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Social Capital and Community Efficacy:

In Poor Localities of Addis Ababa Ethiopia
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Abstract

This study explores how social capital and human and economic variations in poor localities influence the capacity for community efficacy. Through a multivariate analysis using 497 households in poor localities of Addis Ababa, we investigate how social capital dimensions (density of membership, informal network, trust and reciprocity) and human and economic characteristics (education and welfare status) of the households are related to community efficacy. Community efficacy is highly associated with increased participation in local associations; trust in the community, confidence in local institutions and pattern of reciprocity among inhabitants. These findings provide qualified support for the systemic model of local social organization but challenge theory of social disorganization that predicts lower levels of social capital in poor communities engendering lower capacity of community efficacy.

Keywords

social capital; community efficacy; collective action; poor localities; urban poor
1. Introduction

Much of the recent research on community development focused on whether and how community benefits from social resources that are created through social networks, patterns of social interaction among inhabitants, and the form of social organization in the localities (Frankfort and Palen 1993; Parisi et al. 2002; Sampson 1988; Sampson, Morenoff and Earls 1999; Unger and Wandersman 1982). It is also assumed that the stronger the social organization, the higher the capacity for community efficacy would be (Parisi et al. 2002). Community efficacy defined as the ability of local population to come together and act collectively in pursuit of generalized mutual interest (Parisi et al. 2002; Perkins et al. 1990; Sampson, Morenoff and Earls 1999). In this view, community efficacy is an essential quality for community to be engaged in a feasible and sustainable community development (Folra & Flora, 1993; Shuman, 2000; Swanson, 2001; Wilkinson, 2000).

In the classic work of the Chicago School of Urban Sociology it was thought that density, low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity and residential instability led to ‘social disorganization’ resulting high rates of crime and disorder in a community (Savage, Warde and Ward 2003). The concept of social disorganisation came to be defined as the inability of a community to realise the common values of its residents and maintain effective social order (Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush 2001). This theoretical definition was formulated with a basic consideration that the poor community was viewed as suffering from a disrupted or weakened system of networks (Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush 2001). More recently, there is revitalization on the community-level research through increasing use of the concept of ‘social capital.’ Robert Putnam defines social capital as the networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993). Social capital is embedded on social participation in formalized relationships, informal networking, trust, reciprocity and integration in communities (Putnam et al. 1993).

Moreover, a wide range of literature has now highlighted the importance of ‘social capital’ in household’s cooperative strategies to deal with poverty and uncertainty even to subsist in cities of developing regions, particularly in Asia (Evers and Korff 1986, 2000), in Africa (Moser 1998) and in Ethiopia (Dejene 1993, 2001; Levine 1965; Shack 1973; Tirfe 1999). However, there has been little attention to see whether and how social capital in poor community influences the community efficacy. In this article we argue that social capital in poor localities is an important factor in increasing the capacity for community efficacy. The objective of this paper is to examine whether and how the social capital variables (network, trust, reciprocity) and human and economic variables explain the community efficacy. The example we are concerned in this paper is the collective action performed by inhabitants of poor localities in Addis Ababa in mobilizing the inhabitants to contribute the 10 percent matching fund for access road construction. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In second section that follows, we provide a theoretical basis for defining community efficacy. In the third section, we describe generally and operationalize the concept of social capital and the human and economic characteristics. The fourth section is about the method of analysis and the variables used in the analysis. The fifth section discusses the result of multivariate analysis followed by section six which summarize and concludes.
2. Community efficacy

The concept of neighborhoods ‘community efficacy’ captures the importance of the link between trust and cohesion on the one hand and shared expectations for the outcome on the other. It is a task-oriented construct that draws attention to shared expectations and mutual engagement by residents in local development (Parisi et al. 2002). The term community efficacy is, therefore, meant to signify an emphasis on shared beliefs in a neighborhood’s capability for action to achieve an intended effect, coupled with an active sense of engagement on the part of residents (Sampson, Raudenbush and Felton Earls 1997). Networks, trust and reciprocity, which are features of social life, enables the participants to act collectively to having a shared vision (Rudd 2000). Distinguishing between the resource potential represented by personal ties, on the one hand, and the shared expectations for action among neighbors represented by community efficacy, on the other, helps examine whether and how social capital influences community efficacy. The underlying assumption here is that social capital plays a great role in collective action and collective decision-making (Narayan 1995).

