Development. She presented her study "The African Demographic Challenge" and introduced concepts and methods of demography as well as the chances and risks of population growth in Africa.

How to govern population growth was a question that was dealt with by Christine Schuster from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). She illustrated the commitment of German development cooperation in that field by practical examples. The following presentation by AGGN fellow Catherine Biira contrasted the previous presentation. As a professional who had previously worked in the population secretariat of Uganda, she was able to draw on her own experiences. She assessed the activities of international donors quite critically.

Two participants of the workshop then presented case studies to the theme. AGGN fellow Marie Coulibaly gave an impressive report on the current situation of Ebola in West Africa. On the basis of her own field experience, she portrayed how the discourse on the disease dominate over other topics and changes radically common social life. KAAD scholar Godwin

Kavaarpua contributed an analysis of urbanization in Africa, a process that is being intensified by population growth and raising big governance challenges to the planning and administration of megacities in Africa.

The program was complemented by a number of group work sessions, by an excursion to the former inner-German border and by a holy mass organized by the workshop participants with contributions from participants of different African countries.



AGGN AND KAAD FELLOWS GROUP ACTIVITIES



AGGN AND KAAD FELLOWS AT FORMER BRD-DDR BORDER CHECKPOINT HELMSTEDT-MARIENBORN

GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY

BOKO-HARAM INSURGENCY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON REGIONAL SECURITY

Lohna Bonkat



Nigeria has experienced a series of communal and ethno-religious violence. This civil unrest is said to be fuelled by religious differences, extremism and/or tensions between and among adherents of the two major religious ‘camps’ (Islam and Christianity) especially in the northern part of the country. For over a decade, this region has experienced terrorist violence caused by a sectarian sect known as Boko-Haram. Many reasons have been given as to why this group came into existence. Poverty and economic disparities within Nigeria, which are indications of problem of governance, are few factors attributed to the crisis. For the last decade, Boko-Haram has been one of the main security threats Nigeria has been battling with. This group started as a simple, radical movement that over time became so intensified that their activities have escalated beyond Nigeria to other neighbouring countries. The group believes Nigeria should be run by Islamic law, the sharia law. It has used and adapted to several tactics; from mere aggression to more violent extremist activities. It has moved also from using local weapons like machetes to sophisticated improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers. Attacks have been carried out on many innocent Nigerians in vulnerable spaces, like markets, motor parks and so on. The security threat caused by this group on Nigerians, has forced the government to find ways of tackling them, albeit with little success.

Emergence/History of Boko-Haram

Boko-Haram emerged in 2002, according to most studies, as a small Sunni Islamic sect advocating for a strict interpretation and implementation of Islamic law in Nigeria. It is also known as Jama'a Ahlas-sunna Li-da'wa wa-al Jihad (translated roughly from Arabic as “people committed to the propagation of the prophet's teaching and Jihad”¹). This group later split and another new group, Jama'atu Ansurul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (meaning vanguards for the protection of Muslims in black Africa), known as Ansaru came out of it². However, they are popularly known as Boko-Haram meaning “western education is forbidden”. Before 2010, the activities of Boko-Haram were not seen as a security threat to the country. They were perceived as a radical group, used by political elites in the north, particularly Borno State to get favours and win elections. However, in 2009, events took another dimension, when the group leader

¹ Blanchard, L. P. (2014): Nigeria's Boko Haram Frequently Asked Questions: June 10, 2014. Congressional Research Service. www.crs.gov.

² Persson, H. (2014): Nigeria-An Overview of Challenges to Peace and Security: FOI:R---3534 Country Reports on terrorism: 2013.

Mohamed Yusuf and some members of the group were killed by security forces. It was this incidence that led to the re-emergence of the group in 2010 which then became decentralized and fragmented, operating in cells with Abubakar Shekau as its new leader.

Boko Haram's activities range from coordinated attacks using guerrilla tactics on military targets, attacks on civilians by gunmen, suicide bombing, kidnapping of mostly women and girls, sometimes suspected to be used as wives and cooks. The result of the deadly activities of this group on Nigerians, forced the Nigerian government under the then Yar'Adua to declare it a security threat. The group attracted youths from northern Nigeria mostly jobless and neighbouring countries like Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Their activities continued in earnest in spite of the Nigerian government's efforts to curb its activities, making it a grave security threat to the country. Recently, attacks have also been carried out on traditional and Islamic leaders. It has been estimated that at least 3000 people have been killed, more than 1200 in few months' time between May and December, 2013 alone, according to UN³. As a result, the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency in the states in north-eastern Nigeria comprising of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states. Apart from this, efforts were made by the Joint Task Force (JTF) including both military and civilian forces to tackle this insurgency, with the Nigerian army establishing a new division with its headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno State in 2013. Despite the efforts made, the insurgency still continued and escalated to other neighbouring states like Chad, Niger and Cameroon, making it a security issue to not only Nigeria but other countries in West Africa.

Boko-Haram's Insurgency: A Threat to Regional Security

As discussed above, most attacks of Boko-Haram were concentrated in north-eastern Nigeria, even though there have been few incidents of kidnapping some western citizens in neighbouring Cameroon⁴. However, Cameroon, Chad and Niger are being affected by the impact of Boko-Haram activities. Due to the more than 60,000 refugees who have fled Nigeria which these countries are forced to host⁵, they are also burdened economically. Apart from economic pressure from refugees, there have been several reports of clashes between suspected Boko-Haram and Cameroonian security forces. For example, in late May 2014, Cameroon announced the deployment of an additional 1,000 special forces to the northern Nigeria border region. There have been incidences in which members of Boko-Haram have been arrested in Niger in June 2013 that freed Islamist militants⁶. Recently in 2015, numerous attacks have been waged in Ngouboua, a city located in Chad, Niger on cities and villages called Bosso, and Diffa, and in Fokotol in Cameroon⁷. Cross-border attacks carried out in these neighbouring countries show how Boko-Haram has become a regional threat. This trend is disturbing and thus requires an

³ Ibid.

⁴ Olojo, A (2013): Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram. October, 2013. ICCT Research Paper, The Hague.

⁵ UNHCR (2014): "UNCHR condemns Brutality in Nigeria, fears new displacement" May, 2014.

⁶ Blanchard, L. P. (2014): Nigeria's Boko Haram Frequently Asked Questions: June 10, 2014. Congressional Research Service. www.crs.gov.

⁷ www.bbc.com/news/world/africa, January 17, 2015.

immediate and effective action to curb Boko Haram's effect and the fast spread in other regional countries and the resultant threats of instability and insecurity. This situation has forced some West African countries to respond in order to reduce insecurity caused by the insurgency.

Response of Regional Governments to the Boko-Haram Insurgency

The threat to regional peace and security is evident in the effects of Boko-Haram's activities in Nigeria and the neighbouring territories. As a result, efforts are made by the regional governments, especially affected countries in order to reduce the spread and threat to the lives of their citizens. In May 2014, a first meeting spearheaded by French president was held in Paris in which the presidents of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and representatives from the US, UK and EU discussed strategies and actions on how to deal with the insurgency. Subsequently in January 2015, Presidents of West African countries met in order to stop the further escalation of the Boko-Haram activities. An 8,750 member Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) made up of security forces from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin and backed by the African Union (AU)⁸ was created in February 2015 to respond to Boko-Haram. The task force has started its operations and recorded successes in reclaiming towns formally annexed by Boko-Haram. More recently, air raids carried out on the insurgents' hideouts in Sambisa forest and Gwoza hills have yielded some positive results – with many Boko-Haram fighters killed and others chased away, leaving behind their deadly weapons⁹. Another development is the releasing of some abductees by Boko-Haram of a group of 158 women and children in January¹⁰. The efforts made by the MNJTF are so far succeeding and show that serious progress is being made.

The insurgency of Boko-Haram has thus become an international problem that had initially started as a local phenomenon but having become a serious threat to the whole West African sub region over time. Therefore, it requires more concerted efforts not only from the affected countries but also the international community in order to effectively tackle it. It is fundamental to acknowledge the fact that efforts so far put in by some countries in the sub region are making a big impact in weakening the insurgents and reducing the spreading rate of terrorist activities; but that more efforts are still needed to tackle this menace. These will involve, for instance, the tightening of border security of different countries to reduce and stop Boko-Haram from transporting weapons as well as deployment of soldiers by the various countries at their borders to combat the group, training and re-training of security officials in counter-terrorism, procurement of more sophisticated weapons, boosting the morale of the troops, and good intelligence gathering. Including the deconstruction of the terrorists' ideology, creation and provision of jobs for the unemployed and quality and affordable education to the youth are also few additional measures.

⁸ February 11, 2015.

⁹ www.thenationonlineng.net/news/boko-haram-troops-bombard-sambisa-gwoza-with-air-strikes, Feb 20, 2015.

¹⁰ www.bbc.com/news/world/africa, Febraruay 4, 2015.

EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE OUTBREAK IN WEST AFRICA

A SHARED EXPERIENCE OF PREVENTION STRATEGIES IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Marie Paule Coulibaly N.