Community efficacy is influenced by the institutional structure, such as government policies, cultural religious values, social capital, ethnicity, and property rights structure, on which the community is embedded (Castile 1998; Grootaert 1999; Ostrom 1998; Rudd 2000). Therefore, increased frequency of interaction reduces free riding, promotes strong norms of reciprocity and social trust, amplifies the flow of information, and finally provides templates for development collaboration. Associations and institutions provide a framework for sharing information, co-coordinating activities, and making collective decisions and action. In this paper, in order to identify and capture the type of collective action aspect of community efficacy in the study areas, focus group discussion and site reconnaissance survey, were conducted. The focus group discussion and the in-depth interview conducted in the selected 16 poor Kebeles in Addis Ababa revealed the existence of collective action. People were mobilized to contribute 10 percent matching fund for the construction of access road in the neighbourhood, while non-community agents such as government or non-government organizations covered the remaining 90 percent of the fund.

3. Social capital

There has been some debate over the precise definition and measure of social capital (Woolcock and Nayaran 2000). Social capital can be defined as a variety of different entities, which consist of some aspect of social structure (Coleman 1988). Many writers on the concept of social capital used terms ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ to differentiate the type of social capital (Nayaran and Pritchett 1997; Putnam 2000; Woolcock and Nayaran 2000). Bonding social capital associates with strong ties in a closed social structure. Bridging social capital, on the other hand, refers to the aspect of social capital that emphasizes on tolerance of difference members as social actors. It is usually associated with the openness of social structures. The tendency of inhabitants engaging in more that one type of local associations could be regarded as an indicator for the existence of both bonding and bridging type of social capital, which is actually considered important for collective action to happen. For this paper, social capital, therefore, encapsulates both bonding and bridging social relations that help facilitate collective action.
Social capital, due to its embedment in the social relation between and among actors such as individuals, local associations and institutions (Bourdieu 1986; Flora et al. 1997; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Putnam 2000) can be accessed only through social connections. The extent to which actors can engage in collective action is dependent upon both the bonding and bridging type of connections. It also depends on the number of actors involved in the social relations (Bourdieu 1986) and the intensity of reciprocal exchange among actors (Coleman 1988; Coleman 1990). According to Coleman (1990), there are three components of social structure that can be taken by social capital: obligations and expectations, the flow of information, and norms accompanied by sanctions. Though a high level of trustworthiness in society certainly facilitates the emergence of each of these three components. Gronovetter (1985) in the same way emphasized the framework in which interface among actors takes place. He stresses the role of concrete personal relations and structures of such relations in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance. By and large, an essential aspect of community togetherness is a social capital, which includes mutual trust, reciprocity, shared norms and identity (Flora et al. 1997). In light of this background we operationalized and measured the concept of social capital at the household level in the following dimensions:

Density. Density of membership or to be engaged in membership of more than one association indicates bonding and bridging social capital. Having more participation in different local association should favour community efficacy due to the possible learning effect through information transmission and access to it as well as accumulation of social capital (Baland and Platteau. 1997; Pender 1999). In this research it is hypothesize that the more the household is participating in different local association the higher the likelihood to have the capacity for community efficacy.

Active participation. It has been argued that associations, which follow a democratic pattern of decisions making, are more effective than the others in implementing community oriented activities (Grootaert 1999). Local association is assumed to be the important factor to favour community efficacy in the community. A member of household that is considered to be active in local associations activities are very likely to develop and achieve generalized trust (Fukuyama 1995b; Putnam et al. 1993) and reciprocity, which reduces transaction-costs and coordinates collective action.

Informal network. The growing body of literature suggests that both formal and informal type of networks promote social capital (Burt 2000; Coleman 1988; Narayan 1999; Richard and Roberts 1998). Informal networks includes network established with friends and family in the community or neighbourhood-related friendships. In this research, informal network was considered as ordinary socializing, but it also provides personal support, a wide range of help and information, and offer channels for community efficacy. Informal network is hypothesizes to be important, through increasing access to information and trust, in creating a good atmosphere for the household to participate in community efficacy.

Trust variables. Trust is considered as a good lubricant in a given cooperation. It reduces the transaction costs between people, and so liberated resources. Instead of having to invest in monitoring the others, individual are able to trust them to act as expected. It can also create a social obligation; by trusting someone engenders reciprocal trust. There are basically three types of trust: the trust we have in individuals we know which is known as ‘particularized trust’ (Fukuyama 1995a); and the trust we have in those we don not know, but the trust arises because of our confidence in a known social structure, ‘generalized trust’ (Knack and Keffer 1995). And the third one is the type of trust that we have in the formal institutions, which is known as ‘confidence in institution’. All trust variables of the household have been taken in the analysis of community efficacy assuming that there will be a positive relationship and the higher the level of trust, the higher the community efficacy would be.
Reciprocity. Reciprocity and exchanges also increase trust. There are two types of reciprocity (Coleman 1990; Putnam et al. 1993): specific reciprocity which refers to simultaneous exchanges of items of roughly equal value; and diffuse reciprocity refers to a continuing relationship of exchange that at any given time may be unreturned, but overtime is repaid and balanced. Again, this contributes to the development of long-term obligations between people, which can be an important part of achieving positive environmental outcomes. Norms of reciprocity, which entails mutual aid, are dependent on social networks. Bonding networks that connect individuals who are members of a certain group or association sustain particularized reciprocity (Putnam et al. 1993). Bridging networks that connect individuals who are diverse sustain generalized reciprocity (Putnam et al. 1993). Therefore, it is hypothesized that a high level of reciprocity in a community would increase a community efficacy.

4. Human and economic characteristics

There is a direct relationship between community efficacy and human and economic characteristics of inhabitants in a community. A community with limited human resources (e.g. education) and economic resources (e.g. welfare status) is less likely to be engaged in locally oriented collective action towards a generalized interest (Parisi et al. 2002). In such conditions, at least theoretically, individuals of a local population are unable to realize the important of their common values with respect to the well being of the community as a whole (Sampson, Morenoff and Earls 1999). In this respect poor human and economic resources in a local population can translate into a diminished capacity for community efficacy.

Education. The hypothesis for the education variable is that the higher the number of illiterates in a community the lower the community efficacy would be. This assumption was based on previous result that found poor men and women, in urban areas are often deprived of information and knowledge (Schilderman 2002). Poor illiterate inhabitants, not knowing about their rights, services they could access, plans for their area, or what options there are for tackling certain problems, tend not to favour collective action in the community. Moreover, most of the illiterate people are engaged in subsistence activities, whereby they spend much of their time for it. In our study, most of the respondents in the in-depth interview, clearly explained that the majority of the poor were casual labour, artisan work, petty-food trading, selling of “Tela” and “Areki”(traditional home made alcoholic drink), and baking and selling of “Enjera”(traditional food). Hence, time is highly scarce and precious asset for the very poor, a factor, which could pull them back from participating in collective action resulting a low level of community efficacy.

Tenure status. The poor who are unable to gain access to legal shelter with formal title, tenure security and the risk of eviction are of great importance. Informal categories of housing, unauthorised land sub-divisions and houses built or expanded without permits are found across the study areas. Even on a single plot many forms of tenure exist. For example, tenants let out rooms to sub-tenants to many people to spend the night, which is considered by the Kebele officials as an illegal conduct. Therefore, it is hypothesised that inhabitants in the community with tenure status other than owner are very unlikely to favour collective action for mutual benefit of the community.

Poverty. The urban poor are not a homogeneous group: social exclusion affects some people, particularly the very poor, women, leading to inadequate access to information. Hence it is hypothesizes that the household with poor welfare category would not favour collective action.
Summary

The forgoing discussion provides the basis for our conceptual framework. There are two dimensions of social capital that can be linked to community efficacy. First, actors of community must be self-motivated, and second, they must engage in reciprocal exchange and networked formally and informally. Consequently, we expect that higher level of membership in local associations, reciprocal exchange and trust in the community and confidence in governmental institutions will increase capacity for community efficacy. Similarly we hypothesis also that communities endowed with higher levels of human and economic resources will have higher level of community efficacy.