The current outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West Africa started with the first cases reported in March 2014 in Guinea. It is the largest and most complex outbreak since the discovery of the virus in 1976 as it has produced more cases and deaths than the previous ones. Hence, several West African countries experienced the most terrific and rapid outbreak of the Ebola disease in history. Up to February 2015, the Center of Disease Control of Atlanta reported a total of 23,253 confirmed, probable, and suspected cases of this hemorrhagic fever and 9,380 Ebola-related deaths in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. 20 cases were reported in Nigeria, eight in Mali and one single case in Senegal. However, the available documents show that the outbreak was rapidly contained and these countries were freed from the epidemic¹¹. It is recognised that Nigeria quickly contained the Ebola virus disease because of a great intervention and contact tracing which required both manpower and material resources. In facing this epidemic situation, it will be important to investigate why there is no case of the disease in some countries like Côte d'Ivoire that shares its borders with the three countries affected by the virus (Liberia, Guinea and Mali). This article focuses on the strategies employed in Côte d'Ivoire that prevent the outbreak of Ebola virus disease within its territory. It shows the role played by the population in the implementation of a government program.

Background and EVD Characteristics

The Ebola-virus previously called "hemorrhagic fever" was first identified in Zaïre, the current Democratic Republic of Congo. Its name comes from the name of a river in the area of Yambuku, the place where the virus was first identified. The Ebola-virus might be spread by wild animals or by insects. The infection is due to a virus of the family of filoviridae or filo virus. Five types or sub-types of Ebola-virus were isolated: the Zaïre ebolavirus; the Sudan ebolavirus; the Taï Forest ebolavirus in Côte d'Ivoire, the Bundibugyo ebolavirus in Uganda, the Reston Ebola-virus in the USA and in the Philippines. The last virus is non-human and can only be found in animals¹². The virus involved in this rapid outbreak in West Africa is the Zaïre Ebolavirus. The roots of the Ebola-virus remain unclear. Nevertheless, it is known as a disease that can appear, break out and re-emerge in another area or country, sometimes with another type of filo virus. The infection happens through contact with an infected

¹¹ Gatherer (2014): p. 1619-1624; CDC (2015): p. 185-187.

¹² WHO (2014): fact sheet N°103, Sept 2014.

person's body fluids, especially with the stool, urine, saliva or semen of infected people. It also happens if broken skin or mucous membranes of a healthy person come into contact with environments that have become contaminated with an Ebola patient's infectious fluids such as soiled clothing, bed linen, or used needles¹³.

Many patients have been cured of Ebola but an Ebola vaccine has not yet been found. All the vaccines are currently undergoing experimentation on volunteers. The Incubation period, that is, the time interval from infection with the virus to the onset of symptoms lasts 2 to 21 days. Human beings are not infectious until they develop symptoms. The first symptoms include the sudden experience of fever fatigue, muscle pain, headache and sore throat. This is followed by vomiting, diarrhea, rash, symptoms of impaired kidney and liver function, and in some cases, both internal and external bleeding. In fact, Ebola virus disease spreads rapidly through the affected countries mainly because of three factors. The first factor is related to the dysfunction and lack of access to health care facilities. The health coverage is not provided in all locations of the country because of the lack of resources (human, financial and material). The rural areas are the most affected. The second factor linked to the problem of the health system is communication system to sensitise the whole population. Many people consume bush meat and many of the roads within the country are not motorable. Also, clearing of bushes which bring the suspected animal reservoirs closer to the human populations remain a factor. The third factor is due to the fact that the outbreak started in most of the border towns where there were intensive human movements and fluid contacts. That makes contact tracing difficult to contain and to stop the spread or outbreak of the virus within the country¹⁴.

Early prevention strategies in Côte d'Ivoire

Côte d'Ivoire is a tropical country with more than 20 million inhabitants. It is the most affected country by HIV/AIDS in West Africa and many programs that fight against it were implemented all around the country since 1985 up to date. In addition, the political situation in the last decade was not stable. In fact for five years since September 2002, a war divided the country into two almost separately administered territories: the north was under the control of new armed forces and the south was under government control. During that period the new armed forces made several attacks in the south. The country was partly re-unified in 2007 and in 2010 a presidential election was organised but the contestation of the results plunged the country into post-electoral crisis, violence and war. About 3,000 people were killed in a period of 3 months. The armed forces from the north won the war. During that period, the country lost many economic investments, however since 2011 many programs are implemented with foreign investors. The government's concern after a decade of political and economic crisis is to let the country rise from the economic challenge and become an emerging market economy. It appears that the consequences of any outbreaks will impact negatively on the economic growth. So it is of great interest to the government to prevent the Ebola outbreak.

¹³ WHO (2014), August.

¹⁴ Obilade, T. (2015): p. 38-39.

Since then, in Côte d'Ivoire Ebola prevention became one of the main government priorities. The preventive actions implemented in Côte d'Ivoire can be associated to four levels of the socio-ecological models of prevention. The system of prevention takes into consideration influences on the human development and behaviour as intercultural, community, organizational, and interpersonal or individual effects¹⁵. Decisions and restrictions were taken in order to avoid an outbreak in the country and also to have an early intervention in case of any eventual infection. At first closing borders with Liberia and Guinea as well as restricting flights in areas of affected countries were applied. Eating bush meat, spreading false rumors on Ebola outbreaks within the country were strictly forbidden and a person could be punished by the law. Shaking hands and hugging people were discouraged. There is a corridor of sanitation at the entrances of the country: temperature screening and washing hands are compulsory while coming out from the aircraft.

Similarly in Côte d'Ivoire, the strategies and actions implemented to prevent the outbreak are results from the lessons learned in the fight against the HIV epidemic during the last decades. For example, billboards carrying message to sensitize people are spread at the corner of streets to remind them that the risk of an Ebola epidemic is imminent and to encourage them to apply preventive measures. Every suspicious case reported by the population to the local authorities and sanitary district officers was immediately put in quarantine. Expectedly, people in Côte d'Ivoire became suspicious of one another during the outbreak in border countries. Sometimes movements of panic and fears amongst the population were registered. Since the inhabitants were traumatized after the recent civil war, they did not want to experience the death of thousands again. Also, in many areas, in town and even in some villages, people wash their hands with disinfectant gel. This gel is an alcohol solution with water and a dye. It has been noticed that the fear of Ebola infection increased because of the strict prescription to observe preventive measures although no case of Ebola had yet been reported in Côte d'Ivoire. The means of communication avoid alarmist messages. The advertisement messages call each component of the population to act with vigilance and responsibility.

To conclude, one can say that people in Côte d'Ivoire are cautious to prevent an outbreak of Ebola mainly because of the combination of three factors: the early prevention systems applied by the governments at each level within the country; the implementation of strategies strengthened by the lessons learned from the fight against the HIV/AIDS epidemic and lastly the awareness, vigilance and responsibility of every inhabitant of Côte d'Ivoire in preventing the epidemic. This article shows that despite the fact that the country is undeveloped, the active participation of each component of the population contributes to effective health program and strengthens governance and political decision-making processes.

¹⁵ Bronfenbrenner, U (1979); Leach, M. (2010).

FOREST RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN CAMEROON

A CASE STUDY FOR CENTRAL AFRICA

Djiby Racine Thiam¹⁶, Folaranmi D. Babalola¹⁷ and Girma Kelboro (PhD)¹⁸



Forest governance in Cameroon

To facilitate development of the forestry sector in Cameroon, the parliament has enacted some laws to provide legislative framework on regulation of forest, wildlife and fishery resources in the country¹⁹. Specifically, the framework is to promote sustainable management of forest resources; increase contribution of the forestry sector in the GDP; involve local population in the management process of forest resources; and protect biodiversity in the country. The changes in the legislative framework can be understood within the context of the larger national move towards decentralization and participation since the 1990s²⁰.

In theory, the governance practices of property rights and land tenure in Cameroon, which are vital in forest management, are very well structured throughout the different reforms introduced during the past two decades²¹. Table 1 shows the transfer of rights to local communities through decentralization within the forest policy in 1994. Since 1974, three years after the reunification of the Francophone and Anglophone parts, the country experienced three different types of tenure with a direct bearing on forestry: ownerships, usufruct rights and leaseholds²². Ownerships mean landlords have an exclusive right of possession over their properties that can be transferred to whomever they want. "Usufructs" refer to a situation in which communities use properties that do not belong to them and "leaseholds" reflect arrangements made between parties about rental agreements of properties. Usually within leaseholds, a financial compensation is provided to the owner of the land. Under customary law, on the other hand, traditional local leaders serve as

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¹⁹ Ministry of Forest and Wildlife (2011). Project de conservation et d'utilisation durable de la foret de Ngoyla-Mintom: Analyse des dynamiques sociales et evaluation des acteurs et de leurs besoins en renforcement des capacités, Yaoundé Cameroon.

²⁰ Cheka, C. (2007): The state of the process of decentralisation in Cameroon. Africa Development 32(2), p. 181-196.

²¹ Oyono, P. R. (2004): The social and organisational roots of ecological uncertainties in Cameroon's forest management decentralisation model. The European Journal of Development Research 16, p. 174-191.

²² GOC (1974): Ordonnance No. 74-1 du juillet 1974 fixant le régime foncier. http://cameroun-foret.com/system/files/18_93_99.pdf (accessed 15 September 2010).

trustees and land administrators²³. However, allocating property rights in the forestry sector should be subject to an important condition such as benefit sharing.