5. Methodology

Data Source and Study Area

Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia and the study area, accommodates about 2.8 million inhabitants currently (UN, 2001), in its six ‘zones’ and 28 ‘Weredas’ (CSA, 1999). The total area of the city is 540 square kms; out of which 18174 square kms is the fringes inhabited by peasants (AAMPRPO 1999). Addis Ababa is divided into 305 urban Kebeles and 23 rural farmers associations (AAMPRPO 1999:2). The city administration is structured hierarchically from top-down: ‘city council’- ‘Zone’- ‘Wereda’- ‘Kebele’ respectively. A ‘Kebele’ is the smallest administrative units, while ‘Wereda’ and ‘Zone’ administrations play an intermediary role in the hierarchy.

The data set for this paper came from the household survey conducted in 16 ‘Kebeles’, selected randomly from 8 ‘Weredas’, which are, according to the city planning unit and World Bank, classified as very poor part of Addis Ababa based on infrastructure and housing conditions. Data was collected from a total of 497 sampled households using stratified random selection techniques from the 16 Kebeles. The survey was targeted to capture information on household. Head of the household were asked information on socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the household; characteristics of the most important local associations or groups; perception of generalized and particularized trust; reciprocity, collaboration and participation in collective action. In addition, at the community level in-depth interviews and focus group discussion with leaders of community and local association (Ider, Mehaber etc.) and other key informants were held to get a detail perspective on the function of the local association.

6. Analytical Framework

The analysis of community efficacy was done using logistic regression model:

\[ C_i = f(SC_i, D_i, H_i, SE_i, \ldots) \]  

(1)

Where \( C_i \) = collective action (if the household has been participated in a collective action for the last ten year); \( SC_i \) = social capital dimensions; \( D_i \) = demographic characteristics of the head of the household, such as sex and age; \( H_i \) = household characteristics such as tenure
status; SEi= Socio-economic characteristics such as level of education of head of the household and the wealth status of the household.

The dependent variable is collective action, which is participation of the households in “collective action” for mutual community benefit as a proxy for community efficacy. In the household survey respondents were asked if they participated in collective action for infrastructure development within the locality in the last ten year. Accordingly, the dependent variable is dichotomous, which takes 1 if the $i^{th}$ household had participated in collective action and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables are social capital dimensions and other socio-economic variables of the household, which are categorical and scale in nature. It is generally assumed that participation of the household, within the community, in collective action is subject to various limitations and opportunities. Based on this assumption, the following explanatory variables are considered in the analysis.

Social capital measures. Following (Guest and Lee 1983; Putman 1995; Putnam 2000; Stone 1989) seven conditions were used to operationalise social capital at the household level: (1) Density of membership, i.e. number of association per household; (2) Active participation of members in the association where they are members; (3) Informal network as different activities which generates networking with others without being member of association; (4) Generalized trust in the community(Fukuyama 1995a); (5) Particularized trust - trust in very close neighbours or friends; (6) Confidence in institutions, local governmental institutions; (7) Confidence in NGOs.

Socio-economic variables. For socio-economic aspects, six variables have been considered.

(1) Education: It is measured as a dummy variable where 1 is given for literate household heads and 0 otherwise,

(2) Housing tenure status: 1 if the household owns the house where it is living in and 0 otherwise,

(3) Gender: 1 if the household head is male and 0 otherwise,

(4) Poverty status: it is calculated using wealth index and classifying the household in three category- ‘poor’, ‘moderate’, and ‘better off’. The index calculation included data on twenty-three asset indicators that can be grouped into three types: household ownership of consumer durables with 12 questions (Iron, Clock, Sofa, Radio, TV, Sewing Machine, Refrigerator, Electrical mitad, Tape player, Bicycle, Car, Telephone); characteristics of the household’s dwelling with 11 indicators (three about toilet facilities, three about the source of drinking water, one about rooms in the dwelling, two about the dwelling materials used, one about the main source of light and one about main sources of cooking). Using principal component analysis for the whole twenty-three variables we construct and index (the scoring factors are attached in appendix B).
Table 1. Household’s descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective action</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social capital dimensions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density of Membership</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Participation</td>
<td>23.59</td>
<td>21.27</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>53.87</td>
<td>26.23</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal network</td>
<td>34.16</td>
<td>14.15</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>66.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized trust</td>
<td>62.37</td>
<td>33.55</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>75.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularized trust</td>
<td>67.37</td>
<td>13.26</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in local Institutions</td>
<td>33.41</td>
<td>25.63</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing tenure</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better off</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-educated</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary +</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\log\left(\frac{P_i}{1-P_i}\right) = \beta_o + \beta_i X_i
\]  