Table 1: Transfer of rights and powers in decentralization, Forestry Law of 1994

Rights	Aspects concerned	References in the Law
Rights to existing resource management transferred to outlying actors	Exploitation of Council Forests and Community Forests	Article 7, 16 and 17 of Law 94/01
Customary and use rights	Exploitation of all the products of “Private Forests”	Article 8, 26 (1), 30 2, 36 and 86 of Law 94/01
Benefits of part of timber revenue	Revenue from logging	Art. 68 (2) (3), of the Law and Art. 85 of the Decree of Application
Monitoring and Controlling bush fires	Resource conservation	Article 7 of the Decree of Application
Rights of opposition to the classification of protected areas	Exploitation of forest resource	Article 6, 18 and 20 (1) of the Decree of Application


At least two main reasons justify the principles of benefit sharing in allocating property rights to logging companies. First, benefit sharing allows those who couldn't get access to the resource to receive indirect compensations from forest exploitation. Second, benefit sharing gives to local population a sense of being involved in the process of forest exploitation and thereby strengthen collaboration between logging companies and local people. Benefit sharing can be financial transfer, but it could also take other forms such as building social services such as schools, hospitals and employment creation for the youth and marginalized groups.

Institutional arrangements for good governance of forests

The institutional environment developed for good governance in the forestry sector is the legal framework provided by public authorities to promote a paradigm shift leading to an optimal and better use of property rights. The objective is therefore to move out of path dependency in which the existing institutions and stakeholders are embedded in. Governing the allocated property rights should also take into consideration dynamic changes that could occur from the point of view of local population and logging companies. For example, population growth, migration from rural to urban areas, and increase of incomes of local communities could somehow create a power shift and therefore require a new form of arrangement among the stakeholders. Figure 1 proposes factors that could promote a good governance of property rights in the forestry sector in Cameroon²⁴. A combination of factors – effectiveness, accountability, efficiency, equity, transparency and participation – favours a good governance of property rights. Functionality of these factors, however, depends on the nature of the national political system. Once such an environment is promoted, then mechanisms allowing the guidance of the rules of the game between the involved stakeholders should be elaborated.

²³ Oyono, P. R. (2004): The Social and Organisational Roots of Ecological Uncertainties in Cameroon's Forest Management Decentralisation Model. The European Journal of Development Research Vol (16), p. 174-191.

²⁴ Of course different factors could be determined. The list could be completed through further research.

Figure 1: Factors that could promote good governance of property rights in forest sector²⁵

Multi-level stakeholder management approach

The multi-level stakeholder management approach includes integration of local dwellers in the management process. Introducing local population is aimed at improving decision-making during the planning, design, implementation and evaluation processes. In the forestry sector, to optimise the decision-making, the process should cover all stakeholders including groups that are marginalized such as women and unemployed youth or the pygmies, among others. Beyond improving decision-making, introducing local stakeholders provides two additional advantages. First, local stakeholders could facilitate the control of government decisions applied to logging companies through a social mobilization using cooperatives, social networks and stand-alone control agents – witnesses. This can be done through a support of local district level institutions. Second, introducing local dwellers could also facilitate capacity building especially for the unemployed youth. Indeed, when organised around groups, associations and NGOs, local population can request from their public authorities the decision to include social actions in the manner in which, for example, the timbers are exploited by logging companies. These social actions could be undertaken by logging companies in directly building schools, hospitals and roads in the communities where forest resources are exploited. Logging companies could also be committed – by public authorities – to allocate a certain percentage of their profits to the


²⁵ Adapted from FAO (2011): Framework for assessing and monitoring forest governance, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome.

representatives of the community (internal elites) to contribute to the development of villages. Finally, including local population is important for benefit sharing and an impediment of conflicts. All these issues are very important since the government does not have the basic information required to impose such social actions to logging companies without considering local population who knows better the interests of its own communities. Therefore, in managing forest resources in Cameroon, a joint management process between the state and private actors and local population is required and, hence, there is an interest to identify factors leading to successful joint management processes of forest resources as shown in Figure 2. Studies in Eastern Africa show the importance of involving local communities in decision-making to establish viable systems of forest governance²⁶.

Conclusion

Good governance of forest resources requires involvement of all stakeholders both in policy and practice. We suggest that control of policy implementation and law enforcement should be undertaken through a combination of public entities, private actors and local populations to build a hybrid form of institutional framework in which interests of the stakeholders are included. Creation of local witnesses combined with a re-organization of power relationship among the different stakeholders (particularly between the external and local elites) and increase of awareness among the population could lead to a long term improvement of accountability and transparency.

Figure 2: Steps of the elaboration of the public-private partnerships (PPPs)



²⁶ Gatzweiler, F.W. and Kelboro, G. (2014): Decentralization and institutional development in East African forest landscapes. ZEF Policy Brief No. 11.

MEDIA GOVERNANCE AND REPRESENTATION

THE MEDIA AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

Jane Ayeko-Kümmeth



Each time the question of good governance arises, we are all tuned to the traditional three arms of government, namely: the executive, legislature and the judiciary. At the same time we are often quick to refer to the media as the fourth estate. As a network that stands for good governance in Africa, AGGN highly holds the role of the media in achieving this desired but rare valued in the continent. The network sees the media as an instrumental link between citizens and government. Through media, citizens can constantly check and assess government performance. In this regard, 2014 saw the network dedicate some of its activities to understanding the relationship between the media and governance. In March 2014, AGGN held a one-day workshop in Bonn, in which members focused on understanding the media and their place in governance.

Whereas governance is an abstract concept, the media are more solid substance. Bringing the two together is both interesting and challenging. The starting point should then be a quick check on what these concepts stand for. If we move away from the academic debate, then we can simply submit that governance implies a process of leading through established or accepted laws, norms, power or even language. Those who lead then become leaders. It is a two-way traffic between the governors and the governed. This implies interaction of which the media provide the platform. The media on the other hand are dictum suggesting the fourth estate in governance and are nominally known to inform, educate and entertain the public. Due to socio-political and economic changes coupled with technological advancement, media roles have expanded. Today the media are active agents of change in all aspects of life. In this regard, the media can be catalysts for good governance or its direct opposite. Whether or not the media can promote good governance depends on the media themselves, but at the same time on their relationship with government. This calls for the media to be independent and pluralistic, free from any kind of influence, particularly political or commercial control.

In Africa, despite the turbulent environment in which the media operate, they have become more resilient as evidenced by the ever-growing media conglomerates & media giants winning themselves international recognition. These new developments in the industry have re-shaped news production and distribution, resulted in change in the nature of the audiences and mode of information consumption. Evidently, the functions

of the media in governance in contemporary Africa have been restructured. Good governance takes into account the freedom and heterogeneity of the media. At the same time, these are contributory factors for democracy to flourish. Nevertheless, this is only possible if the main elements in government are committed to the principles of good governance and do not pressurise the media to dance to their tunes. We talk of a positive relationship between government and media, when both respect each other and operate within professional limits. In essence the media are supposed to be autonomous, independent, creative, critical but credible. The unfortunate experience in Africa is that even with relative awareness; monopolization of media by powerful actors from both the private and public sectors continues to exist. This minimises the multiplicity of voices in the public sphere. In most cases the government gets at loggerheads with the media if it exposes its weakness.

But as already indicated, the media may or may not be propellers of good governance. Media effects can be destructive as well as constructive. Just as they can give people vital information, so they can spread ‘misinformation’ and thus be held responsible for increased violence. Take the case in which the media play an active role in conflict situations or even be the cause of conflict through their framing of texts. Where the media interpret and frame texts violently they propel social or political conflicts. Sometimes, the media are driven by personal or corporate interest. In such instances, messages are sensationalised; include personal attacks, empathy and simplistic representations of the ‘bad and good guys’. If the media choose to be independent and out of the conflict, it contributes to conflict resolution and alleviation of violence. The relationship with good governance is that both involve decision making. For the media, it is the decision about what to tell people and how to frame it. Framing of media messages is no different from the simple definition of governance, namely, the art of steering societies and making decisions. It determines who has power, who makes decisions, how other players make their voice heard and how account is rendered. Steering is an art that the media are best at. Often times, media institutions frame their messages in a manner aimed at directing and/ or shaping society’s perception of certain issues. This is what we call the power of the media. As a podium for public exposure, the media spectrum is full of multiple actors engaged in the information traffic. The filtering and framing of media messages is often subjective and depends on the different interests of the actors therein involved. In framing their messages, media texts generate publics while publics generate texts. In this vicious cycle media institutions treat audiences as consumers and as commodities.

In situations where the media do not have good relations with the state, they often mobilize local and international pressure against government. Through its messages, it can work as an advocate for the people against the state. Its functioning as a political opposition makes its role both empowering & problematic. This explains why the relationship between the media and Government/good governance is a hotly contested

affair—could be good or bad. Media is power for change; hence media control is power against or for change. In situations where the two are in antagonism government often tries to control the media. Once government gains access to any media institutions, the latter could be heavily politicised & used as a mouthpiece either by government or opposition. In this case news or any media messages reflect the view of those in/with power. This is when we talk of the media as conduits for propaganda. In other words, the role of the media in facilitating good governance depends on relationship with actors therein which makes it crucial for the two to harness good relations. This works against good governance. As it is well known, in conflict situations states often lose their ability to care for their citizens while prolonged conflicts may cause state collapse through breakdown of formal institutions & rule of law, wreckage of public facilities and services, population displacement, exacerbate poverty & massive suffering, environmental destruction, retards development and costly to the international community.

The media like governance have multiple actors who articulate their interests, influence how decisions are made, who the decision-makers are and what decisions are taken. The process and practices therein vary significantly given the environment in which they are applied. Governance in the public sector needs to take into account legal and constitutional accountability and responsibilities. The media are sites for power struggle, but if treated differently, they can be agents for positive change. Free media are requirement for good governance. It is upon this view that during the Bonn workshop, AGGN members agreed that the two should be reconciled.