\(P_i\) = Estimated expected probability of experiencing collective action towards infrastructure development in the locality;  
\(1-P_i\) = Estimated probability of not experiencing collective action;  
\(\beta_o\) = Estimated vector of log-odds of the probability of experiencing collective action when the vector \(\beta_i\) equals 0  
\(\beta_i\) = Estimated vector of the log-odds of the probability of experiencing collective action for each unit change in the corresponding vector of independent variables;  
\(X_i\) = A vector of explanatory variables
Here, the log-odds \([\ln(\Pi/1-\Pi)]\) of the probability of experiencing collective action efficacy is a linear additive function of the vector of the independent variables. However, because log-odds (logit) make little intuitive sense, this model can be transformed into the following multiplicative probability model:

\[
\frac{P_i}{1 - P_i} = e^{\beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i}
\]  

(3)

This exponential relationship implies that, for every unit increase in the independent variable, there is a multiplicative effect on the odds of the experience community efficacy.

7. Analysis of the result

Equation (2) is estimated to empirically examine the impact of social capital and other human and economic factors on collective action. The result from the model indicates a positive and highly significant relationship between the active participation variable and collective action. Households who are active participant in their local associations are more likely to participate in collective action. This could be due to the “social” nature of “social capital” (Grootaert 1999). Networks and interactions engaged in as part of social and other objectives perceived from higher participation in the activities, which benefit the community at large.

Confidence in governmental and non-governmental organization was not found to be statistically significant in the logistic regression. With respect to the confidence in governmental organization, in the qualitative survey, people were asked about the level of satisfaction on the public service provision by the governmental organization. It has been found that no respondent was completely satisfied with any service. Levels of dissatisfaction varied between services and communities. The service with which most people claimed to have problems was on those services, which supposed to be provided by the municipality. Almost all the focus group discussant and interviewees in the in-depth interview expressed their depth of dissatisfaction towards these formal local institutions. The discontent emanated in part due to levels of corruption and lack of capacity, which were considered highest in most of the cases. Of course, corruption and injustices could be one of the possible reasons for low level of confidence in the governmental institutions.

The other noteworthy observation from collective action regression results is that households with better Informal network, reciprocity, and generalized trust are more likely to participate in collective action. This result is plausible under the assumption that people are willing to participate in collective action if they believe that others will\(^1\). Moreover, these variables are indicators of a strong social tie in the community. And social ties may be considered as sign of “subjective interest” in the community (Oliver and Marwell 1988; Oliver 1984), as factors affecting the availability of solidarity incentives for participation in collative action, or as factors reducing transaction cost.

Table 2 Logistic result on determinants of collective action

\(^1\) For further explanation in the interaction between beliefs about others’ willingness to contribute to collective action and character of collective good see the work of Oliver et al. (1988)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Collective action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>19.810*** 5.216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Capital Dimensions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density of membership</td>
<td>1.953*** 0.557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active participation</td>
<td>0.056*** 0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>0.089*** 0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal notebook</td>
<td>0.182*** 0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalize trust</td>
<td>0.057*** 0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularized trust</td>
<td>-0.086*** 0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in local Institutions</td>
<td>0.012 0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-economic variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing tenure</td>
<td>-1.222 * 0.762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Poor)</td>
<td>1.289 1.596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Male)</td>
<td>0.622 0.720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-educated</td>
<td>0.183 0.898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>0.147 0.840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observation</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>71.879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>520.916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant level</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Significant at less than 1 percent level
**  Significant at less than 5 percent level
*   Significant at less that 10 percent

The education variable took the unexpected positive sign. Though the coefficients are statistically insignificant the results showed that educated people are less likely to participate compared to illiterate ones. Despite its insignificance the welfare variable shows negative relationship with collective action. The poor are less likely to participate in collective action compared to the better off. Poor people are more concerned for survival; they spent much of their time and energy for a hand-to-mouth livelihood, which engenders failure to participate in collective action. Even the cost of participation would be expensive.