THE 2015 AFRICAN CUP OF NATIONS IN EQUATORIAL GUINEA AND THE FUTURE OF SPORTS GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

Yvonne Awour Atieno



The 2015 Africa Cup of Nations, dubbed Orange Africa Cup of Nations, took place in Equatorial Guinea for sponsorship reasons. It was the 30th edition of the Africa Cup of Nations; the international football championship of Africa organised by the Confederation of African Football (CAF) and held from 17 January to 8 February 2015. Even though Equatorial Guinea has a population of two million and is the richest per capita in Africa, given the unequal distribution of income and wealth, much of the population could not afford tickets. To cater for this, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, President of Equatorial Guinea, bought 40,000 tickets so that the poor could attend matches.

The tournament was initially to be hosted by Morocco who later demanded postponement of the event because of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa. Morocco was ruled out as a host country and replaced by Equatorial Guinea. At the start, there were widespread doubts as to whether Equatorial Guinea would successfully host the tournament – especially once the condition of the new venues of Ebébiyin and Mongomo first came to light. On 6 February 2015, CAF announced that Morocco had been banned from the next two AFCON tournaments and fined one million US\$. Given the short notice, there were some problems with teams lamenting on the poor state of facilities like shared hotels. Some hotels had electrification problems but by and large, Equatorial Guinea turned the finals into an improbable success. In this light, it became evident that tournaments can be organized within two months.

Ivory Coast won the tournament for the second time in its history of participation in the Africa Cup of Nations title, defeating Ghana 9–8 in a penalty shoot-out after the final finished goalless. They came out after defeating Algeria who had a superb World Cup performance in Brazil regardless of the high expectation that they will win the Cup Afcon. Eventually, the Elephants carried the Cup even though Ghana played well and should have probably won. The first time Ivory Coast won the cup was in 1992. Obviously, it was about time the golden generation of players such as Kolo Toure and Boubacar Barry, the Ivorian goalkeeper who turned out to be the man of the match, took the Cup home. In 1992 Ghana played Ivory Coast in the finals and lost in a penalty shootout which ended 11–10. History surely repeats itself.

On another note, it was very striking to observe how CNN took on reporting the events which overshadowed an otherwise successful tournament. CNN went ahead to report on the fracas

caused by the Equatorial Guinean fans with the headlines: "Africa Cup of Nations: A few good men stand up to be counted in a 'war zone.'" Even though the reaction of the Equatorial Guinean fans was unacceptable, the CNN report was very worrying. Having watched games in Europe with similar behavior from football fans but which may probably never receive the same reporting, to emphasise on such issues when it comes to African games is overrated. To make matters even worse, CNN went ahead to report on the final game making mistakes that should not have been made. The end of the game was reported as "Ivory Ghana beating Ghana". Apparently, it was a typographical error but one wonders how slowly CNN reacted to this lapses.

The tournament took place at a time when FIFA is seeking to elect a new president in 29 May 2015 in Zurich. Danny Jordan the President of the South African Football Association was quoted as saying, "very often, administrative and financial problems have created or stunted African football's growth and progress," he told BBC Sport. Given that FIFA has established the independent Audit and Compliance unit, they will select - on a sample basis - national associations on the continent whose accounts will then be audited. It is encouraging to see universities like Strathmore University of Nairobi in collaboration with Searsport and Wits Business School of Johannesburg offering leadership and management training for sports administrators and managers from all over the continent.

Underlying these developments is the search for better governance and management of sports federations across the continent. Sport organisations typically face escalating performance pressures from various stakeholders, which places increasing demands on the governance structures of such organizations. It bears to remind that governance is at the core of not-for-profit organisations, which sports federations are. Without sound, better and effective governance practices, sport federations cannot be managed. According to Jansen van Rensburg, Venter & Kriek of the University of South Africa and the Witwatersrand business school, the following points therefore prevail in the sports governance discourse:

- What is the nature of the composition of the boards of African national football organisations?
- What are the roles and responsibilities of boards with regard to strategic management?
- What are the strategic management activities performed by football federations?
- What is the perceived influence of the FIFA as an example of a global sport organisation on the governance compliance of African Football federations?

Finally, the fundamental question in the future, taking into consideration the duality between public and corporate governance, will be how good public governance practices can affect sports federations positively. Similarly, proper governance of sport federations can lend some insights into the general public governance debate. Hopefully, the performance of the African football leagues will be improved thereby retaining more players on the continent.

“DECOLONISING EUROPEAN MINDS”: ON THE SECOND “AFRICAN DISCOURSE CONFERENCE” IN FRANKFURT/MAIN (SEPTEMBER 2014)

Rodrigue Naortangar



Calling for change in African mindsets is not new. But calling for the “decolonisation of European minds” sounds unusual. This uncommon idea turned out to be, in my point of view, the common thread of the 2nd “Africa Discourse Conference” (“Konferenz Afrika-Diskurs II”) held on the 26–27 September 2014 in Frankfurt/Main on the topic “Thinking Africa anew – Images, Power, Interest” (“Afrika neu denken – Bilder, Macht, Interessen”). The conference was organised under the leadership of “Kirchliche Arbeitstelle Südliches Afrika” (KASA) which was represented by the Congolese (DRC) theologian Boniface Mabanza who cooperated with other African and German organisations. The concept of the conference focused on representations of Africa in general and on the media in particular. The objective was to inquire into the power and interest mechanisms that underlay the production of images on Africa and to promote, in this regard, positive views and discourses. This concept fits into the basic idea of the “Africa Discourse Conferences” which are meant to provide a platform to positively influence narratives on Africa in Germany and beyond.

The expression “decolonising European minds” came from the Congolese (DRC) sociologist and movie maker Balufu Bakupa-Kanyinda, one of the two keynote speakers, on the first conference day. For him, change in African mindsets should go hand in hand with change in European mindsets. Although African countries are officially independent from former European colonial powers, the perception of Africans in the West is still affected by many biases, clichés and stereotypes. Real decolonisation has to overcome this because the decolonisation-process involves the colonised as well as the coloniser. The other keynote speaker was Dr. Florence Tsagué Assogoum from Cameroon. She outlined the historical reasons why black Africans are most of the time portrayed in the West with unpleasant stereotypes: slavery that lasted for more than four centuries, colonialism that began with the “Africa conference” in Berlin (1884-1885), neocolonialism, (postmodern) race theories etc. which justified economic interests. On the second day of the conference, the other speakers went in the same direction. So did Dr. Pierrette Fofana-Herzberger, a teacher by profession and a communal councilor of Erlangen (Germany) of Senegalese origin. She recalled the clichés on Africa circulating in the media which depict Africa as a continent of the five “Ks”: “Katastrophe” (catastrophe), “Korruption” (corruption), “Krise” (crisis), “Kriege” (wars) and “Krankheit” (disease). The crystallisation of biases on black people began

to settle in the minds of the Europeans in the 15th century. She also reminded us of the negative role played by the Church especially under Pope Nicholas V. In fact he released the Bulle “Divino amore communiti” (1452) which allowed enslaving black Africans, who are depicted as “unbelievers”, in order to “save their souls”. Philosophers like Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel spread the idea that “niggers” are “ignorant” and have no history. Moreover, the exposition of black people in zoos up to the beginning of the last century, letting them appear like curious creatures and animals solidified European stereotypes in this regard. These stereotypes are still persistent. Thus, aid-organisations largely make use of pictures of despaired and disoriented-looking black African children in their fundraising campaigns. An independent journalist from Burkina Faso Wendpanga Eric Segueda testified that some journalists intentionally portray Africa in a negative light in order to adjust their reports to the common negative perception of their readers about Africa. A German PhD candidate at the Chair for European Expansion in the 19th and 20th century at the University of Düsseldorf and a member of “Verein schwarzweiss e.V.” Carolin Authaler stated that there are no great differences between the biases of the past and of today, since there are still untold resistances – at least in Germany – to engage in serious debates on Germany’s colonial past and to draw the consequences from them. The discussions in the different workshops (“Africa Representations in German speaking Media and in development campaigns”; “Scientific Discourses on Africa”; “Self-Designation and Self-empowerment in the Black Diaspora”; “Political Signification of Africa-Images”) and on the round table discussion moderated by Rahime Diallo, a Guinean native who coordinates the foundation “Partnerschaft mit Africa”, converged indeed around the idea that the average European needs to be freed from this negative representations of Africa she/he has inherited from history. European minds need to be “decolonised”.

Many Africans together with German partners are already at work. For instance, individuals like Dr. Pierette Fofana-Herzberger herself in Work-teams like „Schule ohne Rassismus“ (“school without racism”), aid-organizations like Misereor which tries to avoid disrespectful representations of the needy in their fundraising campaigns as one of its representatives Marianne Pötter-Jantzen put it, magazines like “Africa positive” which promote a positive image of the African continent and organisations like “Initiative Schwarze Menschen in Deutschland” and “Berlin Postkolonial e.V.” which stand for the rights of black people living in Germany and for the reparation of the harm caused by former colonial policies.

The unceasing reference to colonial times more than 50 years after the first African independence might sound backward to the contemporary ear. One may argue – as I did during the conference – that interdependency is the law of the moment especially in a globalized world where economies, policies and cultures depend more on one another than before. History and Geography bound Africa and Europe in a common destiny. It is, therefore, more reasonable to promote a better common future than to remain prisoner of a wounded African history which tends to ignore African heroic resistance strategies against colonialism and by extension neocolonialism.

At the same time, one cannot deny the persistence of colonial mindsets whose mechanisms postcolonial studies help to unfold and de-construct. Equal economic, political and cultural partnership does not occur primarily on the superficial level of political correctness in speech and attitudes. It happens foremost in mindsets. And mindsets influence to a large extent actions and relationships hence they have the power to provide us with a self-representation and with ways and means to chart our own destiny. The battle for change begins therefore in the minds. Images play hereby a key role. Balufu Bakupa-Kanyinda goes for “shock therapies” through the “manufacturing” of movies and pictures: They are powerful tools to influence mindsets and subsequently (self-) representation which have the power to change reality. Bakupa-Kanyinda makes often use of those “shock therapies” in his own movies. So did his colleague from Benin Republic Luc Amoussou in his well-known movie “Africa paradis”. The movie produces images and representations that contradict the official and established discourses on Africa as a poor and weak continent. It narrates the misadventures of European asylum seekers in a prosperous Africa after Europe sinks into a terrible war. Such concrete actions help to reduce European superiority complex and stir in Africans the will to become masters of their own destiny against all odds. Their impact might be more efficient if they are backed by national and supranational policies. Thus decolonising European minds appear to be a good governance concern on the African continental level. In fact rooting up historically deep enrooted stereotypes is a herculean task which individuals or single organisations alone can't carry out. Transparent policies with due funding and political will in order to stir awareness regarding this problem at a larger scale are needed²⁷.

²⁷ For more information on the conference go to: <http://www.afrika-im-zentrum.de/index.html>

AFRICA ON THE MOVE

BURKINA FASO: THE PROMISES AND PERILS OF A REVOLUTION

Wilfried Zoungrana



History, they say, repeats itself. But when former President Blaise Compaoré seized power on 15 October 1987 through a coup-d'état and orchestrating the murder of revolutionary President Thomas Sankara, he certainly thought that he would leave power in better circumstances, if at all! History repeated itself but with some variations when Compaoré was forced to resign after 27 years of being in power. Burkina Faso wrote history as the first Sub-Saharan country to topple an overstaying president after the Arab spring of 2011. Commentators hailed it as an "African Spring" and pointed to a rather long list of countries that they predicted may embark on the revolutionary dynamics.

Compaoré led Burkina for more than a quarter century, during which he strengthened his hold on power, contained the opposition, and survived the wrath of the population at least on two occasions- after the murder of critical journalist Norbert Zongo in 1998 and the protests and riots in the army in 2011. No wonder he might have felt invulnerable and confident enough to initiate the revision of the constitution that would have allowed him conditions akin to life-presidency.

Modifying Article 37 or the Crossing of the Rubicon

Article 37 is without doubt the article in the Burkinabe constitution that has suffered the most modifications in the constitutional history of the country. In 1991, it set the duration of a presidential term to seven years and allowed a maximum of two terms. In 1997 the article was amended to allow unlimited reelection. In 2000, the constitution was again modified to reduce the duration of terms from seven years to five years and a maximum of two terms. When Compaoré stood for reelection in 2005, he had already served two terms (1991 and 1998 elections). Political opponents went to the Constitutional Court to contest Compaoré's candidature. The court ruled in favour of the incumbent arguing that the 2000 article modification could not be applied retroactively. Compaoré won the 2005 election and was reelected in 2010 for the second (and last) term according to the 2000 constitutional amendment. On the terms of the constitution Blaise could not stand for elections in 2015 except the constitution is modified.

In July 2012, the parliament decided on the modification of the constitution which enabled among other reforms, the constitution of a senate. The way to the planned modification was

not to be a plain one. Prominent members from the CDP (engl. Congress for Democracy and Progress) such as Roch Marc Christian Kaboré (former Prime Minister 1992–1994 and President of the parliament from 2002–2012), Simon Compaoré (long-time mayor of Ouagadougou, the capital city) and Salif Diallo (Minister under different governments) from the CDP resigned and went on to found the People's Movement for Progress (MPP). Civil society organizations also became activated, e.g. movements such as the balai citoyen (engl. Citizen's Broom) whose adherents were mostly youth and who wanted to witness change at the top of the country's politics. These civil society actors added to the determination to deter Compaoré from undertaking the planned constitutional revision.

The Trigger of the Revolution

Compaoré was decided on pushing through with the constitutional modification despite calls from national politicians and even international actors such as France to refrain from taking such an action. To enact the constitution change according to article 167, three-fourth of the members of Parliament is required or else; the project must be submitted to the citizenry through a referendum. On the morning of October 29, 2014, members of the parliament were gathered when protesters stormed the Parliament, chased out the MPs of the Parliament and set its building on fire and preceded to the president's residence, the Palais de Koscayam. The president responded by suspending the modification of the constitution and decreed a state of emergency. But the Rubicon was already crossed. The protesters demanded his resignation. On the October 30, Compaoré resigned and was helped out of the country to Yamoussokro, Côte d'Ivoire. It was the end of 27 years of power that some feel could have taken a different turn if Compaoré had not persisted on his deadly course of action.

Long live the Revolution, Now who is in power?

Compaoré's resignation created a power vacuum that many actors were eager to fill in the outmost silence of the Constitutional Court that missed an opportunity to provide guidance in such a case. Army Chief Colonel Nabéré Honoré Traoré announced that he will be heading the transition and suspended the national parliament. Colonel Isaac Zida from the president personal guard jumped in and proclaimed himself leader of the transition. Civil society movements however preferred the retired General Kwamé Lougué to lead the transition. Sensing the chaos, the African Union and international donors urged the stakeholders to reach an agreement and made clear that the transition should be led by a civilian otherwise Burkina Faso may face sanctions from the AU and its partners. On November 1, 2014, Colonel Isaac Zida was chosen to conduct the transition in the meantime while a committee was set to designate the president of the transition. In mid-November the committee appointed former foreign minister and long-time ambassador of Burkina Faso to the UN Michel Kafando, as the president of the transition. He nominated Lieutenant Colonel Zida who led the transition for less than three weeks as his new Prime Minister. As it currently stands, the highest task before the transition government is to organize the 2015 elections.

The (Present and Future) Perils of a Revolution

Burkinabe have achieved with the toppling of Blaise Compaoré a significant feat. No wonder they were rated ‘people of the year’ by some newspapers on the continent. Being the second revolution after that of Sankara in 1983, this was regarded as a sign of the country’s attachment to democratic principles and the political awaking of the youth. But as with many revolutions in history, we know that the hardest challenges lie long ahead than behind. Dealing with the legacy of Compaoré and setting avenues for justice without opening the way for unfair retaliation is one such example. Three months after the revolution, the greatest and immediate challenge the transition faces is the question of presidential guard. The population called for the dismantling of the regime which they consider to be associated with some of the political crimes that shook the recent history of the country such as the case of journalist Norbert Zongo. Lt. Zida made a move to reform the army by trying to re-appoint some of the members of the presidential guard of other military sectors. His move was met with resistance by the Regiment of Presidential Security (RSP) which called for the resignation of the Prime Minister. Thanks to multilateral negotiations that saw the involvement of the Moro Naaba, the traditional ruler of the Mosse and highly respected figure in Burkina, the Prime Minister was confirmed in his seat. The population nonetheless went on the street to ask for the dismantling of the RSP. A committee is set to reflect on the modalities to reform the army. Meanwhile, the transition has to create the climate for the economic growth of the country whose growth (of 5%) was affected by the events of October and November 2014. Cotton and gold prices have also fallen with Burkina being one of the biggest producers and exporters of these resources in West Africa.

The Revolution: A Case for Better Governance

Social scientists have always been interested in explaining why and how revolutions happen. They developed rational explanations for historical revolutions such as the 1789 French Revolution or the 1776–1783 American Revolution. Their explanations differ on the emphasis they put on different factors. Proponents of a deprivation theory approach emphasize the discrepancy between the resources available in a country and citizens’ perception of their welfare. If a citizen thinks that the state is in a position to offer more than it does, then this can lead to the outburst of a revolution. Deprivation theory is close to grievance theory which holds that uprising is due to grievance and bad governance. Applying these frameworks to the Burkina Faso revolution make sense since one keeps in mind that the majority of the population is under 25, unemployed, and illiterate. Nonetheless these theories have a weakness: deprivation, bad governance, poverty does not systematically lead to revolt. Another way to explain the Burkina Faso reclaim of power would be to frame it as a constitutional problem. The conflict erupted because people wanted to resist the planned modification of the constitution and not a priori the result of their socio-economic status. Though plausible, this explanation does not provide all the answers either. For instance, why did such a revolt not occur in 1998 and 2005

when the constitution was altered on both occasions? And could the president not have modified the constitution if three-fourth of the MPs agreed to the constitutional change?

To be fair all of these factors contributed in various proportions to producing a situation ripe for revolution. But the last stroke that often triggers a revolution remains unpredictable. Indeed what triggers a revolution could be a cumulative sequence of variables or a sudden set of events. In either circumstance, the point of return can never be determined. Until October 30, Burkinabe were urging Compaoré to refrain from modifying the constitution. He did not take notice. The discourse then radicalized and demanded his resignation.

Looking at the continental scale, one could surely affirm that in many Sub-Saharan countries bad governance has created conditions ripe for a revolution. But will this alone trigger change? This remains to be a question for reflection.