Needless to say, if communities are characterized by serious power imbalances, it could impinge severe constraints on community efficacy. Especially, if the poor were heavily dependent on vertical links with local elites, it would be problematic to use the horizontal associations necessary for organizing collective action for the collective good or mutual benefit. However, in the case of Ethiopia where land is public property and where the poor people’s dependence on local elites is very low, danger of ‘local capture’ (Das Gupta, Grandvoinnet and Romani 2003) considered to be minimal.

Tenure is also found to be significant in explaining collective action at 5 percent level of significance. However, it has a negative sign, which signifies an inverse relationship, showing
more likelihood for renter to participate in collective action compared to the homeowner. However, it is not appropriate to deduce that inhabitants with insecure tenure right have more incentive for collective action. It is expected that homeowners anticipate living in their residence for a long time and will thus look forward to an extended future stream of benefits from any improved service and would act collectively for that. In the current situation the housing provision in Ethiopia is rigid, regulated and government owned most of the rental housing units, whereby the majority of renters expect to see the same long-term benefits and therefore have the same incentives as owners to act collectively for the betterment of their environment. Both renters and homeowners tend to have lived in the community for a longer time.

8. Summary and conclusion

The main objective of this study was to address the basic question that is ‘whether and how can social capital determine the community efficacy in poor urban localities?’ Answering this question can help to understand how to use the existing stock of social capital for community improvement projects. We used household survey and qualitative research, in selected poor neighbourhoods in Addis Ababa to analyse the level of social capital at the household level and its impact on collective action. The multivariate analysis indicated that the extent to which a household can engage in locally oriented collective action rest on the level of social capita and other human and economic variables.

Our findings offer several important new insights into prevailing theories of social organization. First, contrary to the image of poor localities as socially isolated places where residents withdraw from community life out of fear or apathy, our results indicate that residents of poor localities respond to adverse ecological conditions through actions intended to alleviate community problems and getting involved in collective action. Moreover, residents of poor localities also tend to have strong personal networks connecting them to friends and neighbors in their localities. Second, the findings suggest that high level of social capital appear to function as signals of community capacity that motivate residents to become engaged in collective actions. We note, however, that these inferences are based on cross-sectional data, and that further research is needed on the connection between poor localities contexts and community efficacy, preferably using longitudinal data that can link individuals' perceptions of localities conditions to their subsequent participation in community activities.

In conclusion, our results have significant implications for those interested in harnessing the power of communities to address localities problems. We believe that the approach outlined in this paper provides a conceptual and empirical platform to address the issue of collective action in poor urban localities. The contribution of this approach is that it can be provided a useful tool to examine collective action in poor urban localities and assist community researchers, practitioners and policy makers in establishing variations in capacity of the community for community development purpose.
References


Oliver, Pamela. 1984. "If you don't do it, nobody else will: active and token contributors to local collective action." American Sociological Review 49:601-610.


Appendix A: Scale items and robustness

We evaluated the scales (set out below) using a ‘scale reliability analysis’ test, which determines whether we can consider the responses to each question to follow a similar pattern, tapping into one underlying concept or ‘latent’ variable (DeVellis 1991:9). Once the scales were formed, we converted each into true values between –1 and 1 for consistency. We formed the associational membership scale by a simple addition of the number of associations to which each respondent belonged. If a sufficient value of the test statistic, Cronbach’s alpha, is obtained then we can add the values of the questions together to form a single scale. We can then treat this scale as a real number series and perform more complex statistical procedures in order to test the degree to which the variables predict collective action. Low alpha values indicate that responses to the questions are too diverse and would not form a consistent scale. The alpha values we obtained, between 0.76 and 0.90, are all in the optimum range (DeVellis 1991: 85).

Density of membership

Are you a member of any of the following:

- Church or Religious group
- Social support group (Ider)
- Sporting club
- Ethnic based association
- Group dedicated to some cause (e.g. Community development)
- Kebele association
- Finance, credit, saving group (Eqube)
- Political Party
- Professional associations
- Other association (Please specify)

No. of membership added together.

Active participation

To what extend do you participate in the activities of the first, second and third very important association for your life?

- Active participation of members in their first very important association
- Active participation of members in their second very important association
- Active participation of members in their third very important association

Scale 1 ‘note very active’ 2 ‘somewhat active’ 3 ‘very active’. Standardised item alpha = 0.82
Informal networks

- Visit neighbours frequently?
- Spend time together with other people out of home for shopping, drinking or recreation?
- Asking neighbours for help in case of sickness?
- Helping neighbours, when sick, to take to hospital or clinic?

Scale from 1 ‘Yes’ and 2 ‘No’. Standardized item alpha = 0.81

Generalized trust

- Generally speaking, would you say most people living in this neighbourhood could be trusted?
- Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance or would they try to be fair?

Scale from 1 ‘Yes’ and 2 ‘No’. Standardized item alpha = 0.81

Particularized trust

Do you know your neighbours well enough to:
- Have a child minded in an emergency?
- Have children minded regularly?
- Borrow money or anything if needed
- Have a talk with you if you’re feeling down?
- Keep an eye on your home for you if you go away?

Standardized item alpha = 0.90


**Reciprocity**

- Invite neighbours during religious and social fests or any happy occasions?
- Do share or borrow household utensils from their neighbours?
- Do attend funeral service in the neighbourhood even if they are not member of the Ider?
- Bring drink/food after funeral to the mourning family?

Standardized item alpha = 0.81

**Confidence in Institutions**

How much confidence do you have in:
- Local government?
- Judge/court/ police?
- Public services?
- NGOs?

Scale from 1 ‘very great deal’ to 5 ‘None’. Standardised item alpha = 0.76
## Appendix B

Table Scoring factors summary statistics for variables entering the computation of first principal component in Addis Ababa, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Scoring factors</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Scoring factor</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Better off</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own iron</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>1.685</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>41.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own clock/watch</td>
<td>0.558</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>1.173</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>34.70</td>
<td>66.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own sofa</td>
<td>0.770</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>1.558</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>31.70</td>
<td>92.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own radio</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>0.731</td>
<td>53.30</td>
<td>78.40</td>
<td>87.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own TV</td>
<td>0.737</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>1.540</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>23.40</td>
<td>81.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own sewing machine</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>1.210</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>7.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own refrigerator</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>1.938</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>38.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own tape player</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>0.950</td>
<td>33.90</td>
<td>73.70</td>
<td>87.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own electric meter</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>1.495</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>21.60</td>
<td>74.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own bicycle</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>2.418</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own car</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>1.921</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>14.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own telephone</td>
<td>0.695</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>1.516</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>16.80</td>
<td>72.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking water from own tape</td>
<td>0.686</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>1.391</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>41.30</td>
<td>82.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking water from shared tape</td>
<td>-0.638</td>
<td>0.521</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>-1.275</td>
<td>90.30</td>
<td>51.50</td>
<td>14.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other sources</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.595</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>12.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flush toilet</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.448</td>
<td>59.40</td>
<td>73.70</td>
<td>82.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pit latrine</td>
<td>-0.344</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>-0.863</td>
<td>33.90</td>
<td>20.40</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No toilet</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main source of lighting electric</td>
<td>0.639</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of rooms in dwelling</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
<td>97.00</td>
<td>95.20</td>
<td>95.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main cooking fuel is biomass: wood/coal/sawdust</td>
<td>-0.527</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>-1.076</td>
<td>75.80</td>
<td>33.50</td>
<td>10.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floor of the house mud</td>
<td>-0.379</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>-1.101</td>
<td>30.90</td>
<td>9.60</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Each variable besides number of rooms takes the value 1 if true, 0 otherwise. Scoring factor is the “weight” assigned to each variable (normalized by its mean and standard deviations) in the linear combination of the variables that constitute the first principle component. The proportion of the covariance explained by the first principle component is 25 percent. The value of the first eigen value is 5.87 and that of the second eigen value is 2.00. Source: calculation from the survey result.