RWANDAN GENOCIDE: LEARNING THE HARD WAY AND MOVING AHEAD AGAINST ALL ODDS

Silas Udeamuka (PhD)



It is widely known as the country of thousand hills. But for a while it made headlines as a country of a thousand problems. It was heading down the road to serve as a good example of a “failed state”. Today, it is highly respected. It is not uncommon for people to refer to it as the country of a thousand solutions. Much has been written on the unspeakable atrocities committed during the 1994 Genocide. The build-up to the genocide started long ago during the colonial era with the well documented “divide and rule” strategy, by the two colonial powers namely Germany and Belgium. The regimes that took over did not do enough to redress the situation but rather, hate ideology, mistrust, dehumanization took roots; culminating into the 1994 Genocide. Far from being an account of atrocities committed – which have widely been reported on – this column is a humble reflection on how Rwanda, now 21 years after the dark days, has managed to become a role model for many other countries in different aspects. Sustained economic growth of +/- 7%, ICT giant of the region, one of the cleanest capital cities, acclaimed well-functioning nationwide community based health insurance scheme, world record proportion of women in parliament (64%) and other numerous home grown solutions are few examples of post-Genocide Rwanda achievements.

To some, the happenings in Rwanda are just miracles. However, are those miracles from nowhere? An easy and straight-forward response is that the achievements being registered in Rwanda are results of lessons learnt the hard way. When a country had to mourn more than 800,000 lives lost in just 100 days, when a country had to take care of numerous widows, orphans and man-made disabled people, when a country had to see its people fleeing in all four directions of the planet, when a country had to restart from nothing after widespread destructions, when ..., when ..., and when ...; those are hard learnt lessons, I mean. When one learns the hard way as afore-described, the lesson is imprinted somewhere in the mind. With a firm resolution to live and live well, Rwandans took seriously what others might take for granted.

In the following, I would like to reflect on few points that are connected to good governance in the hope of sharing Rwanda’s stories to inspire others. Let me start with a comment on unity, reconciliation and on accountability, concepts which are a significant part of good governance that AGGN aims to promote. In an attempt to give a practical example of Rwanda’s achievement, I will comment on the community health insurance scheme.

Unity and reconciliation: After the hard learnt lessons, Rwandans had to accept one another and resolve to live together as Rwandans. Divisive ideology received zero tolerance. This required a strong, possibly bitter but a necessary medicine of repentance, truth telling, asking and giving forgiveness. Thanks to these remedies, genocide perpetrators and survivors now cohabit. This is something that was unthinkable after the 1994 Genocide.

Accountability: At all different levels from the cell, sector, district, province and country level, accountability is seriously enforced. It is this accountability to the populace that earns Rwanda the attribute of the least corrupt country in the region. The accountability pressure that weighs on leaders at all levels is so high that some chose to resign while others decline offers. That is not very common in other places, especially in least developed countries. For the sake of accountability, performance contracts are signed at all levels throughout the country's governance structures. Underperformance is an assurance of dismissal.

Community health insurance scheme: Commonly referred to as "Mutuelle de Santé", the scheme started in 2004 with a policy document. The scheme was to be reinforced by the law which clearly stated that "every person who resides in Rwanda shall be obliged to join the mutual health insurance scheme". The yearly premium (currently at 3,000 Rwandan francs, equivalent of US\$ 4 per year) for those who cannot afford, is paid for by the government. They are transparently designated by their neighbours during community meetings. Such a system made it possible for the poorest and most vulnerable segments of the population to be fully integrated into the health insurance scheme. Average adhesion rate has been varying year by year around 85%. Other private health insurance schemes are also operating. As reported by Farmer et al. (2013)²⁸, the under-five mortality rate in Rwanda decreased by 70.4% between 2000 and 2011, falling below half of the regional average and approaching the global mean. Undeniably, the health insurance scheme in Rwanda greatly contributed to that progress.

Amidst all those achievements however and like in many other countries, reports here and there point to the growing inequalities between the rich and the poor, though data is scant. Such trend needs a strong policy remedy. As well, Rwanda is subject to criticisms about civil and politic freedom. Recently, asked about this by François Soudan of Jeune Afrique, the president of the Republic of Rwanda, Paul Kagame gave the answer that has always been and still is the subject of heated debate among AGGN fellows. He said,

"When Freedom House and other NGOs are said to evaluate the degree of freedom in Rwanda, they do it based on a restrictive and biased western definition of freedom. For us Rwandans, there is no freedom without the freedom of getting health care, education, shelter, food and electricity; there is no freedom without equality between men and women. We can therefore not understand each other"²⁹

While all is not yet rosy, Rwanda is on the right track in many aspects. Looking 21 years back at a country on the verge of a failed state, Rwanda's story makes an appeal. Can Rwanda's hard way learning experience serve other nations?

²⁸ Farmer PE, Nutt CT, Wagner CM, et al. (2013). "Reduced Premature Mortality in Rwanda: Lessons from Success" BMJ346(f65): 20-22.

²⁹ <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-04-01/187461>

ENGAGING AFRICAN DIASPORA IN DEVELOPMENT

Eric T. Njoya



There has been a whole range of government initiatives in recent years to try to harness the potential of the Diaspora for development. The Diaspora is one of the potential sources that can be used to establish the link between mobility and development. But it is also probably one of the most neglected and least discussed topics in many African countries. The number of countries worldwide whose governments have decided to create a separate, standalone ministry for their citizens living abroad is small. However, an increasing number of countries, including African countries, have dedicated a department, for example within the ministry of foreign affairs that looks after the Diaspora. Countries such as the Philippines have long been known for their efforts in engaging the Diaspora in development. In fact, the government of the Philippines recognized this potential as early as 30 years ago, creating in 1980 the Commission on Philipinos Overseas, mandating it to provide services to overseas Philipinos.

Between US\$350 to US\$400 billion is sent home per year by the Diaspora worldwide. Putting it into perspective, that is roughly the equivalent of the gross domestic product of Switzerland. If all the Diaspora are put together, that is 214,000,000 international migrants; they will make one of the top ten most populous countries in the world. The question that the policy makers face now is not so much whether the Diaspora can benefit their country but rather how they can harness the energy, the dynamism, the talents and financial flows of people overseas.

Every year, the Diaspora make a crucial contribution to the continent through remittances which are actually worth more than foreign direct investments and development aid of donors and governments. This money is being sent to relatives from the African Diaspora to help family and friends at home. Nigeria and Egypt are two African countries on the top ten recipients of remittances with the figures of 21 billion and 18 billion US\$, respectively. This financial resource can be leveraged for development in many different ways. For instance, some people argue that Gambia or Mali could not function without their Diaspora. In 2008, remittances in Gambia were estimated at US\$87 million, constituting 17.0% of gross domestic product. Is the Diaspora Africa's most underused human resource? How can African governments put in place a program to engage the Diaspora in the development of the continent?

Some African leaders have recognised the political, economic and social impact of people overseas. Most importantly, the African Union (AU) has recognised the importance of the

African Diaspora to the extent that in 2005 the AU created another region for the Diaspora. The Diaspora constitutes the 6th region of the AU. Moreover, the AU defines the African Continent as being divided into six geographical regions: 1. North Africa; 2. South Africa; 3. West Africa, 4. East Africa; 5. Central Africa, and 6. The Diaspora.

In 2005, the AU defined the Diaspora as "...peoples of African descent and the heritage living outside the continent, irrespective their citizenship, and who remain committed to contribute to the development of the continent and building of the African Union". The AU further emphasized that it would encourage and invite the full participation of the African Diaspora. Geographically, this large population, variously estimated to range from 150 to 350 million people, is to be found in: (a) The USA,(b) Canada, (c) The Caribbean, (d) Central and south America (including Brazil , Surinam and the Guyana's) and (e) Europe.

African Diaspora can make contributions to the political, social and economic development of the continent. The Diaspora can contribute in terms of the skills, talents and financial resources to the continent. It is often the issue that Africa does not have the capacity to implement development projects. Because of such misguided perceptions, the development business for many decades has been based on the notion of funding consultants from abroad to come and implement the projects. But the evidence says the contrary. There are a lot of talents in African countries and the Diaspora that need to be mobilised and worked with. There is need to move away from depending on foreign capacities, as is evident that development does not work unless there is ownership and certainly local solutions to local problems are very important. Governments should first look at what is available domestically and then secondly what is available among the Diaspora as it is known that the Diaspora also contains large number of very skilled people. How to get these skills to contribute to their home country is however the pressing question. One possibility is that governments should put in place a policy and program to attract the Diaspora to participate in developmental projects in their home country.

Unsurprisingly there is a clear link between good governance and migration. Governance is both push and pull factor for immigration or the circulation of Diaspora from countries with poor governance to those with good governance. On the other hand the Diaspora can impact on good governance in their home countries. In recent years, there have been an increasing number of initiatives taken by African Diaspora networks and organisations to participate in their home countries. Moreover, African Diaspora are increasingly mobilising themselves both individually and collectively to undertake a range of political activities such as overseas voting reform, dual citizenship rights, and democracy in their countries. As a result of such involvement, the Diaspora can directly or indirectly contribute to political development in their home countries. African governments are also increasingly using the Diaspora to gain support for political power through sending delegations to speak with the Diaspora or by using of the internet and other media outlets.

Institutions dedicated to Diaspora should work with governments to ensure that governments have in place the enabling environment that will encourage the Diaspora to return home or encourage them to invest and to think about their countries. Furthermore, governments and various institutions dealing with the Diaspora (including financial institutions) should think about ways and means to collaborate with the Diaspora so that they can invest their remittances for the development of the continent. That is where the bank with their partners and the international finance cooperation step in. Additionally, governments should find mechanisms to work with the Diaspora so that they can contribute in knowledge, in skills and in education for the development of their country.

However, contributing to one's home country does not necessarily mean going back to one's country. Some people cannot return for family or professional reasons. In a global economy, highly skilled people can be employed in any part of the world. So people go where the jobs and opportunities are. The Diaspora is trained to work in certain conditions and those conditions may not exist immediately at home. But overtime it does.

MIGRATION IN GERMANY: A BRIEF ANALYSIS³⁰

Karamba Diaby (PhD)³¹



*Guest
contribution*

The Glossary of Migration by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines “international migration” as a movement of persons who leave their country of origin, or the country of habitual residence, to establish themselves either permanently or temporarily in another country. According to the United Nations, a migrant is an individual who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate. Germany has known various periods of migration with diverse groups of migrants.

Over the centuries, difficult living conditions evoked by incessant wars, religious conflicts, famines, political grievances and lack of prospects forced many people to leave Germany. Germany was basically a country of emigration in the 19th century with an enormous part of the population leaving the country. An estimated six million emigrants left Germany between 1820 and 1920 – the majority immigrated to the USA. With the economic success based on the industrial era, the first larger number of Polish workers were imported to work in the mining sector. From that point on, the number of individuals immigrating to Germany surpassed the number of Germans who left.

During World War II, the next wave of foreign workers was counted in millions, as men from Nazi Germany's occupied territories were forced to work in the German heavy manufacturing sector. In the mid-1950s, after the ethnic cleansing of the Nazi-Regime, Germany has become one of the most important destination countries for immigrants. In this sense, it has been similar to other industrialized countries such as the USA, France and the UK. Germany's post-World War II immigration history is distinguished by the nature of its parallel flows: one of ethnic Germans returning from abroad, and another of foreigners with no German ancestry. This distinction has been enforced by immigration laws especially in terms of the privileges granted to ethnic Germans. It was not until 2000 that Germany officially acknowledged being an immigration country.

³⁰ The following sources have been consulted to develop this piece: “Immigration in Transition” by Veysel Oezcan; Migration Policy Institute, Germany; 2004 “Leading on Points - What Germany can learn from Canada’s immigration and integration policy” by Berlin Institute for Population and Development, Germany; 2012 “African Migration to Europe: Obscured Responsibilities and Common Misconceptions” by Dirk Kohner, GIGA Research Programme: Transformation in the Process of Globalisation; Germany 2007.

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Ethnic Germans returning from abroad- the so-called “Aussiedler”

Between 1945 and 1949, nearly 12 million German refugees and expellees returned to the territory of today's Germany. They were either German nationals who had lived in areas intermittently under German jurisdiction prior to 1945, or ethnic Germans from other parts of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. About two-thirds of these returnees settled in the western part of the country. Their ethnic origin and the post-war economic boom set the basis for their acceptance and integration by and into the German society.

Immigration of the resettlers from places beyond Eastern Europe rose dramatically at the end of the 1980s. Up to that point, virtually all “Aussiedler” had come from Eastern Europe, where they had managed to stay despite systematic expulsions in the aftermath of World War II. Between 1950 and 1987, about 1.4 million such resettlers immigrated to West Germany. Most of them came from Poland (848,000), while another 206,000 arrived from Romania, and 110,000 emigrated from the Soviet Union following the German-USSR rapprochement of the late 1970s and 1980s.

With the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of travel restrictions from the former Eastern Bloc countries, an additional three million ethnic Germans returned to Germany between 1988 and 2003. Almost 2.2 million of these arrived from the former territory of the Soviet Union, with Poland (575,000) and Romania (220,000) providing the remaining flows. As soon as the sense of a new era at the end of the Cold War had begun to fade, the government took measures to moderate the returns. Aid was granted for ethnic German communities in countries of origin in order to improve their living standards and entice them to remain there. Furthermore, the German government introduced a quota system. It is estimated that there are still 1.1 million remaining ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe and the territories of the former Soviet Union. In political and public debates about immigration and integration, however, the resettlers attract much less attention than other immigrants, as they are viewed primarily as Germans and not as foreigners. Statistics do not categorize “Aussiedler” separately- they are simply collapsed into native-born German categories.

Recruitment of migrant workers – the so-called “guest workers”

Immigration of foreigners with non-German ancestry highly increased in the second half of the 1950s when economic growth rates were up to 12.1% and the unemployment rate shrank from 11% in 1950 to less than 1% in 1961. In order to meet labour shortages, the federal government turned to a traditional model of recruiting and temporarily employing foreign workers. The first "Agreement on the Recruitment and Placement of Workers" was negotiated with Italy in 1955. Further contracts soon followed: Greece and Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). Far from perceiving itself as a country of immigration, it was assumed that these migrant workers would eventually leave Germany for their home countries. Based on that assumption, they did not think it was necessary to develop any socio-political or infrastructural concepts to account for longer term residence. The Turkish “guest workers”, as they were soon branded in the media and by politicians, were initially only issued a work permit for two years. A rotational system

was devised to replace the “old” workers with new ones and family members were explicitly forbidden from moving to Germany to join their relatives.

In the 1970s and 1980s the German constitutional court bolstered the rights of foreign workers; henceforth, their right to stay was no longer linked to their employment status. This was the beginning of the trend towards temporary immigrants staying permanently in Germany. When the oil crisis slowed down the German economy in 1973, the government stopped recruiting labor from abroad. At this point, four million foreigners were living in Germany.

African migration to Germany

Migration from Africa is a reflection of its socio-economic dynamics over time. Africa’s history of large population movements is driven by push factors such as slave-trade and colonialism, violent conflicts, poverty, ecological degradation and population pressure. In the past decades, the number of refugees from conflict regions in Africa increased dramatically. Between 1993 and 2002, the population of 27 out of 53 African states suffered from violent conflicts. Apart from push factors, the major part of current migration is due to external pull factors. Threatened by unemployment and lack of prospects in their home country, notably young people are eager to try their luck in Germany. In disregard of the risks, Africans struggle to reach Germany making their extended family contribute to their emigration (e.g. 800 to 1,200 € per person for the transit from the Senegal to the Canary Islands). The increase from 276,000 Africans living in Germany in 2011 to 360,000 in 2014 showcases Germany’s appeal.

Migrants and the labor market

Germany has been a country of immigrants for the past few decades. Since 1954, about 43 million people, Germans and foreigners have immigrated to Germany. During the same period about 32.2 million people have left the country. Nevertheless, migrants’ labor market situation has worsened over the past years, both in terms of levels and compared with the native-born. On average, the unemployment rate of the foreign-born has increased by 5% between 2008 and 2012, compared with 3% for the native-born. Long-term unemployment of migrants is becoming a serious challenge in Germany. In 2012, almost one out of two unemployed migrants had been looking for a job for over a year. Issues such as the non-recognition of higher education qualifications on the one hand and the lack of high education on the other hand, prevent Africans from being fully integrated to the German employment market. The participation in the labor market is crucial to social participation in a society. Being able to provide for oneself is the key to a successful immigration.

Migration is a complex field of action and not a one-way-track, where immigrants, natives, developed countries and developing countries could benefit from each other, if the preconditions are not met and immigrants are able to find an open-minded community free of prejudices and prejudgments.

INTERVIEW OF 2014 FELLOWS



Miria Frances Agunyo

What was/were your motivations to be a member of AGGN?

To learn from a group of multi-professional Africans with the aim of relevantly contributing to aspects of good governance in Uganda and Africa as a whole. I also want to be exposed to various opinions of governance that can be helpful for improvement in Africa. Thirdly, I am eager to network with various professionals within the group in order to disseminate professional expertise and experience in a way applicable to the African setting. When this is done through a bottom-up approach, it will empower citizens and contribute to informed decision-making and good governance.

In what way has AGGN contributed to your academic or professional development goals?

I now have a more informed approach to handling issues related to my profession as an environment and Energy engineer. AGGN exposed me to a holistic thinking approach whereby communal, political as well as social aspects are incorporated. The workshops I attended over the last year were eye-opening, exposing me to key challenges to implementation of suggested solutions on the African continent. Also, thanks to the training on how to deal with media and visits to various historical places in Germany, I was able to learn how to present myself publically.

What are your expectations for the next 2 years of fellowship with AGGN?

I am looking forward to involvement in workshops, trainings or seminars which would disseminate knowledge and good governance aspects to young people in my country. Also, I am hoping for more exposure of AGGN members to different political settings/groups in Germany and the possibility of developing links with interested parties in development cooperation in Africa. I want to contribute by representing AGGN in different fora and strengthen the network's influence in Germany and other places.



Dr. Jane Ayeko Kümmeth

What was/were your motivations to be a member of AGGN?

To meet other African scholars in order to network, share information, exchange ideas and map a way forward to improve matters of governance in Africa. Also, I also wanted to gain more practical knowledge through AGGN workshops.

In what way has AGGN contributed to your academic or professional development goals?

The training workshops are very insightful and always focus on pertinent issues. Through AGGN workshops, I have been able to meet other scholars within and outside my academic discipline who have been helpful to me and have given me tips here and there.

What are your expectations for the next 2 years of fellowship with AGGN?

To gain more knowledge through the training workshops, but also to impart the acquired knowledge to other people. Keep the fire of networking burning and to promote AGGN to other academicians as well as non-academic professionals



Isaac Adjei Safo

What was/were your motivations to be a member of AGGN?


Poor development in Africa is attributed largely to bad governance systems. Therefore incorporating the concept of Good Governance into building a generation of high caliber leaders is critical. AGGN provides the platform for Good Governance training and this motivated me to join the network.

In what way has AGGN contributed to your academic or professional development goals?

Through conferences organized by AGGN, I have gained more knowledge that helps broaden my perspectives on Good Governance.

What are your expectations for the next 2 years of fellowship with AGGN?

I look forward to see a more vibrant AGGN in stepping up with our contributions to African good governance system. I would like to see AGGN reaching out and liaising with local organizations in Africa to transfer knowledge in good governance.



Azza Mustafa Babikir Ahmed

What was/were your motivations to be a member of AGGN?

Since the time I was carrying on my Bachelor's degree at the Faculty of Economic and Social Studies, University of Khartoum, I developed a strong interest in promoting the culture of good governance. I had the opportunity to attend different events where issues of good governance in Sudan were discussed by prominent scientists and activists in the field. Moreover, in the course of my four years volunteering at the Development Studies and Research Institute, University of Khartoum, I was part of different trainings and research programs where good governance was the core concept of work. With my educational and professional background on the principles of good governance, I strongly believe that I will be a good addition to the network.

In what way has AGGN contributed to your academic or professional development goals?

I had and still have the opportunity to share my own experience with other outstanding colleagues, as well as learning from the rich experiences they have. It will help me to have a comprehensive understanding on good governance from varying thematic areas in different contexts on the continent. It will enable me apply the knowledge I am gaining in

my work as a university lecturer, or any future positions that I will take on. Finally I strongly recognize that through the atmosphere of aspiration provided by the AGGN, there will be a great chance to enhance opportunities for the advancement of the African continent in all the economic, political and social aspects of life, while ensuring a smooth democratic transition process built on a solid foundation of shared knowledge and experiences.

What are your expectations for the next 2 years of fellowship with AGGN?

My expectations involve keeping on meeting interesting scholars in the field of good governance and participating in all the training workshops allocated during this period. I am also interested in widely spreading our activities through different forms of collaboration with other institutions working in the same field and through our publications.



Marie Paule Coulibaly

What was/were your motivations to be a member of AGGN?

To get the opportunity to exchange knowledge and information with other fellows about governance issues in Africa and also share the experiences I got from my country and my academic background. Also, I want to reflect on some issues for social and human development and to be more engaged development field.

In what way has AGGN contributed to your academic or professional development goals?

I got more knowledge about governance and leadership in several African contexts. Particularly from the workshop on media I became more aware of the system of communication and the great role it plays on governance and political programme in several African countries.

What are your expectations for the next 2 years of fellowship with AGGN?

I would like to have a more active network and the implementation of more proactive projects on West Africa.



Serawit Bekele Debele

What was/were your motivations to be a member of AGGN?

Having conversations with friends who are already members of the network, I realized AGGN creates the platform for African intellectuals (German trained at least) to debate and discuss some of the most pressing issues the continent is grappling with. I thought I should join this network and learn from as well as contribute to the debates and discussions.

In what way has AGGN contributed to your academic or professional development goals?

In this regard, AGGN has contributed to my academic and professional development in different ways. To mention just a couple of examples, firstly, the workshops and meetings

organized by the network are very relevant in terms of capacity building. Secondly, the fact that there are opportunities of funding to enable members participate in conferences is another way through which the network channels its contribution to fellows' development.

What are your expectations for the next 2 years of fellowship with AGGN?

I hope that fellows will be more proactive in terms of translating their knowledge into practice in order to create positive impact on society. I hope intellectuals will become resources to make Africa a better place. I also hope the network will continue organizing workshops and conferences to debate and discuss ideas and to build the capacity of fellows.



Tefera Belay Endalamaw

What was/were your motivations to be a member of AGGN?

I wanted to have a contemporary knowledge and skill to improve education and natural resource governance issues in my country and Africa in general. And I hope to build an Africa-wide network in the same areas of interest.

In what way has AGGN contributed to your academic or professional development goals?

I have gained a good deal of knowledge on general governance issues and role of Media. I have got a rich network of Africans whom I have already used to improve my thesis work.

What are your expectations for the next 2 years of fellowship with AGGN?

I expect more learning experiences specifically on natural resource/environmental governance, sustainable development and the role and challenges of Africa in the context of globalization.



Dr. Gilbert Ndi Shang

What was/were your motivations to be a member of AGGN?

My main aim of joining AGGN was to form a synergy with other young African scholars in the Diaspora especially Germany in discussing and defending the principles and practices of good governance.

In what way has AGGN contributed to your academic or professional development goals?

To a great extent the activities that I have participated in within the framework of AGGN have been very enlightening with regard to the different dimensions and aspects of good governance. I am a socially committed academic and the AGGN has been a further motivation for me to defend causes of representation both at home and in the diaspora, even when it is not directly about Africa.

What are your expectations for the next 2 years of fellowship with AGGN?

I expect the AGGN to grow in number and ideals as more dynamic members join the network. I think that AGGN needs to spread its net wider and embrace for examples members/guest speakers from Lusophone Africa, richly endowed part of the continent that is facing chronic resource management crisis. I also hope that AGGN could organise joint seminars with similar organisations from other continents, so that we get to exchange ideas about what strategies of governance have worked/failed elsewhere from which we can mutually learn.

***Willis Okumu*****What was/were your motivations to be a member of AGGN?**

I joined AGGN because I believe it is a platform for us as young African professionals to contribute and debate ideas that can transform our continent in terms of governance, accountability and development.

In what way has AGGN contributed to your academic or professional development goals?

Through AGGN I have taken part in conferences that are directly linked to my current PhD research. For instance I was given 500 Euros through AGGN to present my paper at an International Governance conference in Kigali Rwanda in July 2014.

What are your expectations for the next 2 years of fellowship with AGGN?

In the next two years first I will be a senior fellow in AGGN so I expect to have the capacity to mentor other junior fellows into AGGN. Secondly, in the next two years, I expect that AGGN will have the necessary networks such as connections with DAAD Alumni in Africa and other African institutions so that fellows who return to Africa can contribute knowledge and ideas on different issues affecting the continent.

***Robert Omondi Owino*****What was/were your motivations to be a member of AGGN?**

The AGGN offers a platform to meet many African scholars and an extensive network of other global scholars to chart a different future for the African continent.

In what way has AGGN contributed to your academic or professional development goals?

Through AGGN I have access to a number of scholarly conferences and academic exchange that have both enriched me intellectually and broadened my outlook towards life in general.

What are your expectations for the next 2 years of fellowship with AGGN?

An intensive session of intellectual interaction and exchange in diverse themes with other AGGN fellows.

ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENTS

A. PHD DEFENCES IN 2014 AND EARLY 2015

NAME	FIELD	TOPIC	DATE OF DEFENCE	UNIVERSITY
Asebe Regassa	Anthropology	'Conflicts, Narratives of Entitlement and competing Views over Nech Sar National Park, Ethiopia'.	24 June 2014	University of Bayreuth.
Jane Ayeko-Kümmeth	Political Science	The Politics of Public Policy Decisions in Local Government in Uganda.	4 February 2015	University of Bayreuth
Gilbert Ndi Shang	Comparative Literature	State/Society: Narrating transformations in selected African novels.	30 April 2014	University of Bayreuth
George Mutalemwa	Development Studies	People's Organisations in Tanzania: Strengths, Challenges and Implications for Development.	30 March 2015	University of Vechta
Glory Lueong	Development Sociology	The Forest Space, Identity Crises and Cultural Conflicts in the South Region of Cameroon: The Case of the Baka Pygmies in the Face of Conservation Policies and Strategies.	2 December 2014	Justus-Liebig-University of Gießen
Silas Udeamuka	International Development Studies	A Big Push to Break Rural Household Poverty Trap? Millennium Villages Case Study with Emphasis on Agriculture'.	10 March 2014	Ruhr-University Bochum
Mohammed Shafiu	Public Health	Performance of the health insurance scheme in Nigeria: Assessment of the insured, health care providers and health management organizations in Kaduna State, Nigeria'.	5 June 2014	University of Heidelberg

B. AWARDS

Jimam T. Lar has been awarded the 2014 DAAD Prize for Outstanding Achievement of a Foreign Student.

Meron Zeleke has been granted a three-years postdoctoral fellowship with the Volkswagen foundation program of the humanities. She has also been awarded by the Addis Ababa University as a young female scientist in initiative called "honouring rare success".

PUBLICATIONS RELATED TO GOOD GOVERNANCE

- Assoua, Kocra Lossina. 2014. Evaluation Report of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in Ghana, Benin, Burkina Faso und Togo (BMZ-founding), Hanns-Seidel-Foundation.
- Ayeko-Kümmeth, Jane. 2014. "Districts creation and its impact on local government in Uganda". In: African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 8 (3) 81-91.
- Ayeko-Kümmeth, Jane. 2014. "Micro hegemony and political orders in Uganda". In: African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 9 (1) 27-35.
- Kagoro, Jude. 2015. Militarization in Post-1986 Uganda. Ankündigung Politics, Military and Society Interpretation. Berlin u.a.: LIT.
- Kelboro, Girma; Negash, Nesele. 2015. "Effects of Socio-Economic Status and Food Consumption Pattern on Household Energy uses: Implications for Forest Resource Degradation and Reforestation around Wondo Genet Catchments, South-Central Ethiopia". In: Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review 30 (1) 27-46.

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Richard Adu-Gyamfi



Central Africa:
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Remadji Hoinathy (PhD)

